BX1749.T56 S8513 1923
v.3 Pt.1
Thomas, Aquinas, Saint,
1225?-1274.
The Summa contra gentiles of
Saint Thomas Aquinas



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/summacontragenti0000lond

THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

OF

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

THE THIRD BOOK

(PART I—CHAPTERS I-LXXXIII)

LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY

THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN FATHERS FROM THE LATEST LEONINE EDITION

LONDON

BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE LTD.

PUBLISHERS TO THE HOLY SEE

ARCHBISHOP ALEMANY LIBRARY
DOMINICAN COLLEGE
SAN RAFAEL

OCT 2 1928 230
T36AC 3:1
17616

NIHIL OBSTAT:

F. GABRIEL COYLE, O.P., S.T.L.

F. HILARY CARPENTER, O.P., S.T.L.

IMPRIMATUR:

F. BEDE JARRETT, O.P., S.T.L.,

Prior Provincial.

May 10, 1928.

NIHIL OBSTAT:

THOMAS MCLAUGHLIN, S.T.D.,

Censor deputatus.

IMPRIMATUR:

EDM. CAN. SURMONT,

Vicarius generalis.

WESTMONASTERII,

Die 4ª Junii, 1928.

Made and Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	FOREWORD	1
II.	THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN END	3
III.	THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR A GOOD	7
IV.	THAT EVIL IS UNINTENTIONAL IN THINGS	9
V. AND VI.	ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT EVIL IS NOT BESIDE THE INTENTION	11
VII.	THAT EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE	15
VIII. AND IX.	ARGUMENTS WHEREBY SEEMINGLY IT IS PROVED THAT EVIL IS A NATURE OR A THING	17
X.	THAT THE CAUSE OF EVIL IS A GOOD	21
XI.	THAT THE SUBJECT OF EVIL IS A GOOD	26
XII.	THAT EVIL DOES NOT ENTIRELY DESTROY GOOD	27
XIII.	THAT EVIL HAS A CAUSE OF SOME KIND	29
XIV.	THAT EVIL IS AN ACCIDENTAL CAUSE	30
XV.	THAT THERE IS NO SOVEREIGN EVIL	31
XVI.	THAT THE END OF EVERYTHING IS A GOOD	32
XVII.	THAT ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTED TO ONE END, WHICH IS GOD	33
XVIII.	HOW GOD IS THE END OF THINGS	36
XIX.	THAT ALL THINGS TEND TO BE LIKE UNTO GOD	37
XX.	HOW THINGS IMITATE THE DIVINE GOODNESS	38
XXI.	THAT THINGS HAVE A NATURAL TENDENCY TO BE LIKE GOD FORASMUCH AS HE IS A CAUSE	42
XXII.	HOW THINGS ARE DIRECTED IN VARIOUS WAYS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ENDS	43
XXIII.	THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVEN IS FROM AN INTELLECTIVE PRINCIPLE	47
XXIV.	HOW EVEN THINGS DEVOID OF KNOWLEDGE SEEK THE GOOD	53
XXV.	THAT TO KNOW GOD IS THE END OF EVERY INTELLIGENT SUBSTANCE	56
XXVI.	DOES HAPPINESS CONSIST IN AN ACT OF THE WILL ?	61

CHAPTER PAGE

XXVII. THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN CARNAL PLEASURES - - - - - 67

XXVIII. THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN HONOURS - 69

XXIX. THAT MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS NOT IN GLORY - 70

XXX. THAT MAN'S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN WEALTH 72

XXXI. THAT HAPPINESS CONSISTS NOT IN WORLDLY POWER - 73

XXXII. THAT HAPPINESS CONSISTS NOT IN GOODS OF THE BODY 74

XXXIII. THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS IS NOT SEATED IN THE SENSES 74

XXXIV. THAT MAN'S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN ACTS OF MORAL VIRTUE - - - 75

XXXV. THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE ACT OF PRUDENCE - - - - 76

XXXVI. THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE PRACTICE OF ART - - - - - - 77

XXXVII. THAT MAN'S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN CONTEMPLATING GOD - - - - 78

XXXVIII. THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD WHICH IS POSSESSED GENERALLY BY THE MAJORITY - - - 79

XXXIX. THAT MAN'S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD ACQUIRED BY DEMONSTRATION - - - - - - 81

XL. THAT MAN'S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BY FAITH - - - 84

XLI. IS IT POSSIBLE FOR MAN, IN THIS LIFE, TO UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES BY THE STUDY AND INQUIRY OF SPECULATIVE SCIENCES? - - 86

XLII. THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO KNOW SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IN THE MANNER PROPOSED BY ALEXANDER - - - - - 90

XLIII. THAT WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IN THIS LIFE, IN THE MANNER SUGGESTED BY AVERROES - - - - - 95

XLIV. THAT MAN'S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES AS PRETENDED BY THE AFORESAID OPINIONS - 100

XLV. THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS LIFE TO UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES - - - - 102

XLVI. THAT IN THIS LIFE THE SOUL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ITSELF BY ITSELF - - - - 105

XLVII. THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE - - - - - - 108

CHAPTER PAGE

XLVIII. THAT MAN'S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS IS NOT IN THIS LIFE - 111

XLIX. THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE THROUGH KNOWING HIM BY THEIR OWN ESSENCES - - - - - - 116

L. THAT THE NATURAL DESIRE OF THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IS NOT SET AT REST IN THE NATURAL KNOWLEDGE THEY HAVE OF GOD - - - 119

LI. HOW GOD MAY BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE - - 122

LII. THAT NO CREATED SUBSTANCE CAN BY ITS NATURAL POWER ARRIVE AT SEEING GOD IN HIS ESSENCE 124

LIII. THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS A RAY OF THE DIVINE LIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE 126

LIV. ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT GOD CANNOT BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE; AND THE SOLUTION THEREOF - - - - - 128

LV. THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT DOES NOT COMPREHEND THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE - - - - 131

LVI. THAT NO CREATED INTELLECT, IN SEEING GOD, SEES ALL THAT CAN BE SEEN IN HIM - - - 133

LVII. THAT EVERY INTELLECT OF ANY DEGREE CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE DIVINE VISION - - - 135

LVIII. THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE TO SEE GOD MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER - - - 137

LIX. HOW THOSE WHO SEE THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE SEE ALL THINGS - - - - - - 138

LX. THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD SEE ALL IN HIM AT ONCE - 142

LXI. THAT BY SEEING GOD A MAN IS MADE A PARTAKER OF ETERNAL LIFE - - - - - 143

LXII. THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD WILL SEE HIM FOR EVER - 144

LXIII. HOW IN THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS MAN'S EVERY DESIRE IS FULFILLED - - - - - 148

LXIV. THAT GOD GOVERNS THINGS BY HIS PROVIDENCE - 151

LXV. THAT GOD PRESERVES THINGS IN EXISTENCE - - 155

LXVI. THAT NOTHING GIVES EXISTENCE EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS IT ACTS BY GOD'S POWER - - - - 158

LXVII. THAT IN ALL THINGS THAT OPERATE GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THEIR OPERATING - - - - 160

LXVIII. THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE - - - - 162

LXIX. CONCERNING THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO WITHDRAW FROM NATURAL THINGS THEIR PROPER ACTIONS - 165

CHAPTER		PAGE
LXX.	HOW THE SAME EFFECT IS FROM GOD AND FROM THE NATURAL AGENT	173
LXXI.	THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE EVIL FROM THINGS	174
LXXII.	THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CONTINGENCY FROM THINGS	178
LXXIII.	THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE FREE WILL	181
LXXIV.	THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CHANCE OR LUCK	183
LXXV.	THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CONCERNED WITH SINGULAR CONTINGENCIES	185
LXXVI.	THAT GOD'S PROVIDENCE CARES FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS IMMEDIATELY	189
LXXVII.	THAT THE EXECUTION OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CARRIED OUT BY SECONDARY CAUSES	193
LXXVIII.	THAT BY MEANS OF INTELLECTUAL CREATURES OTHER CREATURES ARE RULED BY GOD	195
LXXIX.	THAT THE LOWER INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE RULED BY THE HIGHER	197
LXXX.	OF THE ORDER BETWEEN ONE ANGEL AND ANOTHER	198
LXXXI.	OF THE ORDERING OF MEN AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO OTHER THINGS	205
LXXXII.	THAT THE INFERIOR BODIES ARE RULED BY GOD BY MEANS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES	207
LXXXIII.	CONCLUSION OF THE FOREGOING	210

THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

THIRD BOOK

CHAPTER I

FOREWORD

The Lord is a great God and a great King above all gods. For the Lord will not reject His people. For in His hands are all the ends of the earth and the heights of the mountains are His. For the sea is His and He made it, and His hands formed the dry land (Ps. xciv. 3 *seqq.*)[1]

We have shown in the preceding books that there is one First Being, possessing the full perfection of all being, whom we call God, and who of the abundance of His perfection, bestows being on all that exists, so that He is proved to be not only the first of beings, but also the beginning of all. Moreover He bestows being on others, not through natural necessity, but according to the decree of His will, as we have shown above.[2] Hence it follows that He is the Lord of the things made by Him: since we dominate over those things that are subject to our will. And this is a perfect dominion that He exercises over things made by Him, forasmuch as in their making He needs neither the help of an extrinsic agent, nor matter as the foundation of His work: since He is the universal efficient cause of all being.

Now everything that is produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by that agent: because the good and the end are the proper object of the will, wherefore whatever proceeds from a will must needs be directed to an end. And each thing attains its end by its own action, which action needs to be directed by him who endowed things with the principles whereby they act.

[1] Version of the "Roman Psalter."

[2] Bk. II., ch. xxiii.

Consequently God, who in Himself is perfect in every way, and by His power endows all things with being, must needs be the Ruler of all, Himself ruled by none: nor is any thing to be excepted from His ruling, as neither is there any thing that does not owe its being to Him. Therefore as He is perfect in being and causing, so is He perfect in ruling.

The effect of this ruling is seen to differ in different things, according to the difference of natures. For some things are so produced by God that, being intelligent, they bear a resemblance to Him and reflect His image: wherefore not only are they directed, but they direct themselves to their appointed end by their own actions. And if in thus directing themselves they be subject to the divine ruling, they are admitted by that divine ruling to the attainment of their last end; but are excluded therefrom if they direct themselves otherwise.

Others there are, bereft of intelligence, which do not direct themselves to their end, but are directed by another. Of these some being incorruptible, even as they are not patient of defect in their natural being, so neither do they wander, in their own action, from the direction to their appointed end, but are subject, without fail, to the ruling of the supreme ruler; such are the heavenly bodies, whose movements are invariable. Others, however, being corruptible, are patient of defects in their natural being; yet this defect is supplied to the advantage of another: since when one thing is corrupted, another is generated. Likewise, they fail from their natural direction in their own actions, yet this failing is compensated by some resultant good. Whence it is clear that not even those things which are seen to wander from the direction of the supreme ruling, escape from the power of the supreme ruler: because also these corruptible bodies, even as they are created by God, so too are they perfectly subject to Him. Wherefore, considering this, the Psalmist, filled with the divine spirit, in order to give us an illustration of the divine government, first describes to us the perfection of the supreme governor,—as to His nature when he says, *God*: as to His power, when he says, *a great Lord*, implying

that He needs no one for His power to produce its effect: as to His authority, when he says, *A great king above all gods*, since, although there be many rulers, yet are all subject to His rule. Secondly, he describes to us the manner of this government. As regards intellectual beings, which, if they submit to His rule, receive from Him their last end which is Himself; wherefore he says, *For the Lord will not reject His people.* As regards things corruptible which, albeit at times they wander from their proper mode of action, never escape the power of the supreme ruler, he says, *Because in His hands are all the ends of the earth.* And as regards the heavenly bodies, which transcend the highest summits of the earth, that is of corruptible bodies, and always maintain the order of the divine government, he says, *And the mountain heights are His.* Thirdly, he assigns the reason of this universal government, for the things that God made must needs be governed by Him. To this he refers when he says, *For the sea is His*, etc.

Since then in the First Book we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature, and, in the Second, of the perfection of the divine power, inasmuch as He is the creator and lord of all: it remains for us in this Third Book to treat of His perfect authority or dignity, inasmuch as He is the end and governor of all. We must therefore proceed in this wise, so as first to treat of Him as the end of all things; secondly of His universal government, inasmuch as He governs every creature: thirdly, of that special government, whereby He governs creatures endowed with intelligence.

CHAPTER II

THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN END

ACCORDINGLY we must first show that every agent, by its action, intends an end.

For in those things which clearly act for an end, we declare the end to be that towards which the movement of the agent tends: for when this is reached, the end is said to be reached,

and to fail in this is to fail in the end intended; as may be seen in the physician who aims at health, and in a man who runs towards an appointed goal. Nor does it matter, as to this, whether that which tends to an end be cognitive or not: for just as the target is the end of the archer, so is it the end of the arrow's flight. Now the movement of every agent tends to something determinate: since it is not from any force that any action proceeds, but heating proceeds from heat, and cooling from cold; wherefore actions are differentiated by their active principles. Action sometimes terminates in something made, for instance building terminates in a house, healing ends in health: while sometimes it does not so terminate, for instance, understanding and sensation. And if action terminate in something made, the movement of the agent tends by that action towards that thing made: while if it does not terminate in something made, the movement of the agent tends to the action itself. It follows therefore that every agent intends an end while acting, which end is sometimes the action itself, sometimes a thing made by the action.

Again. In all things that act for an end, that is said to be the last end, beyond which the agent seeks nothing further: thus the physician's action goes as far as health, and this being attained, his efforts cease. But in the action of every agent, a point can be reached beyond which the agent does not desire to go; else actions would tend to infinity, which is impossible, for since *it is not possible to pass through an infinite medium*,[1] the agent would never begin to act, because nothing moves towards what it cannot reach. Therefore every agent acts for an end.

Moreover. If the actions of an agent proceed to infinity, these actions must needs result either in something made, or not. If the result is something made, the being of that thing made will follow after an infinity of actions. But that which presupposes an infinity of things, cannot possibly be, since *an infinite medium cannot be passed through*.[1] Now impossibility of being argues impossibility of becoming:

[1] Aristotle, 1 *Poster.* xxii. 2.

and that which cannot become, it is impossible to make. Therefore it is impossible for an agent to begin to make a thing for the making of which an infinity of actions are presupposed.—If, however, the result of such actions be not something made, the order of these actions must be either according to the order of active forces, (for instance if a man feel that he may imagine, and imagine that he may understand, and understand that he may will): or according to the order of objects, (for instance I consider the body that I may consider the soul, which I consider in order to consider a separate substance, which again I consider so that I may consider God). Now it is not possible to proceed to infinity, either in active forces, as neither is this possible in the forms of things, as proved in 2 *Metaph.*, since the form is the principle of activity: or in objects, as neither is this possible in beings, since there is one first being, as we have proved above.[1] Therefore it is not possible for agents to proceed to infinity: and consequently there must be something, which being attained, the efforts of the agent cease. Therefore every agent acts for an end.

Further. In things that act for an end, whatsoever comes between the first agent and the last end, is an end in respect to what precedes, and an active principle in respect of what follows. Hence if the effort of the agent does not tend to something determinate, and if its action, as stated, proceeds to infinity, the active principles must needs proceed to infinity: which is impossible, as we have shown above. Therefore the effort of the agent must of necessity tend to something determinate.

Again. Every agent acts either by nature or by intelligence. Now there can be no doubt that those which act by intelligence act for an end; since they act with an intellectual preconception of what they attain by their action, and act through such preconception, for this is to act by intelligence. Now just as in the preconceiving intellect there exists the entire likeness of the effect that is attained by the action of the intellectual being, so in the natural

[1] Bk. I., ch. xlii.

agent there pre-exists the similitude of the natural effect, by virtue of which similitude its action is determined to the appointed effect: for fire begets fire, and an olive produces an olive. Wherefore even as that which acts by intelligence tends by its action to a definite end, so also does that which acts by nature. Therefore every agent acts for an end.

Moreover. Fault is not found save in those things which are for an end: for we do not find fault with one who fails in that to which he is not appointed; thus we find fault with a physician if he fail to heal, but not with a builder or a grammarian. But we find fault in things done according to art, as when a grammarian fails to speak correctly; and in things that are ruled by nature, as in the case of monstrosities. Therefore every agent, whether according to nature, or according to art, or acting of set purpose, acts for an end.

Again. Were an agent not to act for a definite effect, all effects would be indifferent to it. Now that which is indifferent to many effects does not produce one rather than another: wherefore from that which is indifferent to either of two effects, no effect results, unless it be determined by something to one of them. Hence it would be impossible for it to act. Therefore every agent tends to some definite effect, which is called its end.

There are, however, certain actions which would seem not to be for an end, such as playful and contemplative actions, and those which are done without attention, such as scratching one's beard, and the like: whence some might be led to think that there is an agent that acts not for an end.—But we must observe that contemplative actions are not for another end, but are themselves an end. Playful actions are sometimes an end, when one plays for the mere pleasure of play; and sometimes they are for an end, as when we play that afterwards we may study better. Actions done without attention do not proceed from the intellect, but from some sudden act of the imagination, or some natural principle: thus a disordered humour produces an itching sensation and is the cause of a man scratching his beard, which he does without his mind attending to it. Such

actions do tend to an end, although outside the order of the intellect. Hereby is excluded the error of certain natural philosophers of old, who maintained that all things happen by natural necessity, thus utterly banishing the final cause from things.

CHAPTER III

THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR A GOOD

HENCE we must go on to prove that every agent acts for a good.

For that every agent acts for an end clearly follows from the fact that every agent tends to something definite. Now that to which an agent tends definitely must needs be befitting to that agent: since the latter would not tend to it save on account of some fittingness thereto. But that which is befitting to a thing is good for it. Therefore every agent acts for a good.

Further. The end is that wherein the appetite of the agent or mover is at rest, as also the appetite of that which is moved. Now it is the very notion of good to be the term of appetite, since *good is the object of every appetite.*[1] Therefore all action and movement is for a good.

Again. All action and movement would seem to be directed in some way to being: either for the preservation of being in the species or in the individual; or for the acquisition of being. Now this itself, being to wit, is a good: and for this reason all things desire being. Therefore all action and movement is for a good.

Furthermore. All action and movement is for some perfection. For if the action itself be the end, it is clearly a second perfection of the agent. And if the action consist in the transformation of external matter, clearly the mover intends to induce some perfection into the thing moved: towards which perfection the movable tends, if the movement be natural. Now when we say a thing is perfect, we

[1] Aristotle, 1 *Ethic.* 1.

mean that it is good. Therefore every action and movement is for a good.

Also. Every agent acts according as it is actual. Now by acting it tends to something similar to itself. Therefore it tends to an act. But an act has the ratio of good: since evil is not found save in a potentiality lacking act. Therefore every action is for a good.

Moreover. The intellectual agent acts for an end, as determining on its end: whereas the natural agent, though it acts for an end, as proved above,[1] does not determine on its end, since it knows not the ratio of end, but is moved to the end determined for it by another. Now an intellectual agent does not determine the end for itself except under the aspect of good; for the intelligible object does not move except it be considered as a good, which is the object of the will. Therefore also the natural agent is not moved, nor does it act for an end, except in so far as this end is a good: since the end is determined for the natural agent by an appetite. Therefore every agent acts for a good.

Again. To shun evil and to seek good are in the same ratio: even as movement from below and upward movement are in the same ratio. Now we observe that all things shun evil: for intellectual agents shun a thing for the reason that they apprehend it as an evil: and all natural agents, in proportion to their strength, resist corruption which is the evil of everything. Therefore all things act for a good.

Again. That which results from the agent's action beside his intention, is said to happen by chance or luck. Now we observe in the works of nature that either always or more often that happens which is best: thus in plants the leaves are so placed as to protect the fruit; and the parts of an animal are so disposed as to conduce to the animal's safety. Wherefore, if this happens beside the intention of the natural agent, it will be the result of chance or luck. But that is impossible: because things that happen always or frequently, are not casual or fortuitous, but those which occur seldom. Therefore the natural agent tends to that which is best:

[1] Ch. ii.

and much more evidently is this so with the intellectual agent. Therefore every agent intends a good in acting.

Moreover. Whatever is moved is brought to the term of movement by the mover and agent. Therefore mover and moved tend to the same term. Now that which is moved, since it is in potentiality, tends to an act, and consequently to perfection and goodness: for by its movement it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore mover and agent by moving and acting always intend a good.

Hence the philosophers in defining the good said: *The good is the object of every appetite*; and Dionysius (*De Div. Nom.* iv.) says that *all things desire the good and the best.*

CHAPTER IV

THAT EVIL IS UNINTENTIONAL IN THINGS

It follows from the above that evil is incidental to things beside the intention of an agent.

For when the result of an action differs from the intention of the agent, it is clear that such result occurs unintentionally. Now evil differs from good which every agent intends. Therefore evil happens beside the intention.

Also. Defect in effect and action results from defect in the principle of action: thus a monstrosity results from a defect in the seed, and limping results from a curvature of the leg. Now an agent acts according as it is possessed of active force, and not according as it suffers from defective power. And according as it acts, it intends the end. Wherefore it intends an end corresponding to its power. Hence whatever follows corresponding to the defective power, will be beside the agent's intention. And this is evil. Therefore evil occurs beside the intention.

Again. The movement of the thing moved has the same tendency as the motion of the mover. Now the thing moved tends *per se* to good, but to evil it tends accidentally and unintentionally. This is most evident in generation and

corruption. For matter, while it underlies one form, is in potentiality to another form, and to the privation of the form which it has already: thus when it is under the form of air, it is in potentiality to the form of fire and the privation of the form of air. And the transformation of matter terminates in both at the same time: in the form of fire by reason of fire being generated, and in the privation of the form of air, by reason of the air being corrupted. But the intention and appetite of matter is not towards the privation, but towards the form: for it does not tend towards the impossible; and it is impossible for matter to be alone under a privation, whereas it is possible for it to be under a form. Therefore it is unintentional that it terminate in privation: and it terminates therein in so far as it attains the form which it intends, the necessary result whereof is the privation of the other form. Therefore in generation and corruption the transformation of matter is directed *per se* to the form, and privation results unintentionally. And the same must needs apply to all manner of movement: so that in every movement there is generation and corruption in some respect: for instance, when a thing is changed from white to black, a white thing is corrupted and a black one is made. Now the good is according as matter is perfected by the form, and potentiality by its proper act: while evil is according as it is deprived of its proper act. Consequently, whatever is moved intends in its movement, to attain some good; and it attains evil beside its intention. Hence, since every agent and mover tends to the good, evil occurs beside the intention of the agent.

Moreover. In those things that act by intelligence or any kind of instinct, intention follows apprehension; because the intention is towards that which is apprehended as an end. Accordingly if something is attained that has no species in the apprehension, it will be beside the intention: for instance, if one were to intend to eat honey, and were to eat gall thinking that it was honey, this will be beside the intention. But every intellectual agent tends to something in so far as he considers it under the aspect of good, as we have

shown above.[1] Wherefore if this be not a good but an evil, it will be beside the intention. Therefore that which acts by intelligence does not work evil except unintentionally. Therefore, since to tend to a good is common to intellectual and natural agents, evil does not ensue from the intention of an agent except beside that intention. In this sense Dionysius says (*De Div. Nom.* iv.) that *evil is unintentional and involuntary*.

CHAPTERS V AND VI

ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT EVIL IS NOT BESIDE THE INTENTION

THERE are, however, some objections that would seem to run counter to this conclusion.

For that which occurs beside the intention of the agent is said to happen fortuitously, casually and seldom.[2] But evil is not said to happen fortuitously and casually, nor does it occur seldom but always or frequently. For in the physical order generation is ever accompanied by corruption. And in voluntary agents sin is of frequent occurrence, since *it is as difficult to behave virtuously, as to find the centre of a circle*, as Aristotle states (2 *Ethic.* ix.). Therefore it would seem that evil is not an unintentional occurrence.

Again. Aristotle says (3 *Ethic.* v.) expressly that *vice is voluntary*; and he proves this from the fact that a man does an injustice voluntarily, and *it is absurd to suppose that the man who does unjust actions voluntarily does not wish to be unjust, and that he who rapes voluntarily does not wish to be incontinent*; and again from the fact that legislators punish evil-doers as doing evil voluntarily. Therefore evil would seem not to be unintentional or involuntary.

Further. Every natural movement has an end intended by nature. Now corruption is a natural movement, even

[1] Ch. iii.
[2] Ch. iii. *Again. That which results* . . ., p. 8.

as generation. Therefore its end, which is privation having the aspect of evil, is intended by nature; even as the form and the good, which are the end of generation.

[1] In order that the solution of the arguments here given may be made clear we must observe that evil may be considered either as in a substance, or as in its action. In a substance that is evil through its lacking something natural and due to it, for that a man have not wings, is not an evil to him, because it is not natural for him to have them; and again if a man have not fair hair, this is no evil, for although he may have it naturally, it is not due to him. But it is an evil if he have no hands, which are natural and due to him, if he be perfect; and yet it is not an evil to a bird. Now every privation, if we take it properly and strictly, is the lack of something natural and due; and consequently the aspect of evil is always in a privation thus understood.

Matter, since it is in potentiality to all forms, is adapted by nature to all of them, yet no one is due to it; since it can be actually perfect without any particular one. Nevertheless, some one of them is due to one of those things that are made of matter: for there can be no water without the form of water, nor can there be fire without the form of fire. Accordingly the privation of such a form, in relation to matter, is not an evil to matter: but in relation to that thing of which it is the form, it is an evil thereof; thus the privation of the form of fire is an evil of fire. And since privations as well as habits and forms are not said to exist except forasmuch as they are in a subject, if privation be an evil in relation to the subject wherein it is, it will be an evil simply: otherwise it will be the evil of something but not simply. Hence that a man be deprived of a hand is an evil simply; but that matter be deprived of the form of air is not an evil simply, but an evil of the air. On the other hand, privation of order or due proportion in an action, is an evil of the action. And since to every action order and proportion are due, such a privation in an action must needs be an evil simply.

[1] Ch. vi.

Accordingly, taking these remarks into account, we must note that what is unintentional is not always fortuitous or casual, as the first argument stated. For if that which is unintentional be always or frequently the result of that which was intended, it will not happen fortuitously or casually: thus if a man intends to enjoy the sweetness of wine, and becomes drunk through drinking, this will be neither fortuitous nor casual: but it would be casual if such a result were to occur seldom.

Therefore the evil of natural corruption, although it ensue beside the intention of the generator, follows nevertheless always, since the presence of one form is ever accompanied by the privation of another. Wherefore corruption does not ensue casually, nor even seldom: although sometimes privation is not an evil simply, but the evil of some particular thing, as stated above. If, however, the privation be such as to deprive the thing generated of that which is due to it, it will be casual and an evil simply, as in the birth of monstrosities: for this does not follow of necessity from that which was intended, but is opposed thereto; since the agent intends the perfection of the thing generated.

Evil of action occurs in natural agents through a defect in the active force. Hence if the agent's force be defective, this evil ensues beside the intention; yet it will not be casual, because it follows of necessity from such an agent: provided always that the agent in question always or frequently suffer this defect. But it will be casual if this defect seldom accompanies this agent. In voluntary agents the intention is directed to some particular good, if the action is to follow: for movement is not caused by universals but by particulars about which actions are. Accordingly, if the good that is intended is accompanied always or frequently by the privation of a rational good, moral evil ensues not casually, but either always or frequently: as in the case of a man who desires intercourse with a woman for the sake of pleasure, to which pleasure is connected the inordination of adultery: wherefore the evil of adultery is not a casual sequel. It would, however, be a casual evil, if sin were to ensue seldom

from what he intends: as in one who while firing at a bird, kills a man.

That anyone should intend suchlike goods which frequently result in privation of a rational good, is due to the fact that many live a sensuous life; because sensible things are the more manifest to us, and move more efficaciously in a world of individual things among which operation takes place: and privation of the rational good ensues from many goods of that kind. Hence it follows that, although evil is beside the intention, it is nevertheless voluntary, as the second argument states, accidentally however and not *per se*. For intention is directed to the last end, which we will for its own sake: while the will is directed also to that which we will for the sake of something else, even though we would not will it simply: for instance the man who throws his cargo overboard for the sake of safety, intends not the throwing of his cargo, but safety, and he wills the throwing of the cargo, not simply but for the sake of safety. In like manner for the sake of obtaining a sensible good a man wills to perform an inordinate action, neither intending the inordinateness nor willing it simply, but for the sake of something in particular. In the same way, therefore, sin and vice are said to be voluntary, as the throwing of a ship's cargo into the sea.

The third objection is solved on the same lines. For the change of corruption is never found without the change of generation: and consequently neither is the end of corruption found without the end of generation. Hence nature does not intend the end of corruption apart from the end of generation, but both at the same time. For it is not the absolute intention of nature that there be no water, but that there be air, the existence of which precludes the existence of air. Accordingly nature intends directly that there should be air; but it does not intend that there should not be water except in so far as this is involved by the existence of air. Wherefore privations are not intended by nature directly, but accidentally: whereas forms are intended directly.

From the foregoing it is clear that what is evil simply, is utterly beside the intention in the operations of nature, for example the birth of monstrosities: but what is evil not simply but relatively, is intended by nature, not directly but accidentally.

CHAPTER VII

THAT EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE

From this it follows that no essence is evil in itself.

For evil, as we have said,[1] is nothing else but *the privation of what is connatural and due to anyone*: for the word *evil* is used in this sense by all. Now privation is not an essence, but is *the non-existence of something in a substance*.[2] Therefore evil is not a real essence.

Again. A thing has being in respect of its essence. Now in so far as it has being, it has a share of good: for if *good is what all desire*, being itself must be called a good, since all things desire being. Therefore a thing is good in so far as it has an essence. But good and evil are opposed to each other. Therefore nothing is evil in so far as it has an essence. Therefore no essence is evil.

Moreover. Every thing is either an agent or something made. But evil cannot be an agent, for that which acts, acts inasmuch as it is actually existing and perfect. In like manner neither can it be something made: since the term of every generation is a form and a good. Therefore nothing is evil as to its essence.

Again. Nothing tends to its contrary, for everything desires what is like and becoming to it. Now everything by acting intends a good, as we proved above.[3] Therefore no being as such is evil.

Further. Every essence is natural to some thing. For if it be in the genus of substance, it is the very nature of that thing. And if it be in the genus of accident, it must needs flow from the principles of some substance, and thus will be

[1] Ch. vi. [2] Aristotle, 3 *Metaph.* ii. 8. [3] Ch. iii.

natural to that substance: although perchance it may not be natural to some other substance; thus heat is natural to fire, whereas it is not natural to water. Now that which is evil in itself, cannot be natural to a thing. For it belongs to the very nature of evil to be the privation of that which is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore evil, since it is the privation of what is natural, cannot be natural to a thing. Hence whatever is in a thing naturally is good for that thing, and it is an evil if it be lacking. Therefore no essence is evil in itself.

Moreover. Whatever has an essence is either itself a form, or has a form: since it is by the form that each thing is placed in a genus or species. Now a form, as such, has the ratio of goodness: for it is the principle of action, and the end which every maker intends; and is the act whereby whatever has a form is perfect. Therefore whatever has an essence, as such, is good. Therefore evil has not an essence.

Further. Being is divided into act and potentiality. Now act, as such, is a good: because, in so far as a thing is in act, it is perfect. Again potentiality is a good: for potentiality tends to act, as clearly may be seen in every kind of movement. Also, it is proportionate to act, and not contrary thereto. Moreover it is in the same genus as act. Also privation does not apply to it save accidentally. Therefore everything that is, in whatever way it is, in so far as it is a being, is a good. Therefore evil has not an essence.

Again. It has been proved in the Second Book[1] of this work, that every being, in whatever way it is, is from God: and we have shown in the First Book[2] that God is perfect goodness. Since, then, evil cannot be the effect of good, it is impossible for a being, as such, to be evil. Hence it is that it is said (Gen. i. 31): *God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good*: and (Eccles. iii. 11): *He hath made all things good in their time*: and (1 Tim. iv. 4): *Every creature of God is good.*

Again Dionysius says (*De Div. Nom.* iv.) *that evil is not a*

[1] Ch. xv. [2] Ch. xxviii., xli.

thing that exists, per se to wit, nor is it *something in things that exist*, as an accident, like whiteness or blackness.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Manichees who held that there are certain things evil by their very nature.

CHAPTERS VIII AND IX

ARGUMENTS WHEREBY SEEMINGLY IT IS PROVED THAT EVIL IS A NATURE OR A THING

It would seem that certain arguments militate against the aforesaid statement.

For each thing derives its species from its proper difference. Now evil is a specific difference in certain genera, namely in moral habits and acts: because as virtue according to its species is a good habit, so the contrary vice is an evil habit according to its species: and the same applies to virtuous and vicious acts. Therefore evil gives certain things their species. Therefore it is an essence, and is natural to certain things.

Further. Each of two contraries is a nature: for if it predicated nothing, one of the contraries would be a pure privation or negation. But good and evil are stated to be contraries. Therefore evil is a nature.

Again. Aristotle in his *Predicaments* (*Categor.* viii. 27) says that good and evil are *the genera of contraries*. Now every genus has an essence or nature: for there are no species or differences of non-being, so that what is not cannot be a genus. Therefore evil is an essence and a nature. Also. Whatever is active is a thing. Now evil as such is active: for it counteracts and corrupts good. Therefore evil as such is a thing.

Moreover. Whatever can be more or less must be a thing admitting of degrees: since negations and privations do not admit of being more or less. Now among evils we find one to be worse than another. Therefore seemingly, evil must be a thing.

Furthermore. Thing and being are convertible terms. Now evil exists in the world. Therefore it is a thing and a nature.

[1]These objections, however, are easily solved. For evil and good in morals are said to be specific differences, as the first argument stated, because morality depends on the will: for a thing comes under the head of morals so far as it is voluntary. Now the will's object is the end and the good. Hence moral matters are specified by their end: even as natural actions are by the form of their active principle, for instance, the action of heating is specified by heat. Since then good and evil are predicated in respect of the universal direction to an end, or the privation of that direction, it follows that in morals the first difference is that of good and evil. Now for one genus there must be one first measure: and the measure in morals is reason. Consequently good and evil in moral matters must depend on the end appointed by reason. Accordingly, in morals, that which derives its species from an end that is in accord with reason, is said to be specifically good: and that which derives its species from an end discordant from reason, is said to be specifically bad. And yet this end, though it sets aside the end appointed by reason, is nevertheless some kind of good, such as a pleasurable object of the senses, or something similar, so that in some animals this end is good, and even in man when it is moderated by reason. Also it happens that what is evil for one, is good for another. Wherefore evil, so far as it is a specific difference in the moral genus, does not denote a thing essentially evil; but something that is good in itself, but evil for man, in so far as it removes the order of reason, which is man's good. From this it follows that evil and good are contraries forasmuch as they are applied to the moral genus; and not in their absolute signification, as the second objection stated: but evil, as such, is a privation of good.

In the same way we may understand the saying that evil and good, taken in the moral order, are the *genera of contraries*, on which the third objection was based. For of all moral contraries, either both are evil, as prodigality and stinginess; or one is good and the other evil, as liberality and stinginess. Hence moral evil is both a genus and a differ-

[1] Ch. ix.

ence, not through being the privation of a good appointed by reason, whence it is called evil, but through the nature of the action or habit that is directed to an end incompatible with the right end appointed by reason: thus a blind man is a human individual, not as being blind, but as being this particular man: and irrational is a difference of animal, not through the privation of reason, but on account of this particular nature to which privation of reason is consequent. It may also be said that Aristotle asserts evil and good to be genera, not in his own opinion, since he does not number them among the ten first genera in each of which some contrariety is found, but according to the opinion of Pythagoras, who affirmed that *good* and *evil* are supreme genera and first principles. Under each of them he placed ten supreme contraries: so that we have the good which is *definite*, which is *equal*, which is *one*, which is *on the right hand*, the *male*, the *restful*, the *straight*, the *luminous*, the *square*, and lastly, *the good*: while under *evil* he placed the *indefinite*, the *unequal*, the *manifold*, the *left-hand*, the *female*, the *moving*, the *crooked*, the *darksome*, the *oblong*, and lastly, the *evil*. In this way and in several passages of his works on logic, he employs examples according to the opinions of other philosophers, as being probable at the time.

Moreover this saying contains a certain amount of truth: for it is impossible that a probable statement should be utterly false. Now of all contraries one is perfect, while the other is incomplete, as containing some kind of privation: thus white and hot are perfect, while cold and black are imperfect, as indicating a kind of privation. Since then incompleteness and privation are a kind of evil, while every perfection and completeness comes under the head of good: it follows that in contraries, one seems to be comprised under good, while the other approaches to the notion of evil. In this way good and evil are seemingly genera of all contraries. In this way too it is clear how evil is opposed to good, which was the line taken by the fourth objection. Because in so far as form and end, which have the aspect of good, and are the true principles of action, involve privation of a con-

trary form and end, the action that is consequent upon this form and end, is ascribed to privation and evil: accidentally however, since privation, as such, is not a principle of action. Rightly therefore does Dionysius say (*De Div. Nom.* iv.) that *evil does not oppose good, except by virtue of a good: and in itself it is powerless and weak*, as not being a principle of action. Evil, however, is said to corrupt good, not only as acting by virtue of a good, as explained: but formally by itself; even as blindness is said to corrupt the sight, through being the very corruption of sight: in the same way whiteness is said to colour the wall, because it is the very colour of the wall.

A thing is said to be a greater or lesser evil by reason of its distance from the good. For thus it is that things which imply privation admit of degrees, as *inequality* and *unlikeness*: thus to be more unequal is to be more distant from equality: and to be more unlike is to go further from likeness.

Wherefore that is said to be more evil, which is more deprived of good, as being more distant from good. But privations are subject to increase not as having a kind of essence, as qualities and forms, as the fifth argument presumed, but through the increase of the cause of privation: thus air is more darksome, according as the light is impeded by the interposition of more obstacles, for thus it is further removed from a participation of light.

Again evil is said to be in the world, not as though it had an essence, or were some thing, as the sixth argument supposed, but forasmuch as a thing is said to be evil with evil: even as blindness and privation of any kind is said to be, because an animal is blind with blindness.

For being is predicated in two ways, as the Philosopher teaches (4 *Metaph.* vii.). First as indicating the essence of a thing; and thus it is divided into the ten categories: in this way no privation can be called a being. Secondly as denoting a synthetical truth: in this way evil and privation are called a being, forasmuch as a thing is said to be deprived by a privation.

CHAPTER X

THAT THE CAUSE OF EVIL IS A GOOD

We may conclude from the foregoing that evil is not caused except by a good.

For were some evil caused by an evil; since evil does not act save by virtue of a good, as proved above,[1] it follows that good itself is the primary cause of evil.

Again. That which is not, is not the cause of anything. Therefore every cause must be some being. Now evil is not a being, as shown above.[2] Therefore evil cannot be the cause of anything. Hence if evil be caused by something, this must be a good.

Again. Whatever is properly and by itself the cause of something intends its proper effect. Hence, if evil by itself be the cause of something, it would intend its proper effect, namely evil. But this is false, for it has been shown[3] that every agent intends a good. Therefore evil is not the cause of anything by itself, but only accidentally. Now every accidental cause is reduced to a *per se* cause. But good alone can be a *per se* cause, and evil cannot be a *per se* cause. Therefore evil is caused by good.

Further. Every cause is either matter, or form, or agent, or end. But evil cannot be either matter or form: for it has been shown above[4] that being whether actual or potential is a good. Neither can it be an agent: since a thing acts forasmuch as it is actual and has a form. Nor again can it be an end, since it is beside the intention, as we have shown.[5] Therefore evil cannot be the cause of a thing: and if anything be the cause of an evil, that evil must be caused by a good.

Since, however, evil and good are opposite to each other: and one opposite cannot be the cause of the other except accidentally; thus *a cold thing causes heat* as stated in *Phys.*

[1] Ch. ix. [2] Ch. vii. [3] Ch. iii.
[4] Ch. vii. [5] Ch. iv.

viii. 1; it follows that good cannot be the effective cause of evil except accidentally.

In the physical order, this accident may be on the part of the agent, or on the part of the effect. On the part of the agent, as when the agent's power is defective, the result being that the action is defective, and the effect deficient: thus when the power of the digestive organ is defective, the result is imperfect digestion of the food and an indigested humour, which are physical evils. Now it is accidental to the agent as such, that its power be defective: for it acts, not as having a defective power, but as having some power: for if it lacked power altogether, it would not act at all. Accordingly evil is caused accidentally on the part of the agent, forasmuch as the agent's power is defective. Hence it is said that *evil has not an efficient, but a deficient, cause*: because evil does not follow from an active cause, except in so far as this cause is defective in power, and in this respect it is not effective.—And it comes to the same if defect in the action and effect, results from a defect in the instrument, or in any thing else required for the agent's action: as when the motive power causes a limp on account of crookedness in the *tibia* : for the agent acts by both, its power and its instrument.

On the part of the effect, evil is caused by good accidentally, either on the part of the matter of the effect, or on the part of its force. For if the matter be indisposed to receive the impression of the agent the effect must needs be defective: thus a deformed offspring results from an indisposition of matter. Nor is it put down to defect in the agent, if it fail to transform an indisposed matter to perfect actuality: since to each natural agent there is appointed a power in proportion to its nature, and if it go not beyond that power, it will not on that account fall short of its power, but only when it falls short of the measure of power due to it by nature.

On the part of the effect's form, evil occurs accidentally, in so far as one form necessarily involves the privation of another, wherefore the generating of one thing is necessarily

followed by the corruption of another. But this evil is not an evil of the effect intended by the agent, as was made clear above,[1] but of the other thing.

Accordingly it is evident that evil is caused only accidentally by a good.—And the same applies to things produced by art, for *Art, in its work, copies nature*,[2] and faults occur in both in the same way.

In morals, however, the case would seem to be different: because moral fault does not apparently follow from a defective power: since weakness of power either wholly excludes, or at least diminishes, moral fault: for weakness does not deserve punishment which is due to guilt, but rather mercy and pardon: seeing that moral fault must be voluntary and not necessary. But if we consider the matter carefully, we shall find that there is a likeness in one respect, and unlikeness in another. There is unlikeness in that moral fault is considered in the action alone, and not in some effect produced, for moral virtues are directed not to making but to doing. Whereas the arts are directed to making, for which reason it has been stated that faults occur in them in the same way as in nature. Therefore moral evil is considered as resulting not from the matter or form of the effect, but only from the agent.

Now, in moral actions four active principles are to be found in due order. The first of these is the executive power, namely the motive force, whereby the members are moved to execute the will's command. Hence this power is moved by the will which is a second principle. And the will is moved by the judgement of the apprehensive power, which judges that a particular thing is good or evil, which are objects of the will, the one moving to pursuit, the other to flight. Again the apprehensive power is moved by the thing apprehended. Hence the first active principle in moral actions is the thing apprehended; the second is the apprehensive power; the third is the will; and the fourth is the motive force, which carries out the command of reason.

Now the act of the executive power already presupposes

[1] Ch. vi. [2] *Phys.* ii. 2.

moral good or evil. For these external acts do not belong to morals, except forasmuch as they are voluntary. Wherefore if the act of the will be good, the external act will also be good, and evil, if it be evil. And there would be nothing savouring of moral evil if the defect in a defective external act has nothing to do with the will: for limping is not a moral but a physical evil. Therefore a defect in this executive power, either wholly excuses or diminishes moral fault.—Again, the act whereby the object moves the apprehensive power is devoid of moral fault: for the visible object moves the sight according to the natural order of things; and so too does every object move a passive power. —Again the act, considered in itself, of the apprehensive power is devoid of moral fault; since a defect therein either excuses or diminishes moral fault, in the same way as a defect in the executive power: for weakness and ignorance equally excuse or diminish sin.—It follows, then, that moral fault is found first and chiefly in the sole act of the will: and an act is logically called moral, precisely because it is voluntary. Therefore the root and origin of moral fault is to be sought in the act of the will.

But there is a difficulty, seemingly, attendant upon this inquiry. For since a defective act results from a defect in the active principle, we must presuppose a defect in the will to precede the moral fault. And if this defect be natural, it will always adhere to the will: so that the will must be guilty of moral fault whenever it acts: whereas acts of virtue prove this to be false. But if the defect be voluntary, it is already a moral fault, the cause whereof will still remain to be sought: and thus the reason will carry on indefinitely. Accordingly we must say that the defect already existing in the will is not natural, lest it follow that the will sins in every act: and that neither is it casual or fortuitous, for then there would be no moral fault in us, since casual things are unforeseen and outside the domain of reason. Therefore it is voluntary. Yet it is not a moral fault: lest we be forced to proceed indefinitely. How this may be, remains to be considered.—The perfection of every

active principle depends on a higher active principle; for the second agent acts by virtue of the first. While, therefore, the second agent remains subordinate to the first, it acts unfailingly: but it fails in acting, if it happen to stray from the order of the first agent: as in the case of an instrument that falls short of the first agent's movement. Now it has been said that, in the order of moral actions, two principles precede the will; to wit, the apprehensive power, and the apprehended object, which is the end. And since for each movable there is a corresponding proper motive power, every apprehensive power is not the motive force due to every appetitive power, but this one belongs to this, and another to that. Accordingly, just as the proper motive force of the sensitive appetite is the apprehensive power of the senses, so the proper motive force of the will is the reason.

Again, since the reason is able to apprehend many goods and many ends; and each one has its proper end: the will also must have as its end and first motive force, not any, but a definite good. Hence when the will tends to its act, through being moved by the apprehension of reason that presents to it its proper good, a right action follows. Whereas when the will breaks away at the apprehension of the sensitive power, or even of the reason which presents some good other than its proper good, there follows in the will's act a moral fault.

Consequently, the sin of action in the will is preceded by lack of order to reason, and to its proper end: to reason, as when the will, on the sudden apprehension of a sense, tends to a good that is pleasurable to sense:—to its due end, as when by deliberating the reason arrives at some good which is not good now, or in some particular way; and yet the will tends to that good as though it were its proper good. Now this lack of order is voluntary: for it is in the will's power to will or not to will. Again it is in the will's power that the reason actually consider the matter, or cease from considering it; or that it consider this matter, or that. Nor is this lack of order a moral evil: for if the reason were to consider

nothing, or to consider any good whatever, as yet there is no sin, until the will tends to an undue end: and this itself is an act of the will.

Accordingly both in the physical and in the moral order it is clear that evil is not caused by good except accidentally.

CHAPTER XI

THAT THE SUBJECT OF EVIL IS A GOOD

FROM what we have said it can be shown that every evil is seated in some good.

For evil cannot exist by itself: since it has no essence, as was proved above.[1] Therefore evil needs to be in some subject. Now every subject, as it is a substance, is a good, as is evident from what has been said.[2] Therefore every evil is in a good.

Also. Evil is a privation, as we have shown.[3] Now privation and the lacking form are in the same subject. But the subject of a form is a being in potentiality to that form, and this being is a good: for potentiality and act are in the same genus. Therefore privation, that is an evil, is in some good as its subject.

Moreover. *A thing is called evil because it hurts:*[4] nor otherwise than because it hurts a good: for it is good to hurt evil, since the corruption of evil is good. Now it would not hurt a good formally, unless it were in that good: thus blindness is hurtful to a man forasmuch as it is in him. Therefore evil must be in a good.

Again. Evil is not caused except by good, and then only accidentally.[5] Now whatever is accidental is reducible to that which is *per se*. Consequently together with the evil effect that is caused accidentally by a good, there must be some good which is the *per se* effect of that good, so as to be the foundation of that evil: because what is accidental is founded on what is *per se*.

[1] Ch. vii. [2] *Ibid.* [3] Ch. ix.
[4] Augustine, *Enchir.* xii. [5] Ch. x.

Seeing, however, that good and evil are mutually opposed; and that one of two opposites cannot be the subject of the other, but expels it: someone at a cursory glance might think it unreasonable to state that good is the subject of evil.

And yet it is not unreasonable if the truth be sought thoroughly. For good, even as being, is predicated universally: since every being, as such, is good, as we have shown.[1] Now it is not unreasonable that non-being should have being for its subject: because every privation is a non-being, and yet its subject is a substance, which is a being. But non-being is not in an opposite being as its subject: for blindness is not universal non-being, but a particular kind of non-being, namely privation of sight: therefore it is not in sight, as its subject, but in an animal. In like manner evil has for its subject, not the opposite good;—for it is the privation of this good,—but some other good: thus moral evil is in a natural good; and an evil of nature, to wit privation of a form, is in matter, which is a good as a being in potentiality.

CHAPTER XII

THAT EVIL DOES NOT ENTIRELY DESTROY GOOD

It is clear from the foregoing that however much evil be increased it can never destroy good entirely: since there must always remain the subject of evil, as long as evil remains. Now the subject of evil is a good.[2] Therefore, some good must always remain. But seeing that evil may be increased indefinitely, and that good is always diminished by the increase of evil: it would seem that good is decreased by evil indefinitely. Now a good that can be diminished by evil must needs be finite: because infinite good is incompatible with evil, as we proved in the First Book.[3] Seemingly, therefore, sometimes a good is wholly destroyed by evil: since if something is subtracted indefinitely from the finite, this must at length be destroyed through such subtraction.

[1] Ch. viii. [2] Ch. xi. [3] Ch. xxxix.

Nor may it be said, as some say, that if the subsequent subtraction be made in the same proportion as the preceding one, and continue thus indefinitely, the good cannot be destroyed, as may be seen in the division of a continuous quantity. Thus if from a line two cubits long you subtract half, and from the remainder subtract half, and continue thus indefinitely, there will always remain something to be divided. But in this process of division that which is subtracted afterwards must always be less in quantity: for half of the whole which was subtracted at first, is greater in absolute quantity than half of the half, albeit the same proportion remains. This, however, nowise applies to the diminution of good by evil. Because the more a good is diminished by an evil, the weaker it becomes, and thus it will be more capable of diminution by the subsequent evil. Again this subsequent evil may be equal to or greater than the previous one: wherefore it will not happen that a smaller quantity of good will always be subsequently subtracted from the good, even if the same proportion be observed.

We must therefore find a different solution. It is clear from what has been already said,[1] that evil entirely destroys the opposite good, as blindness destroys sight: yet there must needs remain the good which is the subject of that evil. And this subject, as such, has the aspect of a good, considered as in potentiality to the actuality of the good which is removed by the evil. Wherefore the less it is in potentiality to that good, the less good will it be. Now a subject becomes less in potentiality to a form, not indeed by the mere subtraction of some part of that subject; nor by the subtraction of some part of its potentiality; but by the fact that the potentiality is hindered by a contrary actuality from reaching to the actuality of the form: thus according as heat is the more increased in a subject, the less is that subject potentially cold. Wherefore good is diminished by evil more by the addition of its contrary, than by the subtraction of good. This applies also to what we have said of evil. For we have said[2] that evil is incidental beside the intention

[1] Ch. xi. [2] Ch. iv.

of the agent, which always intends some good, the result of which is the exclusion of some other good opposed thereto. Hence the more we increase that intended good, the result of which is an evil beside the agent's intention, the more the potentiality to the contrary good will be diminished: and it is thus that the diminution of good by evil increases.

Now this diminution of good by evil cannot go on indefinitely in the physical order. Because all physical forms and forces are limited, and reach a certain term beyond which they cannot reach. Consequently neither can a contrary form, nor can the power of a contrary agent, be increased indefinitely, so as to result in the indefinite diminution of good by evil.

On the other hand this diminution can proceed indefinitely in moral matters. Because the intellect and will have no limit fixed to their actions: for the intellect can proceed indefinitely in understanding: wherefore the mathematical species of numbers and figures are infinite. In like manner the will goes on indefinitely in willing: since he who wills to commit a theft, can so will again, and so on to infinity. Now the more the will tends to undue ends, the more difficult is it for it to return to its proper and due end: as is evident in those who have acquired a vicious habit through sinning frequently. Hence the good of natural aptitude may be diminished indefinitely by moral evil; yet it will never be entirely destroyed, and will always accompany the nature that remains.

CHAPTER XIII

THAT EVIL HAS A CAUSE OF SOME KIND

It can be shown from what precedes that although evil has no *per se* cause, yet every evil must needs have an accidental cause.

For whatever is in a thing as its subject, must needs have a cause: since it results either from the principles of the subject, or from some external cause. Now evil is in good

as its subject, as shown above.[1] Therefore evil must have a cause.

Again. That which is in potentiality to either of two opposites, is not actuated by either except by some cause: for no potentiality actuates itself. Now evil is the privation of that which is connatural and due to anyone:[2] since it is on account of this that a thing is said to be evil. Therefore evil is in a subject that is in potentiality to evil and its opposite. Therefore evil must have some cause.

Moreover. Whatever is in a thing in addition to its nature, supervenes through some other cause; for whatever is natural to it is permanent, unless something else be in the way: wherefore a stone is not borne upwards, unless someone throw it, and water is not heated unless something make it hot. Now evil, in whatever subject it be, is always there in addition to the nature of that subject, since it is the privation of what is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore evil must always have a cause, either *per se* or accidental.

Further. Every evil is consequent to some good;[3] thus corruption is consequent to generation. Now every good has a cause, except the Sovereign Good, in which there is no evil, as proved in the First Book.[4] Therefore every evil has a cause, from which it results accidentally.

CHAPTER XIV

THAT EVIL IS AN ACCIDENTAL CAUSE

From the same premises it is clear that although evil is not a *per se* cause, it is nevertheless an accidental cause. For if A is the cause of B *per se*, whatever is accidental to A is the accidental cause of B: thus *white* which is accidental to the builder, is the accidental cause of the house. Now every evil is in some good.[5] And every good is in some way the cause of something: for matter is in some way the cause of form; while the converse is true in a sense: and the

[1] Ch. xi. [2] Ch. vii. [3] Ch. x.
[4] Ch. xxxix. [5] Ch. xi.

same applies to the agent and the end. Wherefore there does not follow an indefinite sequence in causes, if each thing be the cause of something else, because the circle to be observed in causes and effects is composed of various kinds of cause. Therefore evil is an accidental cause.

Again. Evil is a privation, as shown above.[1] Now privation is an accidental principle in movable things, even as matter and form are *per se* principles. Therefore evil is an accidental cause of something.

Moreover. From a defect in the cause there follows defect in the effect. Now defect in a cause is an evil. And yet it cannot be a *per se* cause; since a thing is not a cause in that it is defective, but in that it is a being : since were it wholly defective, it would be the cause of nothing. Therefore evil is a cause of something, not *per se*, but accidentally.

Further. If we run through all the kinds of cause, we find that evil is an accidental cause. In the species of efficient cause, because defect in effect and action results from a defect in the efficient cause. In the species of material cause, because a fault in the effect arises from indisposition in the matter. In the species of formal cause, because every form is accompanied by the privation of the opposite form. And in the species of final cause, because evil is united to the undue end, inasmuch as the due end is hindered thereby. It is therefore evident that evil is an accidental cause, and cannot be a cause *per se*.

CHAPTER XV

THAT THERE IS NO SOVEREIGN EVIL

It follows from this that there cannot be a sovereign evil, that is the principle of all evils.

For a sovereign evil must needs exclude the association of all good: just as the sovereign good is that which is wholly disconnected from all evil. Now there cannot be an evil entirely apart from good: for it has been proved that evil is

[1] Ch. vii.

seated in some good.[1] Therefore nothing is supremely evil.

Again. If anything be supremely evil, it must be essentially evil: even as the supreme good is that which is essentially good. But this is impossible: since evil has no essence, as was shown above.[2] Therefore it is impossible to suppose a supreme evil that is the principle of evils.

Also. That which is a first principle is not caused by anything. Now every evil is caused by a good, as we have proved.[3] Therefore evil is not a first principle.

Further. Evil does not act except by virtue of a good; as we have proved.[4] But a first principle acts by its own virtue. Therefore evil cannot be a first principle.

Moreover. Since *that which is accidental is subsequent to that which is per se*,[5] the accidental cannot be first. Now evil does not occur except accidentally and unintentionally, as we have proved.[6] Therefore evil cannot be a first principle.

Again. Every evil has an accidental cause, as we have shown.[7] But a first principle has no cause, either *per se*, or accidental. Therefore evil cannot be the first cause in any genus.

Furthermore. *A per se cause precedes one that is accidental.*[8] But evil is none but an accidental cause, as we have proved.[9] Therefore evil cannot be a first principle.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Manichees, who maintained the existence of a sovereign evil, that is the first principle of all evils.

CHAPTER XVI

THAT THE END OF EVERYTHING IS A GOOD

Accordingly if every agent acts for some good, as we have shown above,[10] it follows that good is the end of each thing. For everything is directed by its action to some end; since

[1] Ch. xi. [2] Ch. vii. [3] Ch. x. [4] Ch. ix.
[5] Aristotle, *Phys.* ii. 6. [6] Ch. iv. [7] Ch. xiii.
[8] See above, *Moreover*. . . . [9] Ch. xiv. [10] Ch. iii.

either the action itself is an end; or the end of the action is also the end of the agent: and this is its good.

Again. The end of a thing is the term of its appetite. Now the appetite of a thing terminates in a good: for the Philosopher defines good as *the object of all appetite*.[1] Therefore the end of everything is a good.

Moreover. That toward which a thing tends while it is without it, and wherein it rests when it has it, is its end. Now anything that is without its proper perfection, is moved towards it, as far as in it lies: and if it have that perfection, it rests therein. Therefore the end of a thing is its perfection. But the perfection of a thing is its good. Therefore every thing is directed to good as its end.

Further. Things that know the end, and things that do not know the end, are equally directed to the end: although those which know the end are moved thereto *per se*; whereas those which do not know it, tend thereto as directed by another, as may be seen in the archer and the arrow. Now those that know the end, are always directed to a good as their end; because the will which is the appetite of a previously known end, does not tend towards a thing except under the aspect of good, which is its object. Therefore also those things that do not know the end, are directed to a good as their end. Therefore the end of all is a good.

CHAPTER XVII

THAT ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTED TO ONE END, WHICH IS GOD

FROM the foregoing it is clear that all things are directed to one good as their last end.

For if nothing tends to something as its end, except in so far as this is good,[2] it follows that good, as such, is an end. Consequently that which is the supreme good is supremely the end of all. Now there is but one Supreme

[1] Aristotle, 1 *Ethic.* i.

[2] Ch. xvi.

good, namely God, as we have shown in the First Book.[1] Therefore all things are directed to the Supreme good, namely God, as their end.

Again. *That which is supreme in any genus, is the cause of everything in that genus*:[2] thus fire which is supremely hot is the cause of heat in other bodies. Therefore the supreme good, namely God, is the cause of goodness in all things good. Therefore He is the cause of every end being an end: since whatever is an end, is such, in so far as it is good. Now *the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so*.[3] Therefore God is supremely the end of all things.

Further. In every series of causes, the first cause is more a cause than the second causes: since the second cause is not a cause save through the first. Therefore that which is the first cause in the series of final causes, must needs be more the final cause of each thing, than the proximate final cause. Now God is the first cause in the series of final causes: for He is supreme in the order of good things. Therefore He is the end of each thing more even than any proximate end.

Moreover. In all mutually subordinate ends the last must needs be the end of each preceding end: thus if a potion be mixed to be given to a sick man; and is given to him that he may be purged; and he be purged that he may be lowered, and lowered that he may be healed, it follows that health is the end of the lowering, and of the purging, and of those that precede. Now all things are subordinate in various degrees of goodness to the one supreme good, that is the cause of all goodness: and so, since good has the aspect of an end, all things are subordinate to God as preceding ends under the last end. Therefore God must be the end of all.

Furthermore. The particular good is directed to the common good as its end: for the being of the part is on account of the whole:[4] wherefore *the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man*.[5] Now the supreme good, namely God, is the common good, since the good of all things depends on him: and the good whereby each thing

[1] Ch. xlii. [2] 1 *Metaph.* i. 5.
[3] 1 *Poster.* [4] 1 *Polit.* ii. [5] 1 *Ethic.* ii.

is good, is the particular good of that thing, and of those that depend thereon. Therefore all things are directed to one good, God to wit, as their end.

Again. Order among ends is consequent to the order among agents: for just as the supreme agent moves all second agents, so must all the ends of second agents be directed to the end of the supreme agent: since whatever the supreme agent does, it does for its own end. Now the supreme agent is the active principle of the actions of all inferior agents, by moving all to their actions, and consequently to their ends. Hence it follows that all the ends of second agents are directed by the first agent to its proper end. Now the first agent in all things is God, as we proved in the Second Book.[1] And His will has no other end but His own goodness, which is Himself, as we showed in the First Book.[2] Therefore all things whether they were made by Him immediately, or by means of secondary causes, are directed to God as their end. But this applies to all things: for as we proved in the Second Book,[3] there can be nothing that has not its being from Him. Therefore all things are directed to God as their end.

Moreover. The last end of every maker, as such, is himself: for what we make we use for our own sake: and if at any time a man make a thing for the sake of something else, it is referred to his own good, whether his use, his pleasure, or his virtue. Now God is the cause of all things being made; of some immediately, of others by means of other causes, as we have explained above.[4] Therefore He is the end of all things.

And again. The end holds the highest place among causes, and it is from it that all other causes derive their actual causality: since the agent acts not except for the end, as was proved.[5] And it is due to the agent that the matter is brought to the actuality of the form: wherefore the matter is made actually the matter, and the form is made the form, of this particular thing, through the agent's action, and con-

[1] Ch. xv. [2] Ch. lxxiv. [3] *Loc. cit.*
[4] Bk. II., ch. xv. [5] Ch. ii.

sequently through the end. The later end also, is the cause of the preceding end being intended as an end: for a thing is not moved towards a proximate end, except for the sake of the last end. Therefore the last end is the first cause of all. Now it must needs befit the First Being, namely God, to be the first cause of all, as we proved above.[1] Therefore God is the last end of all.

Hence it is written (Prov. xvi. 13): *The Lord hath made all things for himself:* and (Apoc. xxii. 13), *I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last.*

CHAPTER XVIII

HOW GOD IS THE END OF THINGS

It remains to ask how God is the end of all things: and this shall be made clear from what has been said.

For He is the end of all things, yet so as to precede all in being.[2] Now there is an end which, though it holds the first place in causing forasmuch as it is in the intention, is nevertheless last in execution. This applies to any end which the agent sets up by his action: thus the physician by his action sets up health in the sick man, which is nevertheless his end. There is also an end which, just as it precedes in causing, so also does it precede in being: even so that which one intends to acquire by one's motion or action, is said to be one's end, for instance fire seeks to reach a higher place by its movement, and the king seeks to take a city by fighting. Accordingly God is the end of things as something to be obtained by each thing in its own way.

Again. God is at once the last end of things, and the first agent, as we have shown.[3] Now the end effected by the agent's action, cannot be the first agent, but rather is it the agent's effect. God, therefore, cannot be the end of things, as though He were something effected, but only as something already existing and to be acquired.

[1] Bk. II., ch. xv. [2] Bk. I., ch. xiii. [3] Ch. xvii.

Further. If a thing act for the sake of something already in existence, and if by its action some result ensue; something through the agent's action must accrue to the thing for the sake of which it acts: thus soldiers fight for the cause of their captain, to whom victory accrues, which the soldiers bring about by their actions. Now nothing can accrue to God from the action of anything whatever: since His goodness is perfect in every way, as we proved in the First Book.[1] It follows, then, that God is the end of things, not as something made or effected by them, nor as though He obtained something from things, but in this way alone, that things obtain Him.

Moreover. The effect must tend to the end, in the same way as the agent acts for the end. Now God, who is the first agent of all things, does not act as though He gained something by His action, but as bestowing something thereby: since He is not in potentiality so that He can acquire something, but solely in perfect actuality, whereby He is able to bestow. Things therefore are not directed to God, as to an end that can gain something, but that they may obtain Himself from Him according to their measure, since He is their end.

CHAPTER XIX

THAT ALL THINGS TEND TO BE LIKE UNTO GOD

From the fact that they acquire the divine goodness, creatures are made like unto God. Wherefore if all things tend to God as their last end, so as to acquire His goodness,[2] it follows that the last end of things is to become like unto God.

Moreover. The agent is said to be the end of the effect forasmuch as the effect tends to be like the agent: wherefore *the form of the generator is the end of the act of generation*.[3] Now God is the end of things in such wise as to be also their first active cause. Therefore all things tend to a likeness to God, as their last end.

[1] Ch. xxxvii. *seqq*. [2] Ch. xviii. [3] 2 *Phys*. vii.

Again. Things give evidence that *they naturally desire to be*:[1] so that if any are corruptible, they naturally resist corruptives, and tend to where they can be safeguarded, as the fire tends upwards and earth downwards. Now all things have being in so far as they are like God, who is self-subsistent being: for they are beings only by participation. Therefore all things desire as their last end to be like God.

Further. All creatures are images of the first agent, namely God: since *the agent produces its like*.[2] Now the perfection of an image consists in representing the original by its likeness thereto: for this is why an image is made. Therefore all things are for the purpose of acquiring a divine similitude, as their last end.

Again. Each thing by its movement or action tends to some good as its end, as proved above.[3] Now a thing partakes of the good, in so far as it is like to the sovereign goodness, which is God. Therefore all things, by their movements and actions, tend to a divine likeness as their last end.

CHAPTER XX

HOW THINGS IMITATE THE DIVINE GOODNESS

From what has been said it is clear that the last end of all things is to become like God. Now, that which has properly the aspect of an end, is the good.[4] Therefore, properly speaking, things tend to become like to God forasmuch as He is good.

Now, creatures do not acquire goodness in the way in which it is in God: although each thing imitates the divine goodness, according to its mode. For the divine goodness is simple, being, as it were, all in one. Because the divine being contains the whole fulness of perfection, as we proved in the First Book.[5] Wherefore, since a thing is good so far as it is perfect, God's being is His perfect goodness: for in God, to be, to live, to be wise, to be happy, and whatever

[1] 9 *Ethic.* vii. [2] 1 *De Gen. et Corr.* vii. 6.
[3] Ch. xvi. [4] Ch. xvi. [5] Ch. xxviii.

else is seen to pertain to perfection and goodness, are one and the same in God, as though the sum total of His goodness were God's very being. Again, God's being is the substance of the existing God.[1] But this cannot be so in other things. For it was proved in the Second Book,[2] that no created substance is its own being. Wherefore, if a thing is good so far as it is: and nothing is its own being: none is its own goodness, but each one is good by having a share of good, even as by having a share of being it is a being.

Also. All creatures are not placed on the same level of goodness. For in some the substance is both form and actuality: such, to wit, as are competent, by the mere fact that they exist, to be actually and to be good. Whereas in others, the substance is composed of matter and form: and such are competent to be actually and to be good, but by some part of their being, namely their form. Accordingly God's substance is His goodness: whereas a simple substance participates goodness, by the very fact that it exists: and a composite substance, by some part of itself.

In this third degree of substances, diversity is to be found again in respect of being. For in some composed of matter and form, the form fills the entire potentiality of matter: so that the matter retains no potentiality to another form: and consequently neither is there in any other matter a potentiality to this same form. Such are the heavenly bodies, which consist of their entire matter.—In others the form does not fill the whole potentiality of matter: so that the matter retains a potentiality to another form: and in another part of matter there remains potentiality to this form; for instance in the elements and their compounds. Since, then, privation is the absence in substance of what can be in substance, it is clear that together with this form which does not fill the whole potentiality of matter, there is associated the privation of a form, which privation cannot be associated with a substance whose form fills the whole potentiality of matter, nor with that which is a form essen-

[1] Bk. I., ch. xxi. [2] Ch. xv.

tially, and much less with that one whose essence is its very being. And seeing that it is clear that there can be no movement where there is no potentiality to something else, for movement is *the act of that which is in potentiality*;[1] and since evil is the privation of good: it is clear that in this last order of substances, good is changeable, and has an admixture of the opposite evil; which cannot occur in the higher orders of substances. Therefore the substance answering to this last description stands lowest both in being and in goodness.

We find degrees of goodness also among the parts of this substance composed of matter and form. For since matter considered in itself is being in potentiality, and since form is its act; and again since a composite substance derives actual existence from its form: it follows that the form is, in itself, good; the composite substance is good as having its form actually; and the matter is good, as being in potentiality to the form. And although a thing is good in so far as it is a being, it does not follow that matter, which is only being potentially, is only a potential good. For being is predicated absolutely, while good is founded on order, for a thing is said to be good, not merely because it is an end, or possesses the end; but even though it has not attained the end, so long as it is directed to the end, for this very reason it is said to be good. Accordingly matter cannot be called a being absolutely, because it is a potential being, whereby it is shown to have an order towards being: and yet this suffices for it to be called a good absolutely, on account of this very order. This shows that the good, in a sense, extends further than being; for which reason Dionysius says (*De Div. Nom.* iv.) that *the good includes both existing and non-existing things.* For even non-existent things, namely matter considered as subject to privation, seek a good, namely to exist. Hence it follows that matter also is good; for nothing but the good seeks the good.

In yet another way the creature's goodness falls short from God's. For, as we have stated, God, in His very being,

[1] 3 *Phys.* i.

has supreme perfection of goodness. Whereas the creature has its perfection, not in one thing but in many: because what is united in the highest is manifold in the lowest. Wherefore, in respect of one and the same thing, virtue, wisdom, and operation are predicated of God; but of creatures, in respect of different things: and the further a creature is from the sovereign goodness, the more does the perfection of its goodness require to be manifold. And if it be unable to attain to perfect goodness, it will reach to imperfect goodness in a few respects. Hence it is that although the first and sovereign good is utterly simple, and the substances nearest to it in goodness, approach likewise thereto in simplicity; yet the lowest substances are found to be more simple than some that are higher; elements, for instance, than animals and men, because they are unable to reach the perfection of knowledge and understanding, to which animals and men attain.

From what has been said, it is evident that, although God possesses His perfect and entire goodness in respect of His simple being, creatures nevertheless do not attain to the perfection of their goodness through their being alone, but through many things. Wherefore, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists, it cannot be called good absolutely if it lack other things that are required for its goodness: thus a man who being despoiled of virtue is addicted to vice, is said indeed to be good in a restricted sense, namely as a being, and as a man; but not absolutely; in fact rather should he be called evil. Accordingly it is not the same in every creature, to be and to be good: although each one is good, inasmuch as it exists: whereas in God to be and to be good are simply one and the same.

If, then, each thing tends to a likeness to God's goodness as its end; and a thing is like God's goodness in respect of whatever belongs to its goodness; and the goodness of a thing consists not merely in its being, but in whatever is required for its perfection, as we have proved: it is clear that things are directed to God as their end, not only in respect of their substantial being, but also in respect of such things as are

accidental thereto and belong to its perfection, as well as in respect of their proper operation, which also belongs to a thing's perfection.[1]

CHAPTER XXI

THAT THINGS HAVE A NATURAL TENDENCY TO BE LIKE GOD FORASMUCH AS HE IS A CAUSE

It is clear from the foregoing that things have a tendency to be like God also in the point of their being causes of others.

For the creature tends to be like God by its operation. Now, by its operation, one thing is the cause of another. Therefore things tend to a divine similitude in this also, that they are causes of other things.

Again. Things tend to be like God, forasmuch as He is good, as stated above.[2] Now it is out of His goodness that God bestows being on others; for all things act forasmuch as they are actually perfect. Therefore all things seek to be like God, by being causes of others.

Moreover. Order towards good, is itself a good, as we have shown above.[3] Now every thing forasmuch as it is the cause of another, is directed to a good: for good alone is caused *per se*, and evil is caused only by accident, as we have proved.[4] Therefore it is a good to be a cause of others. Now in respect of any good to which a thing tends, that thing's tendency is to a divine similitude; since every created good is by reason of a share in the divine goodness. Therefore things tend to a divine likeness by being causes of other things.

Again. That the effect tends to be like the agent, amounts to the same as that the agent causes its likeness in its effect: for the effect tends to the end towards which it is directed by the agent. Now the agent tends to assimilate the patient to itself, not only in respect of its being, but also in respect of its causality: because the agent gives to its natural effect not only those natural principles whereby it subsists, but

[1] *Cf.* ch. xxvii. [2] Ch. xx. [3] *Ibid.* [4] Ch. x.

also those whereby it is a cause of other things; thus the animal, when begotten, receives from its begetter both the power of self-nourishment, and the power of generation. Therefore the effect tends to be like the agent, not only in the point of species, but also in the point of its causality of other things. Now things tend to be like God, even as effects tend to be like the agent, as proved above.[1] Therefore things have a natural tendency towards a divine likeness in this, that they are causes of other things.

Moreover. A thing is most perfect when it is able to produce its like: for that light shines perfectly, which gives light to others. Now whatever tends to its own perfection, tends to a divine likeness. Wherefore a thing tends to a divine likeness from the very fact that it tends to be the cause of other things.

Since however a cause, as such, is higher than its effect, it is evident that to tend in this way to a divine likeness, so as to be a cause of other things, belongs to the highest grade among things.

Furthermore. A thing is perfect in itself before being able to cause another, as we have stated already. Hence to be the cause of other things is a perfection that accrues to a thing last. Since then the creature tends to a divine likeness in many points,[2] this remains last, that it seek a likeness to God by being a cause of others. Wherefore Dionysius says (*Cœl. Hier.* iii.) that it is of *all things most godlike to be God's co-operator*; in which sense the Apostle says (1 Cor. iii. 9): *We are God's coadjutors.*

CHAPTER XXII

HOW THINGS ARE DIRECTED IN VARIOUS WAYS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ENDS

It may be shown from the foregoing that the last means whereby a thing is directed to its end is its operation; in various ways, however, according to the variety of opera-

[1] Ch. xix. [2] Ch. xx.

tions. For some things have an operation whereby they move something else; such are *heating*, and *cutting*: and some have an operation in being moved by another: such are *being heated*, and *being cut*. Some operations are a perfection of an actually existing operator, and do not tend to the transmutation of something else: in the former respect these differ from passion and movement, and in the latter from an action which effects a transmutation on some external matter: as an instance of such an operation we have *understanding*, *sensation*, *will*. Wherefore it is clear that things which are set to move or operate only, without moving or making any thing themselves, tend to the divine likeness in that they are perfect in themselves; while those which make and move, as such, tend to a divine likeness, in that they are causes of other things; and that those which move through being moved tend to the divine likeness in both ways.

The lower bodies, in so far as they are moved with natural movements, are considered to be moved only, and not to move except accidentally: for if a stone in its descent puts into motion something that stood in its path, it is an accident: and the same applies to alteration and other movements. Wherefore the end of such movements is that they attain to a divine likeness in the point of their being perfect in themselves, as having their proper form and their proper place.

The heavenly bodies, however, move because they are moved: so that the end of their movement is to attain to a divine likeness in both respects. As regards their own perfection, inasmuch as a heavenly body may be actually *where* previously it was potentially.—Nor does it for this reason attain less to its perfection, although it retains its potentiality to be *where* it was before. For in the same way does primary matter tend to its perfection by acquiring actually the form which it had potentially before, although it ceases to have the one which it had before actually: for thus matter receives successively all the forms to which it has a potentiality, so that its whole potentiality is actualized successively; which could not happen all at one time. Wherefore, since a heavenly body is in potentiality to a particular *whereabouts*,

even as primary matter is to a particular form, it attains to its perfection by the fact that its entire potentiality to a particular whereabouts is successively actualized, which could not happen simultaneously.

Inasmuch as they move by moving, the end of their movement is the attainment of a divine likeness, in that they are causes of other things. Now they are the causes of other things, by causing generation and corruption and other movements in this lower world. Accordingly the movements of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are principles of movement, are directed to generation and corruption in the world beneath them. And it is not unreasonable that the movements of heavenly bodies conduce to the generation of these lower things, although these inferior bodies are of small account in comparison with the heavenly bodies, and yet the end should be of greater account than the means. For the generator's action tends to the form of the generated: and yet that which is generated is not of greater worth than the generator, but, in univocal agents, is of the same species with it. Because the generator intends as its ultimate end not the form of the generated (which form is the end of generation); but the likeness to the Divine Being in the perpetuation of the species, and the diffusion of His goodness, by bestowing its specific form on others, and being the cause of other things. Likewise the heavenly bodies, although of more account than the lower bodies, nevertheless intend by means of their movements the generation of the latter bodies, and to bring to actuality the forms of things generated; not indeed as though this were their ultimate end; but as a means whereby to attain to an ultimate end, the divine likeness, to wit, in that they are causes of other things.

We must take note, however, that a thing, according as it participates in a likeness to God's goodness, which is the object of His will, so too has it a share in a similitude to God's will, whereby things are brought into being and preserved. The higher beings, however, participate in a likeness to the divine goodness in a more simple and universal manner; but the lower beings, in a more particular and divided

way. Wherefore between heavenly and lower bodies, we observe a likeness, not of equiparance, as in things belonging to the same species; but as that which is to be observed between the universal agent and a particular effect. Wherefore just as in this lower world the intention of the particular agent is confined to good of this or that species, so is the intention of the celestial body inclined to the common good of the corporeal substance, which by generation is preserved, multiplied, and increased.

But since, as already stated, everything moved, as such, tends, as towards a divine likeness, to be perfect in itself; and since a thing is perfect in so far as it becomes actual: it follows that the intention of every thing that is in potentiality is to tend to actuality by way of movement. Consequently the more an act is posterior and perfect, the more is the appetite of matter inclined thereto. Therefore the appetite whereby matter seeks a form, must tend towards the last and most perfect act to which matter can attain, as to the ultimate end of generation. Now certain grades are to be found in the acts of forms. For primary matter is in potentiality, first of all, to the elemental form. While under the elemental form, it is in potentiality to the form of a mixed body: wherefore elements are the matter of a mixed body. Considered as under the form of a mixed body, it is in potentiality to a vegetative soul: for the act of such a body is a soul. Again, the vegetative soul is in potentiality to the sensitive, and the sensitive to the intellective. This is proved by the process of generation: for in generation we have first the fetus living with a plant life, afterwards with animal life, and lastly with human life. After this no later or more noble form is to be found in things subject to generation and corruption. Therefore the last end of all generation is the human soul, and to this does matter tend as its ultimate form. Consequently the elements are for the sake of the mixed body, the mixed body for the sake of living things: and of these plants are for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man. Therefore man is the end of all generation. And whereas the same thing is the cause of generation

and preservation of things, the order of the preservation of things is in keeping with the aforesaid order of their generation. Hence we find that mixed bodies are preserved by the qualities becoming to the elements: plants are nourished by mixed bodies; animals derive their nourishment from plants; and some that are more perfect and powerful from the imperfect and weak. Man employs all kinds of things for his own use: some for food, some for clothing. Hence by nature he was made naked, as being able to make himself clothes from other things; even as nature provided him with no becoming nourishment except milk, so that he might supply himself with food from a variety of things. Some he employs as a means of transit: for he is inferior to many animals in swiftness and sustaining power, as though other animals were furnished for his needs. And over and above he employs all things endowed with a sensitive life for the perfection of his intellectual knowledge. Wherefore of man is it said in Psalm viii. 8, the words being addressed to God: *Thou hast subjected all things under his feet.* And Aristotle says (1 *Polit.* xi., xii.) that man exercises a natural sovereignty over all animals.

If, therefore, the movement of the heaven is directed to generation; and all generation is directed to man as the last end of this genus: it is evident that the end of the heavenly movement is directed to man as its last end in the genus of things subject to generation and movement.

This is expressed (Deut. iv. 19) where it is said that God made the heavenly bodies *for the service of all the nations.*

CHAPTER XXIII

THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVEN IS FROM AN INTELLECTIVE PRINCIPLE

It can also be shown from the foregoing that the first principle that causes the heavenly movement is intellective.

For nothing that acts according to its own species intends a form higher than its own, since every agent intends *its*

like.[1] Now a heavenly body, forasmuch as it acts by its own movement, intends the ultimate form, which is the human intellect, which is higher than any corporeal form, as we have proved above.[2] Therefore the heavenly body acts to the effect of generation, not in respect of its own species, as the principal agent does, but in respect of the species of some higher intellectual agent, in relation to which the heavenly body is like an instrument in relation to a principal agent. Now the heaven acts to the effect of generation, inasmuch as it is moved. Therefore the heavenly body is moved by some intellectual substance.

Again. Whatever is in motion must needs be moved by another, as we proved above.[3] Therefore the body of heaven is moved by another. Now this other is either wholly separated from it; or else it is united to it, so that what is composed of heaven and its mover is said to move itself, inasmuch as one part thereof is moved, and the other is mover. If this be the case; since whatever moves itself is living and animate,[4] it follows that the heaven is animate. And not otherwise than with an intellectual soul; for it could not be animated with a nutritive soul, since in the heavenly body there is no generation or corruption; nor with a sensitive soul, since the heavenly body has no variety of organs. Therefore it follows that it is moved by an intellective soul.—If, on the other hand, it be moved by an extrinsic mover, this will be either corporeal or incorporeal. If it be corporeal, it does not cause movement without being moved, for no body moves unless it be moved, as was shown above.[5] So that this too will require to be moved by another. But as it is not possible to have an infinite series of bodies, we must come to some incorporeal first mover. Now that which is utterly separated from a body must be intellectual, as we have shown.[6] Therefore the movement of the heaven which is first among corporeal beings, is caused by some intellectual substance.

Moreover. Heavy and light bodies are moved by

[1] *De Gener.* vii. [2] Ch. xxii. [3] Bk. I., ch. xiii.
[4] Bk. I., ch. xcvii. [5] Bk. II., ch. xx. [6] Bk. I., ch. xliv.

their generator and by that which removes obstacles, as is proved in 8 *Phys.* iv.: for it is impossible that their form be mover and the matter moved, for nothing is moved except a body. Now as the elemental bodies are simple, and there is no composition in them, except that of matter and form, so too are the heavenly bodies simple. Hence if they be moved as heavy and light bodies, it follows that they are moved *per se* by their generator, and accidentally by that which removes an obstacle. But this is impossible: for these bodies cannot be generated, because there is no contrariety in them: and their movements cannot be hindered. Therefore these bodies must needs be moved by things that cause movement by a power of apprehension: which power cannot be sensitive, as we have proved. Therefore it must be an intellective power.

Further. If the principle of the heavenly movement be from nature alone, without any kind of apprehension, it follows that it must be the form of the heavenly body, as is the case with the elements: for although simple forms do not cause movement, they are principles of movements, since natural movements, like all other natural properties, follow from them. Now it is impossible that the heavenly movement follow the form of the heavenly body as its active principle: because thus the form is the principle of local movement, inasmuch as to a particular body, in respect of its form, is due a particular place, to which it is moved by virtue of its form that tends to that place: and because the generator gives this form, it is said to be a mover: even so it is due to fire, in respect of its form, to be in a higher place. Now one place is not more due to a heavenly body in respect of its form, than another. Therefore nature alone is not the principle of the heavenly movement: and consequently the principle of its movement must be something that moves it by apprehension.

Again. Nature always tends to one thing: wherefore things that come from nature, come always in the same way, unless they be hindered: and this seldom happens. Therefore that which is essentially difform cannot possibly be

an end towards which nature tends. Now movement is essentially such; for that which is moved, as such, *is conditioned otherwise now and before.*[1] Consequently nature cannot intend movement for its own sake. Therefore it intends through movement to obtain rest which in relation to movement is as one to many: for a thing is at rest which *is conditioned in the same way now as before.* Accordingly if the heavenly movement were from nature alone, it would be directed to some kind of rest: whereas the contrary is the case, for it is unceasing. Therefore the movement of the heaven is not from nature as its active principle, but from an intelligent substance.

Also. In every movement that is of nature as its active principle, if approach to a particular term be natural, recession from that term must be unnatural and contrary to nature: thus a heavy body naturally seeks a lower place, and recedes therefrom unnaturally. Therefore if the movement of the heaven were natural, since it tends to the west naturally, it would be contrary to nature for it to return from the west to the east. But this is impossible: for nothing in the heavenly movement is violent or unnatural. Consequently it is impossible for nature to be the active principle of the heavenly movement. Therefore its active principle is some apprehensive power, which must be an intelligence, as we have proved above. Therefore the heavenly body is moved by an intelligent substance.

And yet we must not deny that the heavenly movement is natural. For a movement is said to be natural, not only on account of its active principle, but also on account of its passive principle. This is evident in the generation of simple bodies: since such generation cannot be called natural in relation to the active principle. Because for a thing to be moved naturally by an active principle, it must have this active principle within itself, for *nature is a principle of movement in a thing in which it is*:[2] whereas the active principle in the generation of a simple body, is without. Therefore it is not natural by reason of its active principle,

[1] 5 *Phys.* i. [2] 2 *Phys.* i.

but only by reason of its passive principle, namely matter, wherein there is a natural appetite for its natural form. Accordingly the movement of the heavenly body, as to its active principle, is not natural, but voluntary and intellectual: while as to its passive principle it is natural; since a heavenly body has a natural inclination for that movement.

This is made clear if we consider the relation of a heavenly body to its place. For a thing is passive and moved according as it is in potentiality, and it is active and moves according as it is in a state of actuality. Now a heavenly body considered in its substance, and as in potentiality, is indifferent to any place, even as primary matter is indifferent to any form, as we have stated.[1] But it is otherwise with a heavy or light body, which, considered in itself, is not indifferent to any place, and has a definite place appointed to it by reason of its form. Wherefore the nature of heavy and light bodies is the active principle of their movements, while the nature of a heavenly body is the passive principle of its movement. Consequently we must not think that it is moved by violence, like heavy and light bodies, which are moved by us through our intelligence. For heavy and light bodies have a natural aptitude for a movement contrary to that with which they are moved by us; and so they are moved by us violently; albeit the movement of an animal's body, whereby that body is moved by the soul, is not violent to that body as animated, although it is violent in so far as that body is something heavy. On the other hand the heavenly bodies have no aptitude for a contrary movement, but only for that wherewith they are moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently it is both voluntary, as regards its active principle, and natural, as to its passive principle.

That the heavenly movement be voluntary in respect of its active principle, is not inconsistent with the fact that it is one and uniform, for all that the will is indifferent to many things and is not determined to any one. For just as nature is determined to one by its power, so is the will determined

[1] Ch. xxii.

to one by its wisdom, by which the will is unerringly directed to one end.

It is evident from the foregoing that neither approach to any one place nor recession therefrom is contrary to nature. For this happens in the movement of heavy and light bodies for two reasons. First, because the intention of nature, in heavy and light bodies, is determined towards one place: wherefore just as the body naturally tends thereto, so does it recede therefrom against nature: secondly, because two movements, one of which approaches a given term and the other recedes therefrom, are contrary. If, however, we take not the last but a middle place in the movement of heavy and light bodies, both approach thereto and recession therefrom are natural: because the whole movement comes under the intention of nature: and the movements are not contrary, but are one continuous movement.

It is the same in the movement of heavenly bodies: because the intention of nature is not towards one determinate place, as we have said already: moreover the movement with which a body moved in a circle recedes from any given place, is not contrary to the movement with which it approaches towards it, but is one continuous movement: so that any given point in the heavenly movement is like a middle point, and not like the term in a straight movement.

Nor does it make any difference, as to the present question, whether the heavenly body be moved by an intellectual substance united to it, so as to be its soul, or by a separate substance: nor whether each heavenly body be moved by God immediately; or none, and each be moved by the intermediary of created intellectual substances: or only the first heavenly body by God immediately, and the others through the intermediary of created substances: so long as we admit that the heavenly movement is caused by an intellectual substance.

CHAPTER XXIV

HOW EVEN THINGS DEVOID OF KNOWLEDGE SEEK THE GOOD

If, as we have shown,[1] the heavenly body is moved by an intelligent substance, and the movement of the heavenly body is directed to generation in this lower world: it follows that the generations and movements of these lower bodies proceed from the intention of an intelligent substance. For the intention of the principal agent bears on the same thing as that of the instrument. Now the heaven is the cause of the movements of lower bodies by reason of its movement with which it is moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently it is as an instrument of an intelligent substance. Therefore the forms and movements of the lower bodies are caused by an intelligent substance; and are intended by it as by a principal agent, and by the heavenly body, as by an instrument.

Now the species of things caused and intended by an intellectual agent must pre-exist in his intellect: just as the forms of the products of art pre-exist in the mind of the craftsman and flow thence into his work. Consequently all forms that are in these lower bodies, and all their movements flow from intellectual forms which are in the intellect of some substance or substances. Hence Boetius says (*De Trin.* ii.) that *forms which are in matter originated in forms that are immaterial.* In this respect the saying of Plato[1] is verified, that separate forms are the principles of forms that exist in matter: although Plato held them to be *per se* subsistent, and to be the immediate cause of the forms of sensible bodies: whereas we hold them to exist in an intellect, and to cause lower forms through the heavenly movement.

And since whatever is moved by anything *per se* and not accidentally, is directed thereby towards the end of its movement;[2] and since the heavenly body is moved by an

[1] Ch. xxiii. [2] *Cf.* Aristotle, 1 *Metaph.* vi.

intellectual substance; and the heavenly body, by its movement, causes all movement in this lower world; it follows of necessity that the heavenly body is directed to the end of its movement, by an intellectual substance, and consequently all lower bodies to their respective ends.

Accordingly it is easy to understand how natural bodies devoid of knowledge are moved and act for the sake of an end. For they tend to an end, as directed thereto by an intelligent substance: in the same way as an arrow, directed by the archer, tends to the mark. Because as the arrow receives its direction to a fixed end through the aim of the archer, so too natural bodies receive an inclination to their natural ends from their natural movers, whence they derive their forms, powers and movements.

Wherefore it is also clear that every work of nature is the work of an intelligent substance: because an effect is ascribed more especially to the direction of the first mover towards the end, than to the instruments which receive that direction. For this reason the operations of nature are seen to proceed in an orderly manner even as the operations of a wise man.

It is therefore evident that even things devoid of knowledge can work for an end, and desire good with a natural appetite. Also that they seek a divine likeness, as well as their own perfection. Nor does it matter in which way we express it, the former or the latter. Because by tending to their own perfection, they tend to a good, since a thing is good forasmuch as it is perfect. And according as a thing tends to be good, it tends to a divine likeness: since a thing is like unto God forasmuch as it is good. Now this or that particular good is so far appetible as it bears a likeness to the first goodness. Therefore the reason why a thing tends to its own good, is because it tends to a divine likeness, and not vice versa. It is clear therefore that all things seek a divine likeness as their last end.

A thing's own good can be understood in several ways. First, in the sense that it is proper to that thing on the part of the individual. Thus an animal desires its own good, when it desires food, whereby its existence is preserved.—

Secondly, as being proper to that thing on the part of its species. Thus an animal desires its own good, forasmuch as it desires to beget offspring and to feed it, as well as whatever else conduces to the preservation or defence of the individuals of its species.—Thirdly, on the part of the genus. And thus an equivocal agent, for instance the heaven, desires its own good, in causing.—Fourthly, on the part of a likeness of analogy between effect and cause. Thus God, who is outside all genera, gives being to all things on account of his own goodness.

This clearly proves that the more perfect a thing's power, and the higher its degree of goodness, the more universal its desire for good, and the greater the range of goodness to which its appetite and operation extend. For imperfect things extend no further than their own individual good; but perfect things extend to the good of the species; more perfect things, to the good of the genus; and God who is most perfect in goodness, to the good of all being. Wherefore it is said by some, not without reason, that *good, as such, is self-diffusive,*[1] because the better a thing is, the further does the outpouring of its goodness extend. And since, *in every genus, that which is most perfect is the exemplar and measure of all that belongs to that genus,*[2] it follows that God, who is most perfect in goodness, and pours forth his goodness most universally, is in his outpouring the exemplar of all things that pour forth goodness. Now one thing becomes a cause of another by pouring forth its own goodness into that other. And so it is again evident that whatever tends to be the cause of something else, tends to a divine likeness, and yet tends to its own good. Consequently it is not unreasonable to say that the movements of heavenly bodies, and the actions of their movers, are in a way for the sake of these bodies that are generated and corrupted, and of less account than they are. For they are not for the sake of these as their last end: but by intending the generation of these, they intend their own good, and the divine likeness as their last end.

[1] Dionys., *De Div. Nom.* iv. [2] 1 *Metaph.* i. 5.

CHAPTER XXV

THAT TO KNOW GOD IS THE END OF EVERY INTELLIGENT SUBSTANCE

Now, seeing that all creatures, even those that are devoid of reason, are directed to God as their last end: and that all reach this end in so far as they have some share of a likeness to him:[1] the intellectual creature attains to him in a special way, namely through its proper operation, by understanding him. Consequently this must be the end of the intelligent creature, namely to understand God.

For, as we have shown above,[2] God is the end of each thing: wherefore as far as it is possible to it each thing intends to be united to God as its last end. Now a thing is more closely united to God by reaching in a way to the very substance of God; which happens when it knows something of the divine substance,—than when it reaches to a divine likeness. Therefore the intellectual substance tends to the knowledge of God as its last end.

Again. The operation proper to a thing is the end thereof: for it is its second perfection; so that when a thing is well conditioned for its proper operation it is said to be efficient and good. Now understanding is the proper operation of the intellectual substance: and consequently it is its end. Therefore whatever is most perfect in this operation, is its last end; especially in those operations which are not directed to some product, such as understanding and sensation. And since operations of this kind take their species from their objects, by which also they are known, it follows that the more perfect the object of any such operation, the more perfect is the operation. Consequently to understand the most perfect intelligible, namely God, is the most perfect in the genus of this operation which is to understand. Therefore to know God by an act of intelligence is the last end of every intellectual substance.

Someone, however, might say that the last end of an

[1] Ch. xvii. *seqq.* [2] Ch. xvii.

intellectual substance consists indeed in understanding the best intelligible: but that what is the best intelligible for this or that intellectual substance, is not simply the best intelligible; and that the higher the intellectual substance, the higher is its best intelligible. So that possibly the supreme intellectual substance has for its best intelligible that which is best simply, and its happiness will consist in understanding God: whereas the happiness of any lower intellectual substance will consist in understanding some lower intelligible, which however will be the highest thing understood by that substance. Especially would it seem not to be in the power of the human intellect to understand that which is simply the best intelligible, on account of its weakness: for it is as much adapted for knowing the supreme intelligible, *as the owl's eye for seeing the sun.*[1]

Nevertheless it is evident that the end of any intellectual substance, even the lowest, is to understand God. For it has been shown above[2] that God is the last end towards which all things tend. And the human intellect, although the lowest in the order of intelligent substances, is superior to all that are devoid of understanding. Since then a more exalted substance has not a less exalted end, God will be the end also of the human intelligence. Now every intelligent being attains to its last end by understanding it, as we have proved. Therefore the human intellect attains to God as its end, by understanding Him.

Again. Just as things devoid of intelligence tend to God as their end, by way of assimilation, so do intelligent substances by way of knowledge, as clearly appears from what has been said. Now although things devoid of reason tend towards a likeness to their proximate causes, the intention of nature does not rest there, but has for its end a likeness to the sovereign good, as we have proved,[3] although they are able to attain to this likeness in a most imperfect manner. Therefore however little be the knowledge of God to which the intellect is able to attain, this will be the intellect's last end, rather than the perfect knowledge of lower intelligibles.

[1] 1 *Metaph.* i. [2] Ch. xvii. [3] Ch. xix.

Moreover. Everything desires its last end most of all. Now the human intellect desires, loves and enjoys the knowledge of divine things, although it can grasp but little about them, more than the perfect knowledge which it has of the lower world. Therefore man's last end is to understand God in some way or other.

Further. Everything tends to a divine likeness as its own end. Therefore a thing's last end is that whereby it is most of all like unto God. Now the intellectual creature is especially likened to God in that it is intellectual: since this likeness belongs to it above other creatures, and includes all other likenesses. And in this particular kind of likeness it is more like God in understanding actually than in understanding habitually or potentially: because God is always actually understanding, as we proved in the First Book.[1] And in understanding actually he is especially like God, in understanding God: because by understanding Himself God understands all other things, as we proved in the First Book.[2] Therefore the last end of every intelligent substance is to understand God.

Again. That which is lovable only on account of another, is for the sake of that which is lovable for its own sake alone: because we cannot go on indefinitely in the appetite of nature, since then nature's desire would be in vain, for it is impossible to pass through an infinite number of things. Now all practical sciences, arts and powers are lovable only for the sake of something else, since their end is not knowledge, but work. But speculative sciences are lovable for their own sake, for their end is knowledge itself. Nor can we find any action in connexion with man, that is not directed to some other end, with the exception of speculative consideration. For even playful actions, which would seem to be done without any purpose, have some end due to them, namely that the mind may be relaxed, and that thereby we may afterwards become more fit for studious occupations: else we should always have to be playing, if play were desirable for its own sake, and this is unreasonable. Accordingly

[1] Ch. lvi. [2] Ch. xlix.

practical art is directed to speculative art, and again every human operation, to intellectual speculation, as its end. Now, in all sciences and arts that are mutually subordinate, the last end apparently belongs to the one from which others take their rules and principles: thus the art of sailing, to which belongs the ship's end, namely its use, provides rules and principles to the art of ship-building. And such is the relation of metaphysics to other speculative sciences, for all others depend thereon, since they derive their principles from it, and are directed by it in defending those principles; moreover metaphysics is wholly directed to God as its last end, wherefore it is called the *divine science*.[1] Therefore the knowledge of God is the last end of all human knowledge and actions.

Furthermore. In all mutually subordinate agents and movers, the end of the first agent must be the end of all: even as the end of the commander in chief is the end of all who are soldiering under him. Now of all the parts of man, the intellect is the highest mover: for it moves the appetite, by proposing its object to it; and the intellective appetite or will, moves the sensitive appetites, namely the irascible and concupiscible, so that we do not obey the concupiscence, unless the will command; and the sensitive appetite, the will consenting, moves the body. Therefore the end of the intellect is the end of all human actions. *Now the intellect's end and good are the true*,[2] and its last end is the first truth. Therefore the last end of all man and of all his deeds and desires, is to know the first truth, namely God.

Moreover. Man has a natural desire to know the causes of whatever he sees: wherefore through wondering at what they saw, and ignoring its cause, men first began to philosophize, and when they had discovered the cause they were at rest.[3] Nor do they cease inquiring until they come to the first cause; and *then do we deem ourselves to know perfectly when we know the first cause*.[4] Therefore man naturally desires, as his last end, to know the first cause. But God is

[1] 1 *Metaph.* ii.
[2] 6 *Ethic.* ii.
[3] 1 *Metaph.* ii.
[4] *Ibid.* iii.

the first cause of all. Therefore man's last end is to know God.

Besides. Man naturally desires to know the cause of any known effect. Now the human intellect knows universal being. Therefore it naturally desires to know its cause, which is God alone, as we proved in the Second Book.[1] Now one has not attained to one's last end until the natural desire is at rest. Therefore the knowledge of any intelligible object is not enough for man's happiness, which is his last end, unless he know God also, which knowledge terminates his natural desire, as his last end. Therefore this very knowledge of God is man's last end.

Further. A body that tends by its natural appetite to its place, is moved all the more vehemently and rapidly, the nearer it approaches its end: wherefore Aristotle proves (I. *De Cœl.* viii.) that a natural straight movement cannot be towards an indefinite point, because it would not be more moved afterwards than before. Hence that which tends more vehemently to a thing afterwards than before, is not moved towards an indefinite point but towards something fixed. Now this we find in the desire of knowledge: for the more one knows, the greater one's desire to know. Consequently man's natural desire in knowledge tends to a definite end. This can be no other but the highest thing knowable, which is God. Therefore the knowledge of God is man's last end.

Now the last end of man and of any intelligent substance is called *happiness* or *beatitude*: for it is this that every intelligent substance desires as its last end, and for its own sake alone. Therefore the last beatitude or happiness of any intelligent substance is to know God.

Hence it is said (Matth. v. 8): *Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God :* and (Jo. xvii. 3): *This is eternal life : that they may know thee, the only true God.* Aristotle agrees with this statement (10 *Ethic.* vii.) when he says that man's ultimate happiness is *contemplative, in regard to his contemplating the highest object of contemplation.*

[1] Ch. xv.

CHAPTER XXVI

DOES HAPPINESS CONSIST IN AN ACT OF THE WILL?

SINCE the intellectual substance attains to God by its operation, not only by an act of understanding but also by an act of the will, through desiring and loving Him, and through delighting in Him, someone might think that man's last end and ultimate happiness consists, not in knowing but in loving God or in some other act of the will towards Him: especially seeing that the object of the will is the good, which has the aspect of an end, whereas the true, which is the object of the intellect, has not the aspect of an end except forasmuch as it also is a good. Wherefore seemingly man does not attain to his last end by an act of his intellect, but rather by an act of his will.

Further. The ultimate perfection of operation is delight, *which perfects operation as beauty perfects youth*, as the Philosopher says (10 *Ethic.* iv.). Hence if the last end be a perfect operation, it would seem that it must consist in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

Again. Delight apparently is desired for its own sake so that it is never desired for the sake of something else: for it is silly to ask of anyone why he seeks to be delighted. Now this is a condition of the ultimate end, namely that it be sought for its own sake. Therefore seemingly the last end consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

Moreover. All agree in their desire for the last end, for it is a natural desire. Now more people seek delight than knowledge. Therefore delight would seem to be the last end rather than knowledge.

Furthermore. The will is seemingly a higher power than the intellect: for the will moves the intellect to its act; since when a person wills, his intellect considers by an act what he holds by a habit. Wherefore seemingly the act of the will is higher than the act of the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the last end, which is beatitude, consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

But this can be clearly shown to be impossible. For since happiness is the proper good of the intellectual nature, it must needs become the intellectual nature according to that which is proper thereto. Now appetite is not proper to the intellectual nature, but is in all things, although it is different in different things. This difference, however, arises from things having a different relation to knowledge. For things wholly devoid of knowledge have only a natural appetite: those that have a sensitive knowledge, have also a sensitive appetite, under which the irascible and concupiscible appetites are comprised. And those which have intellective knowledge, have also an appetite proportionate to that knowledge, namely the will. The will therefore, forasmuch as it is an appetite, is not proper to the intellectual nature, but only in so far as it is dependent on the intellect. On the other hand the intellect is in itself proper to the intellectual nature. Therefore beatitude or happiness consists principally and essentially in an act of the intellect, rather than in an act of the will.

Again. In all powers that are moved by their objects, the object is naturally prior to the acts of those powers: even as the mover is naturally prior to the movable being moved. Now such a power is the will: for the appetible object moves the appetite. Therefore the will's object is naturally prior to its act: and consequently its first object precedes its every act. Therefore an act of the will cannot be the first thing willed. But this is the last end, which is beatitude. Therefore beatitude or happiness cannot be the very act of the will.

Besides. In all those powers which are able to reflect on their acts, their act must first bear on some other object, and afterwards the power is brought to bear on its own act. For if the intellect understand that it understands, we must suppose first that it understands some particular thing, and that afterwards it understands that it understands: for this very act of intelligence which the intellect understands, must have an object. Hence either we must go on for ever, or if we come to some first thing understood, this will not be

an act of understanding, but some intelligible thing. In the same way the first thing willed cannot be the very act of willing, but must be some other good. Now the first thing willed by an intelligent nature, is beatitude or happiness: because for its sake we will whatever we will. Therefore happiness cannot consist in an act of the will.

Further. The truth of a thing's nature is derived from those things which constitute its essence: for a true man differs from a man in a picture, by the things which constitute man's essence. Now false happiness does not differ from true in an act of the will: because whatever be proposed to the will as the supreme good, whether truly or falsely, it makes no difference to the will, desiring, loving, or enjoying that good: the difference is on the part of the intellect, as to whether the good proposed as supreme be truly so or not. Therefore beatitude or happiness consists essentially in an act of the intellect rather than of the will.

Again. If an act of the will were happiness itself, this act would be either desire, or love, or joy. But desire cannot possibly be the last end. For desire implies that the will is tending to what it has not yet; and this is contrary to the very notion of the last end.—Nor can love be the last end. For a good is loved not only while it is in our possession, but even when it is not: because it is through love that we seek by desire what we have not: and if love of a thing we possess is more perfect, this arises from the fact that we possess the good we love. It is one thing, therefore, to possess the good which is our end; and another to love it, which love before we possessed was imperfect, and perfect after we obtained possession.—Nor again is delight the last end. For it is possession of the good that causes delight; whether we are conscious of possessing it actually; or call to mind our previous possession; or hope to possess it in the future. Therefore delight is not the last end.—Therefore no act of the will can be happiness itself essentially.

Furthermore. If delight were the last end, it would be desirable for its own sake. But this is not true. Because the desirability of a delight depends on what gives rise to the

delight: since that which arises from good and desirable operations, is itself good and desirable, but that which arises from evil operations, is itself evil and to be avoided. Therefore its goodness and desirability are from something else: and consequently it is not itself the last end or happiness.

Moreover. The right order of things agrees with the order of nature: for in the natural order things are directed to their end without any error. Now, in the natural order delight is on account of operation and not conversely. For it is to be observed that nature has joined delight with those animal operations which are clearly directed to necessary ends; for instance to the use of food that is directed to the preservation of the individual; and to sexual matters, that are appointed for the preservation of the species: since were there no pleasure, animals would abstain from the use of these necessary things. Therefore delight cannot be the last end.

Again. Delight, seemingly, is nothing else than the quiescence of the will in some becoming good, just as desire is the inclining of the will towards the attaining of some good. Now just as by his will, a man is inclined towards an end, and rests in it; so too have natural bodies a natural inclination to their respective ends, and are at rest when they have once attained their end. Now it is absurd to say that the end of the movement of a heavy body is not to be in its proper place, but that it is the quiescence of the inclination towards that place. For if it were nature's chief intent that this inclination should be quiescent, it would not give such an inclination: but it gives it so that the body may tend towards its place: and when it has arrived there, as though it were its end, quiescence of the inclination follows. Hence this quiescence is not the end, but accompanies the end. Neither therefore is delight the ultimate end, but accompanies it. Much less therefore is happiness any act of the will.

Besides. If a thing have something extrinsic for its end, the operation whereby it first obtains that thing will be called its last end: thus for those whose end is money, possession is said to be their end, but not love or desire. Now the

last end of the intellective substance is God. Hence that operation of man whereby he first obtains God is essentially his happiness or beatitude. And this is understanding: since we cannot will what we do not understand. Therefore man's ultimate happiness is essentially to know God by the intellect, and not an act of the will.

From what has been said we can now solve the arguments that were objected in the contrary sense. For it does not necessarily follow that happiness is essentially the very act of the will, from the fact that it is the object of the will, through being the highest good, as the first argument reasoned. On the contrary the fact that it is the first object of the will, shows that it is not an act of the will, as appears from what we have said.

Nor does it follow that whatever perfects a thing in any way whatever, must be the end of that thing; as the second objection argued. For a thing perfects another in two ways: first it perfects a thing that has its species; secondly it perfects a thing that it may have its species. Thus the perfection of a house considered as already having its species, is that to which the species " house " is directed, namely to be a dwelling: for one would not build a house but for that: and consequently we must include this in the definition of a house, if the definition is to be perfect. On the other hand the perfection that conduces to the species of a house, is both that which is directed to the completion of the species, for instance its essential principles; and that which conduces to the preservation of the species, for instance the buttresses which are made to support the building; and those things which make the house more fit for use, for instance, the symmetry of the building. Accordingly that which is the perfection of a thing considered as already having its species, is its end; as the end of a house is to be a dwelling. Likewise, the operation proper to a thing, its use, as it were, is its end. On the other hand whatever perfects a thing by conducing to its species, is not the end of that thing: in fact the thing is its end; thus matter and form are for the sake of the species. For although the form is the end of generation, it is not the

end of the thing already generated and having its species, but is required in order that the species be complete. Again, things that preserve the thing in its species, such as health and the nutritive power, although they perfect the animal, are not the animal's end, but vice versa. And again, those things that adapt a thing for the perfection of its proper specific operations, and for the easier attainment of its proper end, are not the end of that thing, but vice versa: for instance, a man's comeliness and bodily strength, and the like, of which the Philosopher says (I *Ethic.* viii., ix.) that they *conduce to happiness instrumentally*.—Now delight is a perfection of operation, not as though operation were directed thereto in respect of its species, for thus it is directed to other ends; thus eating, in respect of its species, is directed to the preservation of the individual: but it is like a perfection that is conducive to a thing's species: since for the sake of the delight we perform more attentively and becomingly an operation we delight in. Wherefore the Philosopher (10 *Ethic.* iv.) says that *delight perfects operation as beauty perfects youth*: for beauty is for the sake of the one who has youth.—Nor is the fact that men seek delight not for the sake of something else but for its own sake, a sufficient indication that delight is the last end, as the third objection argued. Because delight, though it is not the last end, nevertheless accompanies the last end: since delight arises from the attainment of the end.

Nor do more people seek the pleasure that comes from knowledge, than knowledge itself. But more there are who seek sensible delights than intellectual knowledge and the delight consequent thereto: because those things that are without, are better known to the majority, in that human knowledge takes its beginning from sensible objects.

The suggestion put forward by the fifth argument, that the will is a higher power than the intellect, as being the latter's motive force, is clearly untrue. Because the intellect moves the will, first and *per se*: for the will, as such, is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good: whereas the will moves the intellect accidentally as it were, in so far, to wit, that the act of intelligence is itself appre-

hended as a good, and on that account is desired by the will, the result being that the intellect understands actually. Even in this, the intellect precedes the will, for the will would never seek the act of intelligence, did not the intellect first apprehend its act of intelligence as a good.—And again, the will moves the intellect to actual operation, in the same way as an agent is said to move; whereas the intellect moves the will in the same way as the end moves, for the good understood is the end of the will. Now the agent in moving comes after the end, for the agent does not move except on account of the end. It is therefore clear that the intellect is simply higher than the will; while the will is higher than the intellect accidentally and in a restricted sense.

CHAPTER XXVII

THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN CARNAL PLEASURES

From what has been said it is clearly impossible that human happiness consist in pleasures of the body, the chief of which are pleasures of the table and of sex.

It has been shown[1] that according to nature's order, pleasure is on account of operation, and not conversely. Wherefore if an operation be not the ultimate end, the consequent pleasure can neither be the ultimate end, nor accompany the ultimate end. Now it is manifest that the operations which are followed by the pleasures mentioned above, are not the last end: for they are directed to certain manifest ends; eating, for instance, to the preservation of the body, and carnal intercourse to the begetting of children. Therefore the aforesaid pleasures are not the last end, nor do they accompany the last end. Therefore happiness does not consist in them.

Again. The will is higher than the sensitive appetite: for it moves it, as stated above.[2] But happiness does not consist in an act of the will, as we have already proved.[3]

[1] Ch. xxv. [2] Ch. xxv. [3] Ch. xxvi.

Much less therefore does it consist in the aforesaid pleasures which are seated in the sensitive appetite.

Moreover. Happiness is a good proper to man: for it is an abuse of terms to speak of dumb animals as being happy. Now these pleasures are common to man and beast. Therefore we must not assign happiness to them.

Besides. The highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being united to things lower than himself, but consists in his being united to something above him; for the end is better than that which tends to the end. Now these pleasures consist in man being united through his senses to things beneath him, namely certain sensible objects. Therefore we must not assign happiness to suchlike pleasures.

Further. That which is not good unless it be moderate, is not good in itself, but receives its goodness from its moderator. Now the use of the aforesaid pleasures is not good for man unless it be moderate: for otherwise they would frustrate one another. Therefore these pleasures are not in themselves man's good. But the sovereign good is good essentially, because that which is good of itself is better than what is good through another. Therefore suchlike pleasures are not man's supreme good, which is happiness.

Again. In all *per se* predications, if A be predicated of B simply, an increase in A will be predicated of an increase in B: thus if a hot thing heats, a hotter thing heats more, and the hottest thing heats most. Accordingly if the pleasures in question were good in themselves, it would follow that to use them very much is very good. But this is clearly false: because it is considered sinful to use them too much: besides it is hurtful to the body, and hinders pleasures of the same kind. Therefore they are not *per se* man's good: and human happiness does not consist in them.

Again. Acts of virtue are praiseworthy through being directed to happiness.[1] If therefore human happiness consisted in the aforesaid pleasures, an act of virtue would be

[1] *Cf.* 1 *Ethic.* xii.

more praiseworthy in acceding to them than in abstaining from them. But this is clearly untrue: for the act of temperance is especially praised in abstinence from pleasures; whence that act takes its name. Therefore man's happiness is not in these pleasures.

Furthermore. The last end of everything is God, as was proved above.[1] We must therefore posit as man's last end that by which especially man approaches to God. Now man is hindered by the aforesaid pleasures from his chief approach to God, which is effected by contemplation, to which these same pleasures are a very great hindrance, since more than anything they plunge man into the midst of sensible things, and consequently withdraw him from intelligible things. Therefore human happiness is not to be placed in bodily pleasures.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Epicureans who ascribed man's happiness to pleasures of this kind: in their person Solomon says (Eccles. v. 17): *This therefore hath seemed good to me, that a man should eat and drink, and enjoy the fruit of his labour . . . and this is his portion:* and (Wis. ii. 9): *Let us everywhere leave tokens of joy: for this is our portion, and this is our lot.*

The error of the Cerinthians is also refuted: for they *pretended that,* in the state of final happiness, *after the resurrection Christ will reign for a thousand years, and men will indulge in the carnal pleasures of the table: wherefore they are called 'Chiliastae,'*[2] or believers in the Millennium.

The fables of the Jews and Mohammedans are also refuted: who pretend that the reward of the righteous consists in suchlike pleasures: for happiness is the reward of virtue.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN HONOURS

From the foregoing it is also clear that neither does man's supreme good, or happiness, consist in honours.

For man's ultimate end and happiness is his most perfect

[1] Ch. xvii. [2] Augustine, *De Haeres.*, haer. viii.

operation, as we have shown above.[1] But man's honour does not consist in something done by him, but in something done to him by another who shows him honour. Therefore man's happiness must not be placed in honours.

Again. That which is on account of another good and desirable thing is not the last end. Now such is honour: for a man is not rightly honoured, except on account of some other good in him. For this reason do men seek to be honoured, as though wishing to have a voucher for some good that is in them: so that they rejoice more in being honoured by the great and the wise.[2] Therefore we must not assign man's happiness to honours.

Besides. Happiness is obtained through virtue. Now virtuous deeds are voluntary, else they were not praiseworthy. Therefore happiness must be a good obtainable by man through his will. But it is not in a man's power to secure honour, rather is it in the power of the man who pays honour.[3] Therefore happiness is not to be assigned to honours.

Moreover. Only the good can be worthy of honour: and yet it is possible even for the wicked to be honoured. Therefore it is better to become worthy of honour, than to be honoured. Therefore honour is not man's supreme good.

Furthermore. The supreme good is the perfect good. Now the perfect good is incompatible with any evil. But that which has no evil in it cannot possibly be evil. Therefore that which is in possession of the supreme good cannot be evil. Yet it is possible for an evil person to receive honour. Therefore honour is not man's supreme good.

CHAPTER XXIX

THAT MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS NOT IN GLORY

WHEREFORE it is evident also that man's supreme good does not consist in glory which is the recognition of one's good name.

[1] Ch. xxv [2] 1 *Ethic.* v [3] *Ibid*

For glory, according to Cicero,[1] is *the general recognition and praise of a person's good name*, and in the words of Ambrose[2] consists in *being well known and praised*. Now men seek praise and distinction through being famous, so that they may be honoured by those whom their fame reaches. Therefore glory is sought for the sake of honour: and consequently if honour be not the sovereign good, much less is glory.

Again. Those goods are worthy of praise, whereby a man shows himself to be directed to his end. Now he who is directed to his end has not yet reached his last end. Therefore praise is not bestowed on one who has reached his last end: rather does he receive honour as the Philosopher says (1 *Ethic.* xii.). Therefore glory cannot be the supreme good: since it consists chiefly in praise.

Besides. It is better to know than to be known: because only the higher things know; whereas the lowest are known. Therefore man's supreme good cannot be glory, which consists in a man being known.

Further. A man does not seek to be known except in good things: and in evil things he seeks to be hidden. Therefore to be known is good and desirable, on account of the good things that are known in a man. Therefore these good things are better still. Consequently glory, which consists in a man being known, is not his supreme good.

Moreover. The supreme good must needs be perfect, for it satisfies the appetite. But the knowledge of one's good name, wherein glory consists, is imperfect: for it is beset with much uncertainty and error. Therefore glory of this kind cannot be the supreme good.

Furthermore. Man's supreme good must be supremely stable in human things: for it is natural to desire unfailing endurance in one's goods. Now glory, which consists in fame, is most unstable; since nothing is more changeable than human opinion and praise. Therefore such glory is not man's supreme good.

[1] 2 *De Invent.* lv. [2] Augustine, *Contra Maxim.*, ii. 13.

CHAPTER XXX

THAT MAN'S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN WEALTH

HENCE it is evident that neither is wealth man's supreme good. For wealth is not sought except for the sake of something else: because of itself it brings us no good, but only when we use it, whether for the support of the body, or for some similar purpose. Now the supreme good is sought for its own, and not for another's sake. Therefore wealth is not man's supreme good.

Again. Man's supreme good cannot consist in the possession or preservation of things whose chief advantage for man consists in their being spent. Now the chief advantage of wealth is in its being spent; for this is its use. Therefore the possession of wealth cannot be man's supreme good.

Moreover. Acts of virtue deserve praise according as they lead to happiness.[1] Now acts of liberality and magnificence which are concerned with money, are deserving of praise, on account of money being spent, rather than on account of its being kept: and it is from this that these virtues derive their names.[2] Therefore man's happiness does not consist in the possession of wealth.

Besides. Man's supreme good must consist in obtaining something better than man. But man is better than wealth: since it is something directed to man's use. Therefore not in wealth does man's supreme good consist.

Further. Man's supreme good is not subject to chance. For things that happen by chance, escape the forethought of reason: whereas man has to attain his own end by means of his reason. But chance occupies the greater place in the attaining of wealth. Therefore human happiness consists not in wealth.

[1] I *Ethic.* xii.

[2] "The word *liberality* is rightly derived from *spending*: because when a man spends money, he *liberates* it from his keeping, and shows his mind to be *liberated* from affection for it." (Commentary of Ferrariensis, who for *magnificence* reads *munificence*, which is derived from *munus*, a gift.)

Moreover. This is evident from the fact that wealth is lost unwillingly. Also because wealth can come into the possession of evil persons, who, of necessity, must lack the sovereign good. Again because wealth is unstable. Other similar reasons can be gathered from the arguments given above.[1]

CHAPTER XXXI

THAT HAPPINESS CONSISTS NOT IN WORLDLY POWER

In like manner neither can worldly power be man's supreme happiness: since in the achievement thereof chance can effect much. Again it is unstable; and is not subject to man's will; and is often obtained by evil men. These are incompatible with the supreme good, as already stated.[2]

Again. Man is said to be good especially according as he approaches the supreme good. But in respect to his having power, he is not said to be either good or evil: since not everyone who can do good deeds is good, nor is a person evil because he can do evil deeds. Therefore the supreme good does not consist in being powerful.

Besides. Every power implies reference to something else. But the supreme good is not referred to anything further. Therefore power is not man's supreme good.

Moreover. Man's supreme good cannot be a thing that one can use both well and ill: for the better things are *those that we cannot abuse*.[3] But one can use one's power both well and ill: for *rational powers can be directed to contrary objects*. Therefore human power is not man's supreme good.

Further. If any power be man's supreme good, it must be most perfect. Now human power is most imperfect: for it is based on human will and opinion, which are full of inconsistencies. Also the greater a power is reputed to be, the greater number of people does it depend on: which again conduces to its weakness, since what depends on many, is in many ways destructible. Therefore man's supreme

[1] Ch. xxviii. *seqq*.
[2] Ch. xxviii. *seqq*.
[3] I.-II., Q. lv., A. 4.

good does not consist in worldly power. Consequently man's happiness consists in no external good: for all external goods, which are known as *goods of chance*, are contained under those we have mentioned.

CHAPTER XXXII

THAT HAPPINESS CONSISTS NOT IN GOODS OF THE BODY

LIKE arguments avail to prove that man's supreme good does not consist in goods of the body, such as health, beauty and strength. For they are common to good and evil: and are unstable: and are not subject to the will.

Besides. The soul is better than the body, which neither lives, nor possesses these goods, without the soul. Wherefore the soul's good, such as understanding and the like, is better than the body's good. Therefore the body's good is not man's supreme good.

Again. These goods are common to man and other animals: whereas happiness is a good proper to man. Therefore man's happiness does not consist in the things mentioned.

Moreover. Many animals surpass man in goods of the body: for some are fleeter than he, some more sturdy, and so on. Accordingly, if man's supreme good consisted in these things, man would not excel all animals: which is clearly untrue. Therefore human happiness does not consist in goods of the body.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS IS NOT SEATED IN THE SENSES

BY the same arguments it is evident that neither does man's supreme good consist in goods of his sensitive faculty. For these goods again, are common to man and other animals.

Again. Intellect is superior to sense. Therefore the intellect's good is better than the sense's. Consequently man's supreme good is not seated in the senses.

Besides. The greatest sensual pleasures are those of the table and of sex, wherein the supreme good must needs be, if seated in the senses. But it does not consist in them.[1] Therefore man's supreme good is not in the senses.

Moreover. The senses are appreciated for their utility and for knowledge. Now the entire utility of the senses is referred to the goods of the body. Again, sensitive knowledge is directed to intellective: wherefore animals devoid of intelligence take no pleasure in sensation except in reference to some bodily utility, in so far as by sensitive knowledge they obtain food or sexual intercourse. Therefore man's supreme good which is happiness is not seated in the sensitive faculty.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THAT MAN'S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN ACTS OF MORAL VIRTUE

It is clear that man's ultimate happiness does not consist in moral works.

For human happiness, if ultimate, cannot be directed to a further end. But all moral deeds can be directed to something else. This is clear from a consideration of the principal among them. Because deeds of fortitude in time of war are directed to victory and peace: for it were foolish to go to war merely for its own sake.[2] Again deeds of justice are directed to keeping peace among men, through each one possessing his own in peace. The same applies to all other virtues. Therefore man's ultimate happiness is not in moral deeds.

Again. The purpose of the moral virtues is that through them we may observe the mean in the passions within us, and in things outside us. Now it is impossible that the moderation of passions or of external things be the ultimate end of man's life; since both passions and external things can be directed to something less. Therefore it is not possible that the practice of moral virtue be man's final happiness.

[1] Ch. xxvii. [2] 10 *Ethic.* vii.

Further. Since man is man through having reason, his proper good which is happiness must needs be in accordance with that which is proper to reason. Now that which reason has in itself is more proper to reason than what it effects in something else. Seeing then that the good of moral virtue is something effected by reason in something other than itself, it cannot be man's greatest good which is happiness: rather must it be a good that is in reason itself.

Moreover. We have already proved[1] that the last end of all is to become like God. Therefore that in which man chiefly becomes like God, is his happiness. Now this is not in regard to moral actions, since suchlike actions cannot be ascribed to God, except metaphorically; for it is not becoming to God to have passions, or the like, with which moral virtue is concerned. Therefore man's ultimate happiness, which is his last end, does not consist in moral actions.

Furthermore. Happiness is man's proper good. Therefore that good, which of all goods is most proper to man in comparison with other animals, is the one in which we must seek his ultimate happiness. Now this is not the practice of moral virtue; for animals share somewhat either in liberality, or in fortitude: whereas no animal has a share in intellectual action. Therefore man's ultimate happiness does not consist in moral actions.

CHAPTER XXXV

THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE ACT OF PRUDENCE

It is also evident from the foregoing that neither does man's happiness consist in the act of prudence.

For acts of prudence are solely about matters of moral virtue. But human happiness does not consist in the practice of moral virtue.[2] Neither therefore does it consist in the practice of prudence.

Again. Man's ultimate happiness consists in man's most

[1] Ch. xix. [2] Ch. xxxiv.

excellent operation. Now man's most excellent operation in respect of what is proper to man, is in relation to most perfect objects. But the act of prudence is not concerned with the most perfect objects of intellect or reason: since it is not about necessary things, but about contingent practical matters.[1] Therefore its act is not man's ultimate happiness.

Besides. That which is directed to another as its end, is not man's ultimate happiness. Now the act of prudence is directed to another as its end: both because all practical knowledge, under which prudence is comprised, is directed to operation: and because prudence gives man a good disposition as regards things directed to the end, as may be gathered from Aristotle (6 *Ethic.* xiii.). Therefore man's ultimate happiness is not in the practice of prudence.

Furthermore. Irrational animals have no share of happiness: as Aristotle proves (1 *Ethic.* ix.). Yet some of them have a certain share of prudence: as may be gathered from the same authority (1 *Metaph.* i., ii.). Therefore happiness does not consist in an act of prudence.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE PRACTICE OF ART

It is also evident that it cannot consist in the practice of art.

For even the knowledge of art is practical, and so is directed to an end, and is not the ultimate end.

Besides. The end of the practice of art is the thing produced by art: and such a thing cannot be the ultimate end of human life; since rather is it we who are the end of those products, for they are all made for man's use. Therefore final happiness cannot consist in the practice of art.

[1] 6 *Ethic.* vi.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THAT MAN'S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN CONTEMPLATING GOD

ACCORDINGLY if man's ultimate happiness consists not in external things, which are called goods of chance; nor in goods of the body; nor in goods of the soul, as regards the sensitive faculty; nor as regards the intellective faculty, in the practice of moral virtue; nor as regards intellectual virtue in those which are concerned about action, namely art and prudence; it remains for us to conclude that man's ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of the truth.

For this operation alone is proper to man, and none of the other animals communicates with him therein.

Again. This is not directed to anything further as its end: since the contemplation of the truth is sought for its own sake.

Again. By this operation man is united to things above him, by becoming like them: because of all human actions this alone is both in God and in separate substances. Also, by this operation man comes into contact with those higher beings, through knowing them in any way whatever.

Besides, man is more self-sufficing for this operation, seeing that he stands in little need of the help of external things in order to perform it.

Further. All other human operations seem to be directed to this as their end. Because perfect contemplation requires that the body should be disencumbered,[1] and to this effect are directed all the products of art that are necessary for life. Moreover, it requires freedom from the disturbance caused by the passions, which is achieved by means of the moral virtues and prudence; and freedom from external disturbance, to which all the regulations of the civil life are directed. So that, if we consider the matter rightly, we shall see that all human occupations are brought into the service of those who contemplate the truth. Now, it is not possible that man's

[1] I.-II., Q. iv. A. 6.

ultimate happiness consist in contemplation based on the understanding of first principles: for this is most imperfect, as being universal and containing potential knowledge of things. Moreover, it is the beginning and not the end of human study, and comes to us from nature, and not through the study of the truth. Nor does it consist in contemplation based on the sciences that have the lowest things for their object: since happiness must consist in an operation of the intellect in relation to the highest objects of intelligence. It follows then that man's ultimate happiness consists in wisdom, based on the consideration of divine things. It is therefore evident by way of induction that man's ultimate happiness consists solely in the contemplation of God, which conclusion was proved above by arguments.[1]

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD WHICH IS POSSESSED GENERALLY BY THE MAJORITY

It remains for us to inquire in what kind of knowledge of God the ultimate happiness of the intellectual substance consists. For there is a certain general and confused knowledge of God, which is in almost all men, whether from the fact that, as some think, the existence of God, like other principles of demonstration, is self-evident, as we have stated in the First Book:[2] or, as seems nearer to the truth, because by his natural reason, man is able at once to arrive at some knowledge of God. For seeing that natural things are arranged in a certain order,—since there cannot be order without a cause of order—men, for the most part, perceive that there is one who arranges in order the things that we see. But who or of what kind this cause of order may be, or whether there be but one, cannot be gathered from this general consideration: even so, when we see a man in motion,

[1] Ch. xxv. [2] Ch. x.

and performing other works, we perceive that in him there is a cause of these operations, which is not in other things, and we give this cause the name of *soul*, but without knowing yet what the soul is, whether it be a body, or how it brings about operations in question.

Now, this knowledge of God cannot possibly suffice for happiness.

For the operation of the happy must be without any defect: and this knowledge is subject to an admixture of many errors. Some believed that there is no other ordainer of mundane things than the heavenly bodies; wherefore they said that the heavenly bodies are gods.—Some ascribed this order to the elements and to the things generated from them; as though they deemed the movements and natural operations thereof, not to be due to another ordainer, and the order in other things to be caused by them.—Some, deeming human acts not to be subject to any but a human ordinance, declared that men who cause order in other men are gods.—Accordingly this knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness.

Moreover. Happiness is the end of human acts. But human acts are not directed to the aforesaid knowledge as their end: indeed, it is in everyone almost from the very beginning. Therefore happiness does not consist in this kind of knowledge of God.

Again. No one appears to be blamed for lacking happiness: nay, those who have it not and seek it are praised. Whereas he who lacks the aforesaid knowledge of God, is seemingly very much to be blamed: since it is a very clear sign of a man's dullness of perception, if he fail to perceive such evident signs of God's existence: even as a man would be deemed dull who, seeing man, understood not that he has a soul. Hence it is said in the Psalm (xiii. 1: lii. 1): *The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God.*

Further. Knowledge of a thing in general only, and not in respect of a property thereof, is most imperfect; for instance knowledge of man from the fact that he is moved, for this is a knowledge whereby a thing is known only

potentially: because the proper is only potentially contained in the common. Now happiness is a perfect operation: and man's supreme good must needs be in respect of what he is actually, and not in respect of what he is only potentially: since potentiality perfected by act has the aspect of a good. Therefore the aforesaid knowledge of God is not sufficient for our happiness.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THAT MAN'S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD ACQUIRED BY DEMONSTRATION

THERE is also another knowledge of God, higher than the one just mentioned, which is acquired by means of a demonstration, and which approaches nearer to a proper knowledge of him: since by means of a demonstration many things are removed from him, so that in consequence we understand him as something apart from other things.[1] For demonstration proves that God is immovable, eternal, incorporeal, utterly simple, one, and the like, as we have shown in the First Book. Now we arrive at the proper knowledge of a thing not only by affirmation, but also by negation: for just as it is proper to man to be a rational animal, so is it proper to him not to be inanimate or irrational. Yet there is this difference between these two modes of knowledge, that when we have proper knowledge of a thing by affirmation, we know what that thing is, and how it is distinguished from others: whereas when we have proper knowledge of a thing by negations, we know that it is distinct from others, but remain ignorant of what it is. Such is the proper knowledge of God, that can be obtained by demonstrations. But neither does this suffice for man's ultimate happiness. For things belonging to one species for the most part attain to the end of that species, because nature achieves its purpose always or nearly always, and

[1] Bk. I., ch. xiv.

fails in a few instances on account of some corruption. Now happiness is the end of the human species; since all men naturally desire it. Therefore happiness is a common good that can be attained by all men, unless some obstacle occur to some whereby they be debarred[1] from it. Few, however, attain to the possession of the aforesaid knowledge of God by way of demonstration, on account of the obstacles to this knowledge, mentioned at the beginning of this work.[2] Therefore this knowledge is not essentially man's happiness.

Again. Actual existence is the end of that which exists potentially, as was made clear above.[3] Wherefore happiness that is the last end, is an act free of any potentiality to a further act. Now this knowledge of God that is acquired by way of demonstration is still in potentiality to a further knowledge of God, or to the same knowledge, but by a better way: because those who came afterwards endeavoured to add something to the knowledge of God besides that which they found handed down to them by those who preceded them. Therefore such knowledge is not man's ultimate happiness.

Further. Happiness excludes all unhappiness: for no man can be at the same time happy and unhappy. Now deception and error have a large place in unhappiness, since all naturally avoid them. But the aforesaid knowledge of God is subject to the admixture of many errors: as evidenced by many who knew some truths about God through demonstration, yet, following their own opinions, when they lacked proof, fell into many errors. And if some there were who by the way of demonstration discovered the truth about divine things, without any admixture of error in their opinions, it is evident that they were very few: which is inconsistent with happiness which should be the common end. Therefore man's ultimate happiness is not seated in such knowledge as this.

Moreover. Happiness consists in a perfect operation. Now perfect knowledge requires certitude: hence we cannot be said to know, unless we be certain that it cannot be

[1] 1 *Ethic.* ix. [2] Bk. I., ch. iv. [3] Ch. xi., xxii.

otherwise, as stated in 1 *Poster.* ii. But the aforesaid knowledge is beset with uncertainty: as evidenced by the diversity of sciences about divine things, elaborated by those who endeavoured to discover something about them by the way of demonstration. Therefore ultimate happiness does not consist in suchlike knowledge.

Besides. When the will has obtained its last end, its desire is at rest. Now the ultimate end of all human knowledge is happiness. Therefore happiness is essentially that knowledge of God the possession of which leaves no knowledge to be desired of anything knowable. Such, however, is not the knowledge which philosophers were able to have about God by the way of demonstration: because even when we have that knowledge we still desire to know something more;—things that we know not by means of the aforesaid knowledge. Therefore happiness does not consist in suchlike knowledge of God.

Furthermore. The end of everything that is in potentiality is that it be brought to actuality: for to this does it tend by means of the movement with which it is moved to its end. Now everything that is in potentiality tends to be actualized as far as possible. For there are things in potentiality in that their whole potentiality is reducible to act: so that the end of such a thing is that its whole potentiality be actualized: thus a heavy body, that is outside its medium, is in potentiality to its proper place. There are also things whose potentiality cannot be actualized all at once,—for instance primary matter: so that by its movement it is appetent of actualization by various forms in succession, which cannot be in matter at the same time on account of their diversity. Now our intellect is in potentiality to all things intelligible, as stated in the Second Book.[1] And it is possible for two intelligible objects to be in the possible intellect at the same time in respect of the first act which is *science*: although perhaps not in respect of the second act which is *consideration*. Accordingly it is clear that the whole potentiality of the possible intellect can be actualized

[1] Ch. xlvii.

at one time: and consequently this is required for its ultimate end which is happiness. But the aforesaid knowledge which can be acquired about God by the way of demonstration, does not effect this: since when we have it we still are ignorant of many things. Therefore suchlike knowledge of God does not suffice for ultimate happiness.

CHAPTER XL

THAT MAN'S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BY FAITH

THERE is yet another knowledge of God, in one respect superior to the knowledge we have been discussing, namely that whereby God is known by men through faith. In this respect it surpasses the knowledge of God through demonstration, because by faith we know certain things about God, which are so sublime that reason cannot reach them by means of demonstration, as we have stated at the beginning of this work.[1] But not even in this knowledge of God can man's ultimate happiness consist.

For happiness is the intellect's perfect operation, as already declared.[2] But in knowledge by faith the operation of the intellect is found to be most imperfect as regards that which is on the part of the intellect:—although it is most perfect on the part of the object:—for the intellect in believing does not grasp the object of its assent. Therefore neither does man's happiness consist in this knowledge of God.

Again. It has been shown[3] that ultimate happiness does not consist chiefly in an act of the will. Now in knowledge by faith the will has the leading place: for the intellect assents by faith to things proposed to it, because it wills, and not through being constrained by the evidence of their truth. Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in this knowledge.

Besides. The believer assents to things proposed to him by another, but not seen by himself: so that the knowledge of faith resembles hearing rather than seeing. Now a man

[1] Bk. I., ch. v. [2] Ch. xxv. [3] Ch. xxvi.

does not believe in what is unseen by him, and proposed to him by another, unless he thinks this other to have a more perfect knowledge of the things proposed, than he himself has who sees not. Either therefore the believer thinks wrong: or the proposer must have more perfect knowledge of the things proposed. And if the latter also knows these things only through hearing them from another, we cannot proceed thus indefinitely: for then the assent of faith would be without foundation or certitude; since we should not come to some first principle certain in itself, to give certitude to the faith of believers. But it is not possible that the assent of faith be false and without foundation, as is clear from what we have said at the beginning of this work:[1] and yet if it were false and baseless, happiness could not consist in such-like knowledge. There is therefore some knowledge of God that is higher than the knowledge of faith: whether he who proposes faith sees the truth immediately, as when we believe Christ: or receive the truth from him who sees it immediately, as when we believe the Apostles and prophets. Since then man's happiness consists in the highest knowledge of God, it cannot consist in the knowledge of faith.

Moreover. Since happiness is the last end, the natural desire is set at rest thereby. But the knowledge of faith does not set the desire at rest, but inflames it: because everyone desires to see what he believes. Therefore man's ultimate happiness does not consist in the knowledge of faith.

Further. Knowledge of God has been declared to be the end, inasmuch as it unites us to the last end of all, namely God. Now the knowledge of faith does not make the thing believed to be perfectly present to the mind: since faith is of distant, and not present things. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Cor. v. 6, 7) that *so long as we walk by faith, we are pilgrims from the Lord.* Yet faith makes God to be present to the heart, since the believer assents to God voluntarily, according to the saying of Ephes. iii. 17: *That Christ may dwell by faith in our*[2] *hearts.* Therefore the knowledge of faith cannot be man's ultimate happiness.

[1] Bk. I., ch. vii.

[2] Vulg., *your.*

CHAPTER XLI

IS IT POSSIBLE FOR MAN, IN THIS LIFE, TO UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES BY THE STUDY AND INQUIRY OF SPECULATIVE SCIENCES?

THE intellectual substance has yet another knowledge of God. For we have said in the Second Book[1] that the separate intellectual substance, by knowing its own essence, knows both what is above it, and what is below it, in a way proportionate to its substance. This must especially be the case, if that which is above it, be its cause, since the likeness to the cause must be found in the effect. Wherefore, since God is the cause of all created intellectual substances, as proved above,[2] it follows that separate intellectual substances, by knowing their own essence, know God Himself by the way of some kind of vision: for the intellect knows by the way of vision the thing whose likeness is in the intellect; just as the likeness of the thing seen by the body, is in the sense of the seer. Whatever intellect, therefore, apprehends a separate substance, by knowing *what it is*, sees God in a higher way than he is known by any of the kinds of knowledge mentioned above. Accordingly, whereas some[3] have deemed man's ultimate happiness to be in this life, for the reason that he knows separate substances, we must inquire whether in this life man be able to know separate substances: and it is a point that may well be questioned. For our intellect, according to its present state, understands nothing without a phantasm, which stands in the same relation to the possible intellect, whereby we understand, as colours to the sight, as was made clear in the Second Book.[4] Hence if, through the intellectual knowledge which is acquired from phantasms, it be possible for any of us to succeed in understanding separate substances, it will be possible in this life for someone to understand these same separate substances; and in consequence, by seeing these

[1] Ch. xcvi. *seqq.*
[2] Bk. II., ch. xv.
[3] Averroes, 3 *De Anim.*
[4] Ch. lix., lxxiv.

separate substances, he will participate in that mode of knowledge with which the separate substance, by understanding itself, understands God. If, on the other hand, by knowledge derived from phantasms, it be altogether unable to succeed in understanding separate substances, it will be impossible for man in the present state of life to acquire the above mode of divine knowledge.

The possibility of succeeding in understanding separate substances, through knowledge derived from phantasms, has been explained by some in various ways. Avempace[1] maintained that by the study of speculative sciences, it is possible to arrive at a knowledge of separate substances, from understanding those things which we know through phantasms. For we are able by the action of the intellect to extract the quiddity of a thing which has quiddity without being its quiddity. Because the intellect is naturally adapted to know any quiddity as such: since the proper object of the intellect is *what a thing is*. Now if that which is first understood by the possible intellect is something that has a quiddity, we can, by the possible intellect, abstract the quiddity of the thing first understood; and if this quiddity has again a quiddity, it will be again possible to abstract the quiddity of this quiddity. And since we cannot go on indefinitely, we must stop somewhere. Therefore by way of analysis our intellect can arrive at knowing a quiddity that has no quiddity: and such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Consequently, through its knowledge of these sensibles, that is acquired from phantasms, our intellect can arrive at understanding separate substances.

He goes on to prove the same statement by another yet similar way. Thus, he lays down that the idea of a thing, for instance of a horse, in me and in you is multiplied only through the multiplication of the spiritual forms, which are different in you and me. It follows then that an idea which is not clothed with any such form, is the same in you and me. Now, as we have proved, the quiddity of the idea, which our intellect by its innate aptitude abstracts, has no spiritual

[1] Ibn Badja, Arabian philosopher of the 12th century.

and individual form: for the quiddity of the idea is not the quiddity of the individual, whether corporeal or spiritual, since the thing understood, as such, is universal. Therefore our intellect has a natural aptitude to understand a quiddity the idea of which is the same in all. Such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Therefore our intellect has a natural aptitude to know separate substances.

Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, these explanations are frivolous. For since the idea as such is universal, the quiddity of an idea must be the quiddity of a universal, namely genus or species. Now the quiddity of the genus or species of these sensible objects, the intellective knowledge whereof we acquire through phantasms, includes both matter and form. Consequently it is quite unlike the quiddity of a separate substance, which is simple and immaterial. Therefore it is impossible to understand the quiddity of a separate substance, through understanding the quiddity of a sensible object.

Again. A form that cannot as to its very being be separated from a particular subject is not of the same kind as a form which, in its being, is separated from a particular subject, although both may be considered apart from that particular subject. For magnitude is not the same kind of thing as a separate substance, unless we suppose there are separated magnitudes midway between the species and the sensible object, as some Platonists have maintained. But the quiddity of a genus or species of sensible things cannot be separated in its very being, from a particular individual matter; unless perhaps, as the Platonists think, we suppose the species of things to exist separately, which Aristotle has refuted.[1] Consequently the aforesaid quiddity is altogether different from separate substances, which are nowise in matter. Therefore it does not follow from the fact that these quiddities are understood, that separate substances can be understood.

Moreover. If we grant that the quiddity of a separate substance is of the same kind as the quiddity of the genus or

[1] 1 *Metaph.* ix.

species of these sensible things, it cannot be said to be of the same specific kind, unless we say that the species of these sensible things are the separate substances themselves, as the Platonists maintained. It follows that they are only of the same kind in the point of quiddity as such; namely in the common ratio of genus and substance. Consequently by means of these quiddities we shall understand nothing about separate substances except their remote genus. Now by knowing the genus, we do not therefore know the species except potentially. Therefore it will not be possible to understand a separate substance through understanding the quiddities of these sensible things.

Besides. A separate substance differs more from sensible things, than one sensible from another. But understanding the quiddity of one sensible does not suffice for understanding the quiddity of another: for a man who is born blind, is quite unable through understanding the quiddity of sound, to understand the quiddity of colour. Much less therefore will anyone, through understanding the quiddity of a sensible substance, be able to understand the quiddity of a separate substance.

Further. If again we grant that the spheres of the separate substance are causes of movement, and that by their movement they cause the forms of sensible substances,[1] this mode of knowing separate substances through sensible things, does not suffice for knowing their quiddity. Because from the effect we know its cause either in the point of likeness between cause and effect, or in this, that the effect indicates the power of the cause. In the point of likeness, we do not gather from the effect *what the cause is*, unless agent and effect be of one species: and this is not the case with separate substances and sensible things. In the point of power, it is again impossible unless the effect equal the power of the cause: since then the whole power of the cause is known from the effect; and the power of a thing indicates its substance. But this cannot apply to the point in question: because the powers of separate substances surpass all the

[1] Ch. xxii. *seq.*

sensible effects that our intellect understands, even as a universal power surpasses a particular effect. It is therefore impossible through understanding sensible objects to arrive at understanding separate substances.

Moreover. Whatever intelligible things we are able to know by means of inquiry and study, belong to one or other of the speculative sciences. Accordingly if through understanding the natures and quiddities of these sensible objects, we succeed in understanding separate substances, it follows that it would be possible to understand separate substances through one or the other speculative science. Yet we do not find this to be the case: for no speculative science teaches what any separate substance is, but only the fact that it is. It is therefore not possible to succeed in understanding separate substances through understanding the natures of sensible objects. And if it be said that such a speculative science is possible, although it has not yet been discovered, this makes no difference, since it is not possible, from any principles known to us, to arrive at understanding the aforesaid substances. Because all the proper principles of any science whatever, depend on the first indemonstrable self-evident principles, the knowledge of which we acquire from sensible objects, as stated in 2 *Poster.* xv. And sensible objects do not sufficiently lead to the knowledge of immaterial things, as we have proved in the preceding arguments. Therefore no science is possible whereby one may be able to attain to the understanding of separate substances.

CHAPTER XLII

THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO KNOW SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IN THE MANNER PROPOSED BY ALEXANDER[1]

ALEXANDER supposed the possible intellect to be subject to generation and corruption, on account of its being *a disposition of human nature resulting from the mixture of the*

[1] Alexander of Aphrodisia, peripatetic philosopher, 3rd-2nd century B.C.

elements, as we have seen in the Second Book.[1] Now it is not possible for a power of this kind to arise above the material world. And so he maintained that our possible intellect can never attain to the understanding of separate substances: but he held that, according to our present state of life, we are able to understand separate substances. He endeavoured to prove this as follows. Whenever a thing is completed as regards being generated, and has reached the ultimate perfection of its substance, its proper operation, whether action or passion, will also be completed: for even as operation follows substance, so does perfection of operation follow perfection of substance: wherefore an animal, when quite perfect, is able to walk by itself. Now the habitual intellect, which is nothing else but *the intelligible species formed by the active intellect, and residing in the possible intellect*, has a twofold operation. One is to make things potentially understood to be actually understood,—and this it has in reference to the active intellect,—while the other is to understand what is actually understood: for man is able to do these two things by an intellectual habit. Accordingly when the generation of the habitual intellect is complete, both of these operations will be completed in the intellect. Now whenever the intellect acquires new species it reaches the complement of its generation. And so its generation must necessarily be completed eventually, unless there be an impediment: since no generation tends to the infinite. Therefore eventually both operations will be completed in the habitual intellect, by its making all things potentially understood to be understood actually,—which is the complement of the first operation;—and by understanding all things intelligible, both separate and not separate.

And seeing that the possible intellect is unable to understand separate substances, according to his opinion, as we have stated; he means that we shall understand separate substances by the habitual intellect, in so far as the active intellect, which according to him is a separate substance, will become the form of the habitual intellect and be united

[1] Ch. lxii.

to us: so that thereby we shall understand, even as now we understand by the possible intellect; and, since it is in the power of the active intellect to make things actually understood, which are intelligible potentially, and to understand separate substances, in that state we shall understand separate substances, and all non-separate intelligible things.

According to this explanation, by this knowledge which we derive from phantasms, we attain to the knowledge of the separate substance; not as though the phantasms themselves and the things understood from them, were a means for knowing separate substances, as happens in speculative sciences, which was the position of the previous opinion;[1] but because the intelligible species are in us a kind of disposition to this particular form which is the active intellect. This is the first point of difference between these two opinions.

Consequently, when the habitual intellect becomes perfect through these intelligible species produced in us by the active intellect, the active intellect itself becomes a form united to us, as stated. And he calls this the *acquired intellect*, which, they state, Aristotle held to come from without. And so, although man's ultimate perfection is not seated in the speculative sciences, as the previous opinion maintained; yet by them man is disposed for the attainment of his ultimate perfection. This is the second point of difference between the second and first opinions.

Thirdly they differ in this, that, according to the first opinion, the active intellect's act of understanding is the cause of its union with us. Whereas, in the second opinion, the reverse is the case: since it is because it is united to us as a form, that we understand it and other separate substances.

But there is no reason in these statements. For the habitual intellect, like the possible intellect, is supposed by Alexander to be subject to generation and corruption. Now according to him an eternal thing cannot become the form of that which can be generated and corrupted; for this is why he maintains that the possible intellect, which is

[1] Ch. xli.

united to us as a form, is subject to generation and corruption; and that the active intellect, which is incorruptible, is a separate substance. Since then, according to Alexander, the active intellect is supposed to be an eternal separate substance, it will be impossible for the active intellect to become the form of the habitual intellect.

Again. The form of the intellect, as intellect, is the intelligible, just as the form of the sense is the sensible: for the intellect does not receive a thing, properly speaking, except intelligibly, as neither does the sense, except sensibly. If then the active intellect cannot become an intelligible through the habitual intellect, it cannot possibly be its form.

Besides. There are three ways in which we are said to understand by means of something. First, we understand by means of the intellect, which is the power that elicits this operation: wherefore also the intellect may be said to understand, and the very act of the intellect in understanding becomes our act of understanding.—Secondly, we understand by means of the intelligible species: whereby we are said to understand, not as though the species itself understood, but because the intellective power is actuated by it, just as the power of sight is by the species of colour.—Thirdly, as by a medium through knowing which we arrive at the knowledge of something else.

If, then, man at length understands separate substances through his intellect, it must be in one of these ways. It is not in the third way: because Alexander does not grant that either the possible or the habitual intellect understands the active intellect.—Nor is it in the second way: because to understand by means of an intelligible species is ascribed to the intellective power that is informed by that species: yet Alexander does not grant that either the possible or the habitual intellect understands separate substances: and consequently we cannot possibly understand separate substances by means of the active intellect in the same way as we understand things by means of an intelligible species.—And if it is as by an intellective power, it follows that the active intellect's act of understanding is the man's act of

understanding. Now this cannot be unless the substance of the active intellect and the substance of the man be joined together in unity of being: for it is impossible that there be identity of operation where there is distinction of substances. Hence the active intellect will be one in being with man. But not in respect of accidental being: because the active intellect would then be not a substance but an accident: for instance colour added to a body makes one according to accidental being. It would follow then, that the active intellect together with man makes one in substantial being. Therefore it will be either the human soul or a part thereof, and not a separate substance, as Alexander maintained. Therefore the opinion of Alexander does not explain how man can understand separate substances.

Moreover. If the active intellect at any time become the form of this particular man, so that he be able to understand by means of it, for the same reason it may become the form of some other man who will likewise understand by its means: the result being that at the same time two men will understand by means of the active intellect, as their form. But this implies that the active intellect's act of understanding is the act of understanding of the man who understands by its means, as already stated: and consequently two who understand will have one act of understanding. Which is impossible.

Moreover his reasoning is altogether frivolous. First, because, when the generation of a genus is perfected, its operation must be perfected, yet in keeping with the mode of that, but not of a higher genus: for when the generation of air is perfected, it has generation and complete upward movement, yet not so as to be moved towards the place of fire. Likewise, when the generation of the habitual intellect is complete, its operation, which is to understand, will be complete, according to its mode, but not according to the mode of understanding in separate substances, so as to understand separate substances. Consequently from the generation of the habitual intellect it cannot be concluded that at some time man will understand separate substances.

Secondly, because it belongs to the same power to complete an operation and to perform it. Consequently if the perfection of the habitual intellect's operation be to understand separate substances, it follows that the habitual intellect sometimes understands separate substances. But Alexander does not hold this: for it would follow that to understand separate substances comes to us through the speculative sciences, which are comprised under the habitual intellect. Thirdly, those things that begin to be generated, for the most part are completely generated: since all generations of things are due to definite causes, which produce their effects either always or in the majority of cases. If then, completeness of action follows completeness of generation, it follows that complete operation accrues to things generated, always or most frequently. And yet those who study in order that habitual intellect may be engendered in them do not succeed in understanding separate substances, either in most, or in all, cases: in fact no one has boasted of having attained to this point of perfection. Therefore the perfection of the habitual intellect is not to understand separate substances.

CHAPTER XLIII

THAT WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IN THIS LIFE, IN THE MANNER SUGGESTED BY AVERROES[1]

As the greatest difficulty presented by Alexander's opinion was that he supposed the habitual intellect to be altogether corruptible, Averroes thought to offer an easier proof that at times we understand separate substances, in that he deemed the possible intellect to be incorruptible and substantially separate from us, just as the active intellect. First, he shows the necessity of admitting that the relation of the active intellect to those principles which we know naturally is either that of agent to instrument or that of form to matter. For the habitual intellect whereby we understand, has not

[1] 3 *De Anima*, text, comm. 30.

only this action which is *to understand*, but also this which is *to make things actually understood*: for we know by experience that both are in our power. Now "to make things actually understood," indicates more specially the habitual intellect than "to understand": because it is necessary to make a thing actually understood before one understands it. Now, in us certain things are made actually understood naturally, and not by study or by choice, as the first intelligible principles. And it does not belong to the habitual intellect to make these actually understood, for it belongs to this power to make actually understood those things which we know by study: rather are they a beginning of the habitual intellect, wherefore Aristotle gives the name of *understanding* to the habit of these principles (6 *Ethic.* vi.). And they are made actually understood by the active intellect alone: and by them those other things are made actually understood which we know by study. Accordingly to make these things which are by way of consequence understood actually, is an act both of the habitual intellect, as to first principles, and of the active intellect.

Now one action does not proceed from two principles unless one of them be compared to the other as agent to instrument, or as form to matter. Consequently the active intellect must be compared to the first principles of the habitual intellect, either as agent to instrument, or as form to matter.

How this may be possible he explains as follows. Since the possible intellect, according to his opinion, is a separate substance,[1] it understands the active intellect and other separate substances, as well as the first principles of speculative knowledge: and consequently it is the subject of both. Now whenever two things come together in one subject, one of them is as the form of the other: even so, since colour and light are in the diaphanous body as their subject, one of them, namely light, must be the form of the other, namely colour. And this is necessary when one of them is ordained to the other, but not when they are united accidentally in

[1] Bk. II., ch. lix.

the same subject, as whiteness and music. Now the object of speculative knowledge and the active intellect are mutually ordained to each other: since these understood speculative principles are made actually understood by the active intellect. Therefore the active intellect is related to these understood speculative principles as form to matter. Consequently since these same principles are joined to us by phantasms, which are a kind of subject thereof, it follows that the active intellect also is joined to us, being the form of these principles. When therefore these principles are in us potentially only, the active intellect is only joined to us potentially. When some of these principles are in us actually and some potentially, the active intellect is joined to us actually in part, and potentially in part: and then it is said to be moved towards the above conjunction: because as the more things are made actually understood in us, the more perfectly is the active intellect joined to us. And this progress and movement towards conjunction is effected by study in speculative sciences, whereby we acquire true knowledge, and false opinions are put aside, which are outside the order of this movement, just as monstrosities are outside the operation of nature. Wherefore men help one another towards this progress, just as they help one another in speculative sciences. And so when all potential knowledge has become actual in us, the active intellect will be perfectly joined to us as a form, and we shall understand perfectly by it, just as now we understand perfectly by the habitual intellect. Consequently, since it belongs to the active intellect to understand separate substances, we shall then understand separate substances, just as now we understand speculative knowledge. This will be man's ultimate happiness, wherein man will be a god as it were.

That this explanation is of no account whatever is made clear enough by what we have already said: for it is based on many suppositions that have been already disproved.

First, we have shown above[1] that the possible intellect is not a substance distinct from us in being. Hence it does not

[1] Bk. II., ch. lix.

follow that it is the subject of separate substances: especially since Aristotle asserts[1] that the possible intellect is the power of *becoming all things*, so that seemingly it is the subject of such things only as are made to be understood.

Again. It has also been proved above[2] that the active intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul, to which Aristotle assigns the operation of *making things to be actually understood*, which lies in our power. Hence it does not follow that understanding by means of the active intellect is the cause of our being able to understand separate substances: else we would always understand them.

Further. If the active intellect were a separate substance, it would not be joined to us except by means of species made to be actually understood, according to his explanation: as neither would the possible intellect be united to us: although the possible intellect is related to those species as matter to form, while the active intellect, on the contrary, is related to them as form to matter. Now the species which are made to be actually understood are joined to us, according to him, by means of the phantasms, which stand related to the possible intellect as colours to the sight, but to the active intellect as colours to the light, as may be gathered from the statement of Aristotle (3 *De Anima* v.). Now we cannot ascribe to a stone in which colour is, either the action of seeing, so that it see; nor the action of the sun, so that it give light. Therefore according to this opinion, we cannot ascribe to man either the action of the possible intellect so that he understand, or the action of the active intellect, so that he understand separate substances, or that he make things to be actually understood.

Besides. According to this opinion, the active intellect is not supposed to be joined to us as a form, except through its being the form of the principles of understanding, whereof it is stated to be the form also because the active intellect and these principles have an action in common, namely to make things actually understood. Consequently it cannot be a form to us, except for as much as the principles of

[1] 3 *De Anima*, v. [2] Bk. II., ch. lxxvi.

knowledge have an action in common with it. But these principles have no share in the action of understanding separate substances, because they are species of sensible things: unless we return to the opinion of Avempace, that the quiddities of separate substances can be known by means of what we know of the sensible world. Therefore nowise can we understand separate substances by this means.

Moreover. The active intellect bears a different relation to principles of knowledge whereof it is the cause; and to separate substances, whereof it is not the cause, but which it only knows, according to his theory. Therefore if it be joined to us through being the cause of principles of knowledge, it does not follow that it is joined to us, in so far as it knows separate substances: and clearly his argument contains a fallacy *of accident.*

Again. If we know separate substances by means of the active intellect, this is not because the active intellect is the form of this or that principle of understanding, but through becoming a form in us: for it is thus that we are able to understand by its means. Now it becomes a form in us also by means of the first principles of understanding, according to his own statement. Therefore from the very beginning man can understand separate substances by means of the active intellect. If, however, it be said that the active intellect does not become a form in us perfectly by means of some principles of understanding, so that we be able to understand separate substances:—the sole reason for this is because these principles of understanding do not equal the perfection of the active intellect in understanding separate substances. But not even all these principles of understanding combined together equal this perfection of the active intellect in understanding separate substances: since all of them are not intelligible except in so far as they are made to be actually understood: whereas the latter are intelligible by their very nature. Therefore although we shall know all these intelligible principles, it does not follow that the active intellect will become a form in us so perfectly that we understand

separate substances by it. Else, if this be not required, we shall have to admit that by understanding anything intelligible, we also understand separate substances.

CHAPTER XLIV

THAT MAN'S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES AS PRETENDED BY THE AFORESAID OPINIONS

But it is impossible to allow that man's happiness consists in such a knowledge of separate substances as the above mentioned opinions[1] maintained.

For it is of no purpose to strive for an end by means which cannot secure that end. Since then man's ultimate end is happiness, to which his natural desire tends, it is impossible to assign man's happiness to that which he cannot obtain: else it would follow that man was made in vain, and that his natural desire is void, which is impossible. Now it is clear from what we have said that it is impossible for man to understand separate substances, as laid down by the above mentioned opinions. Therefore man's happiness does not consist in such knowledge of separate substances.

Again. In order that the active intellect be united to us as a form so that by it we may understand separate substances, it is required that the generation of the habitual intellect be complete, according to Alexander;[2] or that all the principles of understanding be actualized in us, according to Averroes:[3] both of which amount to the same, because the habitual intellect is engendered in us, by the principles of understanding being actualized in us. Now all the species of sensible things are understood potentially. Wherefore, in order that the active intellect be joined to a man, it is necessary that he actually understand by his speculative intellect all the natures of sensible things, and all their powers, operations and movements. But it is impossible for a man to know all this through the principles of specula-

[1] Ch. xli. *seqq.* [2] Ch. xlii. [3] Ch. xliii.

tive sciences, whereby we are moved to the conjunction with the active intellect, as they say: for it is not possible to acquire knowledge of all these things, from those which come under the perception of our senses, whence the principles of speculative sciences are derived. Therefore it is impossible for any man to arrive at this conjunction in the way assigned by them: and consequently man's happiness cannot consist in such a union.

Besides. Granted that it be possible for man to be united to the active intellect in the manner suggested, it is clear that such a perfection is obtainable by very few; so much so that neither they nor any one else, however much they be advanced and skilled in speculative sciences, have dared to boast of having obtained this perfection. In fact all of them have confessed to ignorance of many things: thus Aristotle, speaking of the quadrature of a circle, and of the reasons for the order in heavenly bodies, himself states (2 *De Cœlo* v.) that he can only give probable arguments: and he leaves to others to decide what is certain in these things and their movers (11 *Metaph.* viii.). Now happiness is a common good, to which many can arrive, *unless they be prevented*, as Aristotle says (1 *Ethic.* ix.). It is true also of any natural end of a species, that it is obtained by the majority of the members of that species. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot consist in the aforesaid union.

It is clear that Aristotle, whose opinion the philosophers in question endeavoured to follow, did not hold that man's ultimate happiness consists in a union of this kind. For he proves (1 *Ethic.* xiii.) that man's happiness is an operation of his own according to perfect virtue: wherefore he had to treat specially of the virtues, which he divided into moral and intellectual: and he proves (10 *Ethic.* vii.) that man's ultimate happiness consists in contemplation. Hence it follows that it is not seated in the act of a moral virtue; nor of prudence or art, and yet these are intellectual virtues. Consequently it must be an operation according to wisdom which is the chief of the three remaining intellectual virtues,

namely wisdom, knowledge and understanding, as he proves in 6 *Ethic.* vii.: for which reason he declares (10 *Ethic.* viii.) that the wise man is a happy man. Now according to him (6 *Ethic.* l.c.) wisdom is one of the speculative sciences, and *the head of the others*: and at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, he gives the name of wisdom to the science of which he purposes to treat. Clearly therefore the opinion of Aristotle was that the ultimate happiness which man is able to obtain in this life, is that knowledge of divine things which can be acquired through the speculative sciences. But this last way of knowing divine things, not through speculative sciences, but by a kind of natural process of generation, was invented by some of his commentators.

CHAPTER XLV

THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS LIFE TO UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

SINCE then in this life separate substances cannot be known by us in the ways mentioned above,[1] it remains for us to inquire whether we be able to understand separate substances in this life in any way at all.

Themistius[2] seeks to prove that this is possible by an argument *a fortiori*. For separate substances are more intelligible than material things: since the latter are intelligible in so far as the active intellect causes them to be actually understood; whereas the former are intelligible in themselves. If, therefore, our intellect understands these material things, much more is it adapted to understand separate substances.

This argument must be appraised in the light of the various opinions about the possible intellect. For if the possible intellect is a power independent of matter, and has its being apart from the body, as Averroes maintains, it will follow that it has no necessary relation to things material; so that the more a thing is intelligible in itself, the more

[1] Ch. xli. *seqq.* [2] A.D. 317-387. *Paraphr. de Anima* iii. 51.

will it be intelligible to the possible intellect. But then it would seem to follow, since we understand from the beginning by means of the possible intellect, that we understand separate substances from the beginning: which is clearly false. Averroes seeks to avoid this difficulty, as we have explained above in setting forth his opinion, which we proved to be false.

If, however, the possible intellect is not separate from the body in its very being, from the very fact that it is united in being to such a body, it has a necessary relation to material things, so that only through them can it acquire knowledge of other things. Hence it does not follow, if separate substances be more intelligible in themselves, that they be more intelligible to our intellect. This is proved by the words of Aristotle (2 *Metaph.* ix.). For he says there that *the difficulty of understanding those things is in us and not in them: because our intellect stands in relation to things most evident as the eye of the owl to the sunlight.* Consequently, seeing that we cannot arrive at understanding separate substances through understanding material things, as we have proved,[1] it follows that our possible intellect can nowise understand separate substances.

This appears again from the relation of the possible to the active intellect. Because a passive power is in potentiality to those things only which are included in the range of its proper active principle: for every passive power has a corresponding active power in nature: otherwise passive power would be useless, since it cannot be brought to actuality, except by an active principle. Hence we find that the sight is not receptive of other than colours which are enlightened by the light. Now the possible intellect is a power in a certain sense passive, and therefore it has its corresponding agent, namely the active intellect, which stands in relation to the possible intellect as light to the sight. Consequently the possible intellect is in potentiality to those intelligible objects only which have been made so by the active intellect. Wherefore Aristotle (3 *De Anima* v.)

[1] Ch. xli.

in describing each intellect, says that *the possible intellect is the power to become all things*, while the active intellect *is the medium of making all things*: so that the power in either case refers to the same objects, being active in the one and passive in the other. Since then separate substances are not made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and only material things are so made, it follows that the possible intellect extends to these alone: and therefore we cannot understand separate substances thereby.

Wherefore Aristotle employed a fitting example: for the owl's eye can never see the light of the sun. And yet Averroes tries to depreciate this example, saying that the likeness between our intellect in relation to separate substances, and the owl's eye in relation to the sun's light, is one of difficulty, not of impossibility: and he proves this as follows. Because if it were impossible for us to understand things intelligible in themselves, separate substances to wit; they would be intelligible without purpose, as to no purpose would a thing be visible, if it could not be seen by any sight.

Now this argument is clearly of no account at all: for even though these substances be never understood by us, they are understood by themselves: so that not without purpose would they be intelligible: as neither is the sun uselessly visible,—to continue Aristotle's comparison—because the owl cannot see it, since man and other animals can see it.

Accordingly if we suppose the possible intellect to be united in being to the body, it cannot understand separate substances. It makes a difference, however, what we hold with regard to its substance. For if we suppose it to be a material force subject to generation and corruption, as some have maintained,[1] it would follow that by its very substance it is confined to the understanding of material things: and consequently it would nowise be able to understand separate substances: since it could not possibly itself be separate.—On the other hand, if the possible intellect, although united to the body, be incorruptible and inde-

[1] *Cf.* Ch. xlii.

pendent of matter in its being, as we have proved above[1]; it follows that its being confined to the understanding of material things is incidental to it through its union with the body. And so, when the soul shall be separated from the body, the possible intellect will be able to understand things that are intelligible in themselves, namely separate substances, by the light of the active intellect, which in the soul is like the intellectual light that is in separate substances. This is what our faith holds about our understanding separate substances after death and not in this life.

CHAPTER XLVI

THAT IN THIS LIFE THE SOUL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ITSELF BY ITSELF

A CERTAIN difficulty would seem to arise against what we have been saying, on account of a passage of Augustine which must be carefully discussed. For he says (9 *De Trin.* iii.): *Just as the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things by means of the senses, so does it acquire knowledge of incorporeal things by itself. Therefore it also knows itself by itself, since itself is incorporeal.* For it would seem to follow from these words that the soul understands itself by itself, and that by understanding itself, understands separate substances: and this is contrary to what we have proved. We must, accordingly, inquire how the soul understands itself by itself.

Now it cannot possibly be said that by itself it understands *what itself is*. Because a cognitive power is made actually cognoscent by something in it whereby it knows. And if this be in it potentially, it knows potentially; if it be in it actually, it knows actually; and if it be in a middle way, it knows habitually. Now the soul is always actually present to itself, and never only potentially or habitually. Wherefore, if the soul knows itself by itself, it will always understand actually what itself is: and this is clearly false.

[1] Bk. II., ch. lxxix.

Again. If the soul, by itself, understands what itself is; and since every man has a soul; every man will know what his soul is: which is evidently untrue.

Moreover. Knowledge that results from something implanted in us by nature, is itself natural: for instance the self-evident principles which are known through the light of the active intellect. Accordingly, if by the soul itself we know what the soul is, we shall know it naturally. But no one can err in things that we know naturally: for no one errs in self-evident principles: so that no one would err about what the soul is, if the soul knew this by itself. But this is clearly false: since many have maintained the soul to be this or that body; some, that it consisted in number or harmony.[1] Therefore the soul does not, by itself, know what itself is.

Besides. In every order *that which is per se precedes and causes that which is accidental.* Accordingly that which is known *per se*, is known before all things that are known through something else, and is the principle through which they are known, for instance first principles in comparison with conclusions. Therefore if the soul, by itself, knows what itself is, this will be known *per se*, and consequently it will be known first, and will be the principle whereby other things are known. But this is clearly false: for science does not postulate *what the soul is* as being something already known, but proposes it as a point of inquiry from other sources. Therefore the soul does not by itself know what itself is.

But it is clear that neither did Augustine intend this. For he says (10 *De Trin.* ix.) that *when the soul seeks self-knowledge, it does not seek to see itself as though it were absent, but to discern itself as present: not to know itself, as though it knew not; but in order to distinguish itself from what it knows to be distinct.* Whereby he gives one to understand that by itself the soul knows itself as present to itself, but not as distinct from other things. Hence he says that some erred in not distinguishing the soul from things that

[1] See Bk. II., ch. lxiii.

are different from it. Now through knowing what a thing is, one knows it as distinct from others: wherefore a definition which states what a thing is, distinguishes the thing defined from all others. Consequently Augustine did not mean that the soul by itself knows what itself is.

Neither did Aristotle mean this. He says in fact (3 *De Anima*, iv.) that *the possible intellect understands itself even as it understands other things*. Because it understands itself by means of an intelligible species, by which it is brought to actual intelligibility. For, considered in itself, it is only potentially an intelligible being: now nothing is known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act. Wherefore separate substances, the substance whereof is as something actual in the genus of things intelligible, understand by their very substance what they are: whereas our possible intellect understands what it is, through the intelligible species by which it is made actually understanding. And so Aristotle (3 *De Anima*, iv.) shows the nature of the possible intellect from the act of understanding, namely that it is *unmixed with the body and incorruptible*, as we explained above.[1]

Accordingly Augustine means to say that our mind knows itself by itself, inasmuch as it knows *that it is*: because by the very fact that it perceives itself to act, it perceives that it exists; and since it acts by itself, it knows by itself that it exists.

In this way then the soul, by knowing itself, knows of the separate substances *that they are*; but not *what they are*, which is to understand their substance. For when either by demonstration or by faith we know about separate substances that they are certain intellectual substances, in neither way could we receive this knowledge, unless our soul derived from itself the knowledge of intellectual being. Consequently we must use the science about the soul's intelligence as a principle on which to establish all our knowledge about separate substances.

But it does not follow, if by the speculative sciences we

[1] Bk. II., ch. lix. *seqq.*

are able to arrive at the knowledge of what the soul is, that we are able to arrive at the knowledge of what separate substances are, by means of these sciences: because our intelligence, by which we arrive at the knowledge of what the soul is, is far removed from the intelligence of a separate substance. Nevertheless through knowing what our soul is, we are able to go so far as to know a remote genus of the separate substances: but this is not the same as to understand their substance.

And just as through the soul itself we know that the soul is, inasmuch as we perceive its acts, and seek by a study of its acts and their objects to know what it is, through the principles of speculative sciences: so too, concerning those things that are in our soul, namely its powers and habits, we know indeed that they are, inasmuch as we perceive their acts; but what they are we gather from the nature of these same acts.

CHAPTER XLVII

THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE

If, in this life, we are unable to understand separate substances by reason of our intellect's innate relation to phantasms, much less can we see the divine essence in this life, since it is far above all separate substances. We may take it as a sign of this, that the more our mind is raised to the contemplation of spiritual things, the more is it withdrawn from sensible things. Now the divine substance is the highest term to which contemplation can reach: hence the mind that sees the divine substance must be wholly freed from the senses, either by death or by rapture. Wherefore it is said in God's person (Exod. xxxiii. 20): *Man shall not see me, and live.*

If it is stated in Holy Writ that some have seen God, we must understand this to have been either through an imaginary vision—or even a bodily vision, the presence of the divine power being shown by corporeal species whether

appearing externally, or formed internally in the imagination:—or by gathering some intellectual knowledge of God from His spiritual effects.

A difficulty, however, arises through some words of Augustine which would seem to imply that we are able to understand God in this life. For he says (9 *De Trin.* vii.) that *with the eyes of the soul we see the form of our being and of our actions—whether effected in ourselves or truly and rightly on other bodies—in the eternal truth, from which all temporal things proceed.* Again (12 *Conf.* xxv.) he says: *If we both see that what you say is true, and that what I say is true: where, I ask, do we see this? Surely, neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the immutable truth itself which transcends our minds.* And (*De Vera Relig.* xxxi.) he says that *we judge of all things according to the divine truth*: and again (1. *Solil.* xv.): *We must first know the truth by which other things can be known,* referring, it would seem, to the divine truth. It would seem then, from his words, that we see God Himself who is His own truth, and that through Him we know other things.

Other words of his would seem to point to the same conclusion, in 12 *De Trin.* ii., where he says: *It is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things, according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas which, unless they were above the human mind, would surely not be unchangeable.* Now unchangeable and eternal ideas cannot be elsewhere than in God, since according to the teaching of faith, God alone is eternal. Accordingly it would seem to follow that we can see God in this life, and that through seeing Him and the ideas of things in Him, we judge of other things.

Yet it is not to be believed that Augustine, by these words, meant that we are able in this life to see God in His essence. We must therefore inquire how, in this life, we see that *unchangeable truth,* or these *eternal ideas,* and how judge of them according to it.

Augustine allows that truth is in the soul (2 *Solil.* xix.): wherefore he proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth. Now truth is in the soul not only in the

same way as God is said to be in all things by His essence; or as He is in all things by His likeness,—a thing being true so far as it is like to God—for then the soul would not be higher than other things in this respect. It is therefore in the soul in a special way, forasmuch as the soul knows the truth. Accordingly just as the soul and other things are said to be true in their nature, according as they are likened to that supreme nature, which is truth itself, since it is its own being understood by itself; so too, that which is known by the soul, is true so far as it bears a likeness to that divine truth which God knows. Wherefore a gloss on Ps. xi. 2, *Truths are decayed from among the children of men*, says that *as a mirror gives many reflections of one face, so are many truths reflected in men's minds from the first truth.*[1] Now although different things are known, and different things believed to be true, by different people, yet some truths there are in which all men agree, such as first principles both of the speculative and of the practical intellect: inasmuch as a kind of image of the divine truth is reflected in the minds of all men.

Consequently when a mind knows with certitude anything at all, and by tracing it back to the principles by which we judge of everything, comes to see it in those principles, it is said to see all such things in the divine truth or in the eternal ideas, and to judge of all things according to them. This explanation is confirmed by Augustine's words (1 *Solil.* viii.): *The speculations of science are seen in the divine truth, even as these visible things are seen in the light of the sun:* for it is evident that these things are not seen in the body of the sun, but by the light, which is a likeness of the solar brilliance reflected in the air, and cast upon such bodies. Therefore, from these words of Augustine, we cannot conclude that God is seen in His essence in this life, but only as in a mirror: and to this the Apostle witnesses as regards the knowledge of this life (1 Cor. xiii. 12): *We see now through a glass in a dark manner.*

And though this mirror, which is the human mind, reflects

[1] Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* xi.

the likeness of God more faithfully than creatures of lower degree, yet the knowledge of God that can be gathered from the human mind, does not surpass the knowledge gathered from sensible things: since even the soul knows what itself is through understanding the nature of sensible things, as already stated.[1] Consequently even in this way God is not known in higher fashion than the cause is known from its effect.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THAT MAN'S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS IS NOT IN THIS LIFE

SEEING then that man's ultimate happiness does not consist in that knowledge of God whereby he is known by all or many in a vague kind of opinion, nor again in that knowledge of God whereby he is known in science through demonstration; nor in that knowledge whereby he is known through faith, as we have proved above:[2] and seeing that it is not possible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God in His essence, or at least so that we understand other separate substances, and thus know God through that which is nearest to Him, so to say,[3] as we have proved; and since we must place our ultimate happiness in some kind of knowledge of God, as we have shown;[4] it is impossible for man's happiness to be in this life.

Again. Man's last end is the term of his natural appetite, so that when he has obtained it, he desires nothing more: because if he still has a movement towards something, he has not yet reached an end wherein to be at rest. Now, this cannot happen in this life: since the more man understands, the more is the desire to understand increased in him,—this being natural to man,—unless perhaps someone there be who understands all things: and in this life this never did nor can happen to anyone that was a mere man; seeing that in this life we are unable to know separate substances which in themselves are most intelligible, as we have proved.[5]

[1] Ch. xlv., xlvi. [2] Ch. xxxviii. *seqq.* [3] Ch. xxxvii.
[4] Ch. xlv [5] Ch. xxxviii.

Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot possibly be in this life.

Besides. Whatever is in motion towards an end, has a natural desire to be established and at rest therein: hence a body does not move away from the place towards which it has a natural movement, except by a violent movement which is contrary to that appetite. Now happiness is the last end which man desires naturally. Therefore it is his natural desire to be established in happiness. Consequently unless together with happiness he acquires a state of immobility, he is not yet happy, since his natural desire is not yet at rest. When therefore a man acquires happiness, he also acquires stability and rest; so that all agree in conceiving stability as a necessary condition of happiness: hence the Philosopher says (1 *Ethic.* x.): *We do not look upon the happy man as a kind of chameleon.* Now, in this life there is no sure stability; since, however happy a man may be, sickness and misfortune may come upon him, so that he is hindered in the operation, whatever it be, in which his happiness consists. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

Moreover. It would seem unfitting and unreasonable for a thing to take a long time in becoming, and to have but a short time in being: for it would follow that for a longer duration of time nature would be deprived of its end; hence we see that animals which live but a short time, are perfected in a short time. But, if happiness consists in a perfect operation according to perfect virtue,[1] whether intellectual or moral, it cannot possibly come to man except after a long time. This is most evident in speculative matters, wherein man's ultimate happiness consists, as we have proved:[2] for hardly is man able to arrive at perfection in the speculations of science, even though he reach the last stage of life: and then in the majority of cases, but a short space of life remains to him. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

Further. All admit that happiness is a perfect good: else it would not bring rest to the appetite. Now perfect

[1] 10 *Ethic.* vii. [2] Ch. xxxvii.

good is that which is wholly free from any admixture of evil: just as that which is perfectly white is that which is entirely free from any admixture of black. But man cannot be wholly free from evils in this state of life; not only from evils of the body, such as hunger, thirst, heat, cold and the like, but also from evils of the soul. For no one is there who at times is not disturbed by inordinate passions; who sometimes does not go beyond the mean, wherein virtue consists, either in excess or in deficiency; who is not deceived in some thing or another; or at least ignores what he would wish to know, or feels doubtful about an opinion of which he would like to be certain. Therefore no man is happy in this life.

Again. Man naturally shuns death, and is sad about it: not only shunning it now when he feels its presence, but also when he thinks about it. But man, in this life, cannot obtain not to die. Therefore it is not possible for man to be happy in this life.

Besides. Ultimate happiness consists not in a habit but in an operation: since habits are for the sake of actions. But in this life it is impossible to perform any action continuously. Therefore man cannot be entirely happy in this life.

Further. The more a thing is desired and loved, the more does its loss bring sorrow and pain. Now happiness is most desired and loved. Therefore its loss brings the greatest sorrow. But if there be ultimate happiness in this life, it will certainly be lost, at least by death. Nor is it certain that it will last till death: since it is possible for every man in this life to encounter sickness, whereby he is wholly hindered from the operation of virtue; such as madness and the like which hinder the use of reason. Such happiness therefore always has sorrow naturally connected with it: and consequently it will not be perfect happiness.

But someone might say that, since happiness is a good of the intellectual nature, perfect and true happiness is for those in whom the intellectual nature is perfect, namely in separate substances: and that it is imperfect in man, by way of a kind of participation. Because he can arrive at a full

understanding of the truth, only by a sort of movement of inquiry; and fails entirely to understand things that are by nature most intelligible, as we have proved.[1] Wherefore neither is happiness, in its perfect form, possible to man: yet he has a certain participation thereof, even in this life. This seems to have been Aristotle's opinion about happiness. Wherefore (1 *Ethic.* x.) inquiring whether misfortunes destroy happiness, he shows that happiness seems especially to consist in deeds of virtue, which seem to be most stable in this life, and concludes that those who in this life attain to this perfection, are happy *as men*, as though not attaining to happiness simply, but in a human way.

We must now show that this explanation does not avoid the foregoing arguments. For although man is below the separate substances in the natural order, he is above irrational creatures: wherefore he attains his ultimate end in a more perfect way than they. Now these attain their last end so perfectly that they seek nothing further: thus a heavy body rests when it is in its own proper place; and when an animal enjoys sensible pleasure, its natural desire is at rest. Much more therefore when man has obtained his last end, must his natural desire be at rest. But this cannot happen in this life. Therefore in this life man does not obtain happiness considered as his proper end, as we have proved. Therefore he must obtain it after this life.

Again. The natural desire cannot be void; since *nature does nothing in vain*.[2] But nature's desire would be void if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore man's natural desire can be fulfilled. But not in this life, as we have shown. Therefore it must be fulfilled after this life. Therefore man's ultimate happiness is after this life.

Besides. As long as a thing is in motion towards perfection it has not reached its last end. Now in the knowledge of truth all men are ever in motion and tending towards perfection: because those who follow, make discoveries in addition to those made by their predecessors, as stated in 2 *Metaph.*[3] Therefore in the knowledge of truth man is not situated as

[1] Ch. xlv. [2] 2 *De Cœlo* xi. [3] Did. edit., Iα. i.

though he had arrived at his last end. Since then as Aristotle himself shows (10 *Ethic.* vii.) man's ultimate happiness in this life consists apparently in speculation, whereby he seeks the knowledge of truth, we cannot possibly allow that man obtains his last end in this life.

Moreover. Whatever is in potentiality tends to become actual: so that as long as it is not wholly actual, it has not reached its last end. Now our intellect is in potentiality to the knowledge of the forms of all things: and it becomes actual when it knows any one of them. Consequently it will not be wholly actual, nor in possession of its last end, except when it knows all, at least these material things. But man cannot obtain this through speculative sciences, by which in this life we know truth. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

For these and like reasons Alexander and Averroes held that man's ultimate happiness does not consist in human knowledge obtained through speculative sciences, but in that which results from conjunction with a separate substance, which conjunction they deemed possible to man in this life. But as Aristotle realized that man has no knowledge in this life other than that which he obtains through speculative sciences, he maintained that man attains to happiness, not perfect, but proportionate to his capacity.[1]

Hence it becomes sufficiently clear how these great minds suffered from being so straitened on every side. We, however, will avoid these straits if we suppose, in accordance with the foregoing arguments, that man is able to reach perfect happiness after this life, since man has an immortal soul; and that in that state his soul will understand in the same way as separate substances understand, as we proved in the Second Book.[2]

Therefore man's ultimate happiness will consist in that knowledge of God which he possesses after this life; a knowledge similar to that by which separate substances know him. Hence our Lord promises us a *reward . . . in*

[1] *Cf.* Ch. xlii. *seqq.* [2] Ch. lxxxi., *It must be observed.* . . . p. 230.

heaven (Matt. v. 12) and (Matt. xxii. 30) states that the saints *shall be as the angels*: who always see God in heaven (Matt. xviii. 10).

CHAPTER XLIX

THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE THROUGH KNOWING HIM BY THEIR OWN ESSENCES

We must now inquire whether this same knowledge whereby after death separate substances and souls know God by their own essences, be sufficient for their ultimate happiness.

In order to discover the truth in this matter, we must first of all show that to know God in this way, is not to know His essence.

An effect may be known through its cause in several ways. First, when the effect is taken as the means of knowing the existence and qualities of the cause: this happens in sciences which prove the cause from the effect.—Secondly, when the cause is seen in the effect itself, inasmuch as the likeness of the cause is reflected in the effect: thus a man is seen in a mirror on account of his likeness. This way differs from the first: because in the first there are two knowledges, of effect and of cause, whereof one is the cause of the other; for the knowledge of the effect is the cause of our knowing its cause. Whereas in the second way there is one sight of both: because while seeing the effect we see the cause therein at the same time.—Thirdly, when the very likeness of the cause in the effect is the form by which the cause is known by its effect: for instance if a box had an intellect, and were to know by its own form the art from which that very form had been produced in likeness to that art. But by none of these ways is it possible to know from its effect *what* the cause *is*, unless the effect equate the cause, and express the whole power of the cause.

Now separate substances know God by their substances in the same way as a cause is known from its effect; not however in the first way, because then their knowledge would be dis-

cursive; but in the second way, inasmuch as one of them sees God in another; and in the third way, inasmuch as each of them sees God in itself. Yet none of them is an effect equalling God's power, as we have shown in the Second Book.[1] Therefore they cannot see the divine essence by this kind of knowledge.

Besides. The intelligible likeness whereby a thing is understood as to its substance, must be of the same species, in fact it must be its species: even as the form of the house, which is in the architect's mind, is of the same species as the form of the house which exists in matter, or rather it is its species; for we do not understand what an ass is, or what a horse is, through the species of a man. But the nature of a separate substance is not of the same species as the divine nature, indeed not even of the same genus, as we showed in the First Book.[2] Therefore a separate substance cannot possibly understand God through its own nature.

Further. Every created thing is confined to a certain genus or species. But the divine essence is infinite, comprising within itself the entire perfection of all being, as we proved in the First Book.[3] Therefore the divine substance cannot be seen through anything created.

Moreover. Every intelligible species through which the quiddity or essence of a thing is understood, comprehends that thing in representing it: wherefore words signifying what a thing is are called *terms* and *definitions*. But no created image can possibly represent God thus: since every created image belongs to some fixed genus, whereas God does not, as was proved in the First Book.[4] Therefore it is not possible to understand the divine substance through a created image.

Further. It was proved in the First Book[5] that God's substance is His being. But the being of a separate substance is distinct from its substance, as we proved in the Second Book.[6] Therefore the essence of a separate substance is not a sufficient medium whereby God may be seen in His essence.

[1] Ch. xxii. *seqq.* [2] Ch. xxv. [3] Ch. xxviii., xliii.
[4] Ch. xxv. [5] Ch. xxv. [6] Ch. lii.

And yet the separate substance, through its own substance, knows about God, that He is; that He is the cause of all things; that He is above all and far removed from all, not only from the things that are, but even from those that can be conceived by the created mind. This knowledge about God we also are able somewhat to obtain, because from His effects we know of God that He is, and that He is the cause of other things, surpassing all and remote from all. And this is the limit and the highest point of our knowledge in this life where, as Dionysius says (*De Myst. Theol.* i., ii.), *we are united to God as to something unknown.* This happens when we know of Him *what He is not,* while *what He is* remains utterly unknown. Hence in order to indicate the ignorance of this most sublime knowledge, it was said to Moses (Exod. xx. 21) that he *went to the dark cloud wherein God was.*

Since, however, the lower nature in its summit attains only to what is lowest in the higher nature, it follows that this same knowledge is more sublime in separate substances than in us. This can be shown as to each way of attaining to this knowledge. For if the cause be known by its effect, the nearer that effect is, and the clearer its resemblance to its cause, the more evident does it make the existence of that cause. Now separate substances, that know God by themselves, are nearer effects and bear a clearer resemblance to God, than the effects through which we know God. Therefore separate substances know more certainly and more clearly than we that God exists.—Again. Since by negations we come by any way whatever to a proper knowledge of a thing, as stated above,[1] the more things one knows to be removed from God, and the greater their propinquity, the nearer does one approach to a proper knowledge of Him: even so, he who knows that man is neither inanimate nor insensible, approaches nearer to a proper knowledge of man than one who knows only that he is not inanimate, although neither of them knows what man is. Now, separate substances know more than we, and the things that are nearer to God; and consequently by their

[1] Ch. xxxix.

intelligence remove from God more things and nearer things from God than we do. Therefore they approach nearer to a proper knowledge of God than we: although neither do they, through understanding themselves, see the divine substance.

Again. The higher the persons over whom one knows a man to be placed the better the knowledge one has of his eminence: thus, although a peasant may know that the king is the highest in the land, yet since he knows only some of the lowest officials of the kingdom, with whom he has business, he does not realize the king's exalted position, as one who knows the dignity of all the great men of the kingdom, over whom he knows the king to be placed: although neither of them comprehends the height of the kingly rank. Now we know none but the lowest things: and consequently although we know that God is far above all, we do not know the divine supereminence as the separate substances do, to whom the highest orders of things are known, while they know God to be higher than them all.

Again. It is clear that the causality and virtue of a cause are all the better known, according as more and greater effects thereof are known. Wherefore it evidently follows that separate substances know the divine causality and power better than we, although we know him to be the cause of all.

CHAPTER L

THAT THE NATURAL DESIRE OF THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IS NOT SET AT REST IN THE NATURAL KNOWLEDGE THEY HAVE OF GOD

Now it is not possible that the separate substance's natural desire rest in such a knowledge of God.

For whatever is imperfect in a species, seeks to acquire the perfection of that species: thus whoso has an opinion about a matter, and therefore imperfect knowledge about it, for this very reason is spurred to the desire for certain knowledge about it. Now the aforesaid knowledge which separate substances have about God without knowing his

substance, is an imperfect kind of knowledge; for we do not deem ourselves to know a thing if we know not its substance: so that the chief point in knowing a thing is to know *what it is*. Therefore this knowledge which the separate substances have about God does not set their appetite at rest, but spurs it on to the vision of the divine substance.

Again. The knowledge of effects is an incitement to know the cause: wherefore men began to philosophize because they sought the causes of things. Therefore the desire for knowledge naturally implanted in all intellectual substances does not rest unless, knowing the substance of effects, they know also the substance of their cause. Consequently, since separate substances know that God is the cause of all the things whose substances they see, their natural desire does not rest, unless they see God's substance also.

Besides. As there is a connexion between knowing the adequate cause (*propter quid*) of a thing being so and so, and knowing that it is so (*quia est*), so is there a connexion between knowing about a thing *what it is* (*quid est*), and knowing that it exists (*an est*). Because if we know the adequate cause of a thing being so and so, we can prove that it is so, *e.g.* that the moon undergoes eclipse: even so, if we know of a thing, what it is, we can prove that it exists. Such is the teaching in 2 *Poster.* i. Now we observe that those who know that a thing is so and so, naturally seek to know the adequate cause of its being so. Therefore those who know that a thing exists, naturally seek to know what it is; and this is to know its essence. Therefore the natural desire for knowledge is not set at rest by the knowledge of God whereby it is known that He exists.

Further. Nothing finite can set the intellect's desire at rest. This is proved from the fact that the intellect, given any finite object, strives to go beyond it: so that given a finite line of any length, it strives to apprehend a longer; and it is the same in numbers: and this is the reason why we can add indefinitely to numbers and mathematical lines. Now the excellence and power of any created substance is finite. Therefore the intellect of a separate substance is not satisfied

with knowing separate substances, however excellent they be, but still tends by its natural desire to understand the substance which is of infinite excellence, as we proved in the First Book[1] concerning the divine substance.

Moreover. Just as there is a natural desire for knowledge in all intellectual natures, so is there in them a natural desire to rid themselves of ignorance or nescience. Now separate substances, as stated,[2] know in the manner already mentioned, that God's substance is above them, and above everything that they understand: wherefore they know that the divine substance is unknown to them. Therefore their natural desire tends to understand the divine substance.

Besides. The nearer a thing is to its end, the greater the desire with which it tends to that end: wherefore we may notice that the natural movement of bodies is increased towards the end. Now the intellect of separate substances is nearer to the knowledge of God than ours: and consequently they desire to know God more intensely than we do. And however much we know that God is, and other things mentioned above,[3] we still go on desiring, and seek to know Him in His essence. Much more therefore do separate substances desire this naturally: and consequently their natural desire is not satisfied with the above-mentioned knowledge of God.

Hence we conclude that the ultimate happiness of a separate substance does not consist in the knowledge whereby it knows God by its own substance: since its desire still leads it on to the substance of God.

It also clearly follows from this that ultimate happiness is to be sought nowhere else but in an operation of the intellect: since no desire leads us so high as the desire of knowing the truth. For all our desires, whether of pleasure or of anything else that man wants, can be satisfied with other things: whereas the aforesaid desire rests not until it has reached God, the supreme cause and maker of all. Hence Wisdom rightly says (Ecclus. xxiv. 7): *I dwell in the highest places, and my throne is in a pillar of a cloud*: and it is said

[1] Ch. xliii. [2] Ch. xlix. [3] *Ibid.*

(Prov. ix. 3) that *Wisdom by her maids inviteth to the tower.* They should blush, then, who seek man's happiness in the lowest things, whereas it is placed on such a height.

CHAPTER LI

HOW GOD MAY BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE

SINCE then it is impossible for a natural desire to be void;—and it would be were it impossible to arrive at understanding the divine substance; for all minds desire this naturally:—we must conclude that it is possible for the divine substance to be seen by means of the intellect; both by separate intellectual substances, and by our souls.

It is sufficiently clear from what has been said, what manner of vision this is. For we have proved[1] that the divine substance cannot be seen by the intellect in any created species. Wherefore if God's essence be seen at all, it must be that the intellect sees it in the divine essence itself: so that in that vision the divine essence is both the object and the medium of vision.

Since, however, the intellect is unable to understand any particular substance, unless it be actuated by some species informing it, that is the image of the thing understood; someone might deem it impossible for a created intellect to see the very substance of God in the divine essence as an intelligible species, inasmuch as the divine essence is self-subsistent, and we have proved in the First Book[2] that God cannot be the form of anything.

In order to understand this truth, we must note that a self-subsisting substance is either a form alone, or is composed of matter and form. Accordingly, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of something else: because the form therein is already confined to that matter, so that it cannot be the form of another thing. But that which subsists so as nevertheless to be a form alone, can be the form of something else, provided its being be such

[1] Ch. xlix. [2] Ch. xxvi. *seqq.*

that some other thing can participate in it, as we have proved concerning the human soul in the Second Book.[1] If, however, its being cannot be participated in by another, it cannot be the form of anything; because by its very being it is determined in itself, as material things are by their matter. Now we must consider this as being the case not only with regard to substantial or natural being, but also as regards intelligible being. For, since truth is the perfection of the intellect, that intelligible which is truth itself, will be a pure form in the genus of intelligible things. This applies solely to God: for, since truth is consequent upon being, that alone is its own truth, which is its own being; and this belongs to God alone, as we proved in the Second Book.[2] Consequently other subsistent intelligibles are not pure forms in the genus of intelligible things, but have a form in a subject: for each of them is a true thing, but not the truth, even as it is a being, but not being itself. It is therefore clear that the divine essence can be compared to the created intellect as an intelligible species by which it understands: which cannot be said of the essence of any separate substance. And yet it cannot be the form of another thing as to its natural being: for it would follow that being united to this other, it would constitute one nature; which is impossible, since the divine essence is perfect in itself in its own nature. Whereas the intelligible species in its union with the intellect, does not constitute a nature, but perfects the intellect to the effect of understanding: and this is not inconsistent with the perfection of the divine essence.

This immediate vision of God is promised to us in Holy Writ (1 Cor. xiii. 12): *We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face.* It would be impious to understand this in a material way, and imagine a material face in the Godhead: since we have proved[3] that God has no body. Nor is it possible for us to see God with a bodily face since the eyes of the body, which are situate in the face, can only see bodily things. Thus then shall we see God face to face,

[1] Ch. lxviii. [2] Ch. xv. [3] Bk. I., ch. xxvii.

because we shall see Him immediately, even as a man whom we see face to face.

It is according to this vision that we become most like unto God, and participators of His bliss: since God understands His substance by His essence, and this is His bliss. Wherefore it is said (1 Jo. iii. 2): *When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; because we shall see Him as He is.* And (Luke xxii. 29, 30) our Lord said: *I dispose to you, as My Father hath disposed to Me, a banquet,*[1] *that you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom.* Now these words cannot be understood as referring to the food and drink of the body, but to that which is taken from the table of Wisdom, of which Wisdom says (Prov. ix. 5): *Eat my bread and drink the wine which I have mingled for you.* Accordingly, to eat and drink at God's table is to enjoy the same bliss as that which makes God happy, and to see God as He sees Himself.

CHAPTER LII

THAT NO CREATED SUBSTANCE CAN BY ITS NATURAL POWER ARRIVE AT SEEING GOD IN HIS ESSENCE

However it is not possible for any created substance to attain, by its own power, to this way of seeing God.

For that which is proper to the higher nature cannot be acquired by a lower nature, except through the action of the higher nature to whom it properly belongs: thus water cannot become hot except through the action of heat. Now to see God in His essence is proper to the divine nature, since to operate through its own form is proper to the operator. Therefore no intellectual substance can see God in the divine essence, unless God Himself bring this about.

Again. A form proper to A does not become B's except through A's agency: because an agent produces its like by communicating its form to another. Now it is impossible to see the divine substance unless the divine substance itself become the form by which the intellect understands, as we

[1] Vulg., *kingdom.*

have proved.[1] Therefore no created substance can attain to that vision, except through the divine agency.

Besides. If any two things have to be united together so that one be formal and the other material, their union must be completed by an action on the part of the one that is formal, and not by the action of the one that is material: because the form is the principle of action, whereas matter is the passive principle. Now in order that the created intellect see God's substance, the divine essence itself must be united to the intellect as an intelligible form, as we have proved.[2] Therefore no created intellect can attain to this vision except through the divine agency.

Further. *What is so of itself, is the cause of what is so through another.*[3] Now the divine intelligence sees of itself the divine substance: for the divine intelligence is the divine essence, in which God's substance is seen, as we proved in the First Book:[4] whereas the created intellect sees the divine substance in the divine essence as in something other than itself. Therefore this vision cannot be acquired by the created intellect, except through the action of God.

Moreover. Whatever exceeds the limits of a nature, cannot be acquired by that nature except through the agency of another: thus water does not flow upwards unless it be moved by something else. Now it is beyond the limits of any created nature to see God's substance: because it is proper to every created intellectual nature to understand according to the mode of its substance: whereas the divine substance cannot be understood thus, as we proved above.[5] Therefore no created intellect can possibly attain to a vision of the divine substance except by the agency of God who surpasses all creatures. Hence it is said (Rom. vi. 23): *The grace of God is life everlasting.* For we have proved[6] that man's happiness consists in seeing God, which is called life everlasting: and we are said to obtain this by God's grace alone, because that vision surpasses the faculty of every creature, and it is impossible to attain thereto except by God's gift;

[1] Ch. li. [2] See above. [3] 8 *Phys.* v.
[4] Ch. xlv. [5] Ch. xlix. [6] Ch. l.

and when such things are obtained by a creature, it is put down to God's grace. Again our Lord says (Jo. xiv. 21): *I will manifest myself to him.*

CHAPTER LIII

THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS A RAY OF THE DIVINE LIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE

To so sublime a vision the created intellect needs to be raised by some kind of outpouring of the divine goodness. For it is impossible that the proper form of anything become the form of another, unless this other bear some resemblance to the thing to which that form properly belongs: thus light does not actuate a body which has nothing in common with the diaphanous. Now the divine essence is the proper intelligible form of the divine intellect, and is proportionate thereto: for these three, understanding, medium of understanding, and object understood, are one in God. Therefore that same essence cannot become the intelligible form of a created intellect, except through the created intellect participating in some divine likeness. Therefore this participation in a divine likeness is necessary in order that the divine substance be seen.

Again. Nothing can receive a higher form unless it be disposed thereto through its capacity being raised: because every act is in its proper power. Now the divine essence is a higher form than any created intellect. Wherefore in order that the divine essence become the intelligible species to a created intellect, which is requisite in order that the divine substance be seen, the created intellect needs to be raised for that purpose by some sublime disposition.

Besides. If two things from not being united become united, this must be either through both being changed, or one only. Now if we suppose that some created intellect begin to see the divine essence, it follows from what we have said,[1] that the divine essence is united to that intellect as

[1] Ch. li.

an intelligible species. But it is impossible that the divine essence be changed, as we have proved.[1] Therefore this union must begin through a change in the created intellect. And this change can only consist in the created intellect acquiring some new disposition.—The same conclusion follows if we suppose some created intellect to be endowed from the outset of its creation with such a vision. For if, as we have proved,[2] this vision exceeds the faculty of nature, it is possible to conceive any created intellect as complete in its natural species without its seeing God's substance. Consequently, whether it see God from the beginning, or begin to see Him afterwards, its nature needs something to be added to it.

Further. Nothing can be raised to a higher operation except through its power being strengthened. Now a power may be increased in two ways. First, by a mere intensifying of the power: thus the active power of a hot subject is increased by the intensity of the heat, so that it is capable of a more vehement action in the same species. Secondly, by the addition of a new form: thus the power of a diaphanous body is increased so that it can give light, through its being made actually lightsome by receiving the form of light anew. This increase of power is necessary in order that there result an operation of another species. Now the natural power of the created intellect is not sufficient for the vision of the divine substance, as we have shown.[3] Therefore its power needs to be increased, in order that it attain to that vision. But increase through intensification of the natural power is insufficient: because that vision is not of the same kind as the natural vision of the created intellect: which is clear from the distance of the things seen. Therefore there must be an increase of the intellective power through its receiving a new disposition. Now owing to the fact that we derive our knowledge of intelligible beings from sensible things, we transfer the terms employed in sensual knowledge to our intellectual knowledge; especially those that appertain to the sight, which of all the senses is the highest and most spiritual,

[1] Bk. I., ch. xiii. [2] Ch. lii. [3] Ch. lii.

and therefore most akin to the intellect: and for this reason intellectual knowledge is called *sight*. And because bodily sight is not effected without light, those things which serve for the perfection of intellectual vision are called *light*: wherefore Aristotle (3 *De Anima*, v.) compares the active intellect to light, because the active intellect makes things actually intelligible, even as light somewhat makes things to be actually visible. Accordingly the disposition whereby the created intellect is raised to the intellectual vision of the divine substance, is rightly called the *light of glory*: not that it makes the object actually intelligible, as the light of the active intellect does; but because it makes the intellect able actually to understand.

This is the light of which it is said (Ps. xxxv. 10): *In Thy light we shall see light*, i.e. the light of the divine substance. Again it is said (Apoc. xxii. 5):[1] *The city*, namely of the Blessed, *hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon . . . for the glory of God hath enlightened it*. Again it is said (Is. lx. 19): *Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day, neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee: but the Lord shall be unto thee for an everlasting light, and thy God for thy glory*.—For this reason too, since in God to be is the same as to understand, and because He is to all the cause of their understanding, He is said to be *the light* (Jo. i. 9): *That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world*: and (1 Jo. i. 5): *God is light*: and (Ps. ciii. 2): *Thou . . . art clothed with light as with a garment*.—For this reason too, both God and the angels are described in Holy Writ in figures of fire, on account of the brilliancy of fire.[2]

CHAPTER LIV

ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT GOD CANNOT BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE; AND THE SOLUTION THEREOF

SOMEONE will object against the foregoing:

No additional light can help the sight to see things that surpass the natural faculty of corporeal sight: since the

[1] *Cf.* xxi. 23. [2] Exod. xxiv. 17; Acts ii. 3; Ps. ciii. 4.

sight can see only coloured objects. Now the divine substance surpasses the whole faculty of a created intellect, more even than intelligence surpasses the senses' capacity. Therefore no additional light can raise the created intellect to see the divine substance.

Again. This light that is received into the created intellect, is something created. Therefore it also is infinitely distant from God: and consequently such a light cannot help the created intellect to see the divine substance.

Besides. If the aforesaid light can do this for the reason that it is an image of the divine substance; since every intellectual substance, for the very reason that it is intellectual, bears a likeness to God, the nature itself of an intellectual substance will suffice for it to see God.

Further. If this light is created; since there is no reason why that which is created should not be connatural to some creature; there might possibly be a creature that would see the divine substance through its connatural light. But the contrary of this has been proved.[1]

Moreover. *The infinite, as such, is unknown.*[2] Now we proved in the First Book[3] that God is infinite. Therefore the divine substance cannot be seen through the light in question.

Furthermore. There should be proportion between the understanding and the thing understood. But there is no proportion between the created intellect, even perfected by this light, and the divine substance: for there still remains an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot be helped by any light to see the divine substance.

By these and like arguments some have been induced to maintain that the divine substance is never seen by a created intellect. This opinion both would destroy the rational creature's true happiness, which can consist in nothing but the vision of the divine substance, as we have proved,[4] and is contrary to the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from what we have said.[5] Wherefore it should be rejected as false and heretical.

[1] Ch. lii. [2] 1 *Phys.* iv. 4. [3] Ch. xliii. [4] Ch. l. [5] Ch. li.

It is not difficult, however, to answer the above arguments. For the divine substance is not so outside the range of the created intellect, as to be absolutely beyond its reach, as sound is to the sight, or an immaterial substance to the senses: because the divine substance is the first intelligible, and the principle of all intellectual knowledge: yet it is outside the range of the created intellect, as exceeding its power, just as the highest sensibles are outside the range of the senses. Wherefore the Philosopher (2 *Metaph.*)[1] says that *our intellect stands in relation to the most evident things, as the owl's eye does in relation to the sun.* Therefore the created intellect needs to be strengthened by some divine light in order to be able to see the divine substance. This solves the first argument.

Moreover, this light raises the created intellect to the vision of God, not on account of its affinity to the divine substance, but on account of the power which it receives from God to produce such an effect: although in its being it is infinitely distant from God, as the second argument stated. For this light unites the created intellect to God, not in being but only in understanding.

Since, however, it belongs to God Himself to understand His substance perfectly, the light in question is a likeness of God in this that it perfects the intellect for seeing the divine substance. Now no intellectual substance can be like God in this way. For since no created substance's simplicity is equal to the divine simplicity, it is impossible for the created substance to have its entire perfection in one subject: for this is proper to God, as we proved in the First Book,[2] who is being, understanding and blessed in respect of the same. Consequently in the intellectual substance the created light through which it is raised to the beatific vision of God, differs from any light whereby it is perfected in its specific nature, and understands proportionately to its substance. Hence the reply to the third argument is clear.

The fourth argument is solved thus. The vision of the divine substance surpasses all natural power, as was shown.[3]

[1] Ed. Did., 1α, 1, 2. [2] Ch. xxviii. [3] Ch. lii.

Consequently the light whereby the created intellect is perfected in order to see the divine substance must needs be supernatural.

Nor can the fact that God is infinite be an obstacle to the vision of the divine substance, as the fifth objection argued. For He is not said to be infinite by way of privation, as quantity: and the infinite of this kind is reasonably unknown, because it is like matter devoid of form which is the principle of knowledge. But He is said to be infinite negatively, as a *per se* subsistent form that is not limited by being received into matter. Wherefore that which is infinite in this way is in itself most knowable.

There is indeed proportion between the created intellect and understanding God, a proportion not of measure, but of aptitude, such as of matter for form, or cause for effect. In this way there is no reason against there being in the creature a proportion to God, consisting in the aptitude of an intelligent being for an intelligible object, as well as of effect in respect of its cause. Wherefore the solution of the sixth objection is clear.

CHAPTER LV

THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT DOES NOT COMPREHEND THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE

THE mode of any action whatever depends on the efficacity of its active principle,—for that which has the stronger heat imparts greater heat: consequently the mode of knowledge also must depend on the efficiency of the principle of knowledge.

Now the light mentioned above[1] is a principle of knowing God: since thereby the created intellect is raised to the vision of the divine substance. Accordingly, the mode of the divine vision must be commensurate with the power of this same light. But this light is far short in strength of the clarity of the divine intelligence. Wherefore it is impossible

[1] Ch. liii.

that the divine substance be seen in the aforesaid light as perfectly as it is seen by the divine intellect. Now the divine intellect sees this substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible: because the truth of the divine substance, and the clarity of the divine intellect are equal; nay more, they are one. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly by the aforesaid light see the divine substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible. Now whoever knows a thing so as to comprehend it, knows it as perfectly as it is knowable: thus whoever knows that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, as a matter of opinion based on probable reasons, because wise men say so, does not yet comprehend it; but only he who knows it as a scientific conclusion, through the medium that causes that conclusion. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly comprehend the divine substance.

Again. A finite power cannot in its operation rise to the level of an infinite object. Now the divine substance is something infinite in comparison with every created intellect: since every created intellect is confined to a certain species. Therefore the vision of a created intellect cannot possibly rise to the level of the divine substance in seeing it, namely in seeing the divine substance as perfectly as it is visible. Therefore no created intellect comprehends it.

Further. Every agent acts perfectly so far as it perfectly participates in the form that is the principle of action. Now the intelligible form by which the divine substance is seen, is the divine essence itself: and although it becomes the intelligible form of the created intellect, the created intellect does not grasp it as much as it can be grasped. Therefore it does not see it as perfectly as it can be seen. Therefore it is not comprehended by the created intellect.

Besides. Nothing comprehended goes beyond the limits of the comprehender. Consequently if the created intellect were to comprehend the divine substance, this would not exceed the limits of the created intellect: which is impossible. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly comprehend the divine substance.

We do not however say that the divine substance is seen, yet not comprehended by a created intellect, as though something thereof were seen and something not seen; since the divine substance is utterly simple: but because it is not seen as perfectly by the created intellect as it is visible, even as one who holds a demonstrated conclusion as an opinion is said to know it but not to comprehend it, because he does not know it perfectly, that is scientifically, although there be no part of it that he knows not.

CHAPTER LVI

THAT NO CREATED INTELLECT, IN SEEING GOD, SEES ALL THAT CAN BE SEEN IN HIM

HENCE it is clear that though the created intellect may see the divine substance, it knows not all that can be seen in the divine substance.

For then alone does it necessarily follow that if one principle be known, all its effects are known in it, when that principle is comprehended by the intellect: because then is a principle known as to its whole power, when all its effects are known from it. Now other things are known from the divine essence, as effects are known from their cause. Consequently since the created intellect cannot know the divine substance so as to comprehend it, it does not follow that because it sees it, it sees also all that can be known in it.

Again. The higher the intellect the more it knows;—either a greater number of things, or at least more about the same things. Now the divine intellect surpasses every created intellect: and consequently it knows more things than any created intellect. Yet it knows not things except through knowing its own essence, as we proved in the First Book.[1] Therefore more things are knowable in the divine essence, than any created intellect can see therein.

Besides. The measure of a power is according to what it can do. Consequently to know all that a power can do is

[1] Ch. xlix.

the same as to comprehend that power. But, since the divine power is infinite, no created intellect can comprehend it any more than it can comprehend its essence, as we proved above.[1] Neither, therefore, can a created intellect know all that the divine power can do. Yet all the things that the divine power can do are knowable in the divine essence, because God knows them all, and not otherwise than in His essence. Therefore a created intellect by seeing the divine essence, does not see all that can be seen in the divine substance.

Moreover. No cognitive power knows a thing except under the aspect of its proper object: thus by sight we do not know a thing except as coloured. Now the proper object of the intellect is *what a thing is*, namely the essence of a thing, as stated in 3 *De Anima*, iv. Consequently whatever the intellect knows of a thing, it knows it through the knowledge of its essence, so that whenever by demonstration we become acquainted with the proper accidents of a thing, we take as principle, *what that thing is*, as stated in 1 *Poster.* i. iv. On the other hand, if the intellect knows the essence from its accidents, according to the statement in 1 *De Anima*, i. that *accidents are a great help in knowing what a thing is*; this is accidental, in so far as the knowledge of the intellect arises from the senses, and so by knowing the accidents as perceived by the senses we need to arrive at knowing the substance: for this reason this does not occur in mathematics, but only in physics. Consequently whatever cannot be known in a thing by knowing its substance must be unknown to the intellect. Now by knowing the substance of one who wills, we cannot arrive at knowing what he wills: because the will does not tend altogether naturally to that which it wills; for which reason the will and nature are said to be two active principles. Therefore the intellect cannot know what a person wills, except that it may do so from certain effects: thus if we see a person working willingly, we know what he willed. Or again from a cause; thus God knows what we will, as also other of His effects, in that He is the cause of our willing. Or again by someone insinuating

[1] Ch. lv.

his will to another, as when by speaking he makes known his likes and dislikes. Since then many things depend on God's simple will, as we have partly shown above,[1] and will show yet more clearly further on;[2] although the created intellect may see the divine essence, it does not know all the things that God sees in His essence.

Someone may object to what has been said, that God's substance is something greater than all the things He can do, or understand, or will, except Himself: wherefore if the created intellect can see God's substance, much more can it know all that God either understands, or wills, or can do, except Himself.

But if we consider carefully, to know a thing in itself is not the same as to know it in its cause: since there are things which are easy to know in themselves, but not easy to know in their causes. It is true, then, that to know God in Himself is more than to know anything else besides Him, if this can be known in itself. But it belongs to a more perfect knowledge to know the divine substance and to see its effects therein, than to know the divine substance without seeing its effects in it. And it is possible to see the divine substance without comprehending it. But it is not possible to know all that can be known in that substance, without comprehending it, as we have proved.

CHAPTER LVII

THAT EVERY INTELLECT OF ANY DEGREE CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE DIVINE VISION

SINCE, as we have proved,[3] the created intellect is raised by a kind of supernatural light to the vision of the divine substance, there is no created intellect of so low a degree, as to its nature, that cannot be raised to this vision.

For we have proved[4] that this light cannot be connatural to any creature, but surpasses every created nature in its

[1] Bk. I., ch. lxxxi.
[2] Ch. lxiv., *seqq.*
[3] Ch. liii.
[4] *Ibid.*

power. Now that which is done by a supernatural power, is not hindered by any diversity of nature, since the divine power is infinite; so that in the miraculous healing of a sick man, it matters not whether he ail much or little. Consequently the difference of degrees in the intellectual nature does not prevent the lowest in that nature from being raised by the aforesaid light to that vision.

Again. The highest intellect in the order of nature is infinitely distant from God in perfection and goodness: whereas its distance from the lowest intellect is finite: for there cannot be an infinite distance between one finite thing and another. Consequently the distance between the lowest created intellect and the highest, is as nothing in comparison with the distance between the highest created intellect and God. Now that which is as nothing cannot cause an appreciable variation: thus the distance between the centre of the earth and the human eye, is as nothing in comparison with the distance between the human eye and the eighth sphere, compared with which the earth occupies the space of a mere point: for which reason no appreciable variation arises from astronomers considering the human eye as the centre of the earth in their demonstrations. It makes no difference therefore what intellect be raised by the aforesaid light to the vision of God, whether it be of the highest, or of the lowest, or of a middle degree.

Besides. It was proved above[1] that every intellect desires naturally to see the divine substance. Now the natural desire cannot be void. Therefore every created intellect can arrive at the vision of the divine substance, the lowliness of its nature being no obstacle.

Hence it is that (Matt. xxii., 30) our Lord promises men the glory of the angels: *They shall be*, he says, speaking of men, *like the angels of God in heaven*. And (*Apoc.* xx.)[2] it is stated that *the measure of a man* is that *of an angel*. For this reason nearly everywhere in Holy Writ angels are described in the form of men, either wholly, as the angels who appeared to Abraham in the likeness of men (Gen. xviii. 2),

[1] Ch. 1. [2] xxi. 17.

or in part, as may be seen in the animals (Ezech. i. 8) of which it is said that they had the *hands of a man under their wings.*

Hereby we refute the error of those who said that however much the human soul be raised, it cannot attain to an equality with the higher intellects.

CHAPTER LVIII

THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE TO SEE GOD MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER

WHEREAS the mode of operation results from the form that is the principle of operation, and the aforesaid light is a principle of the vision whereby the created intellect sees the divine substance, as we have proved;[1] it follows that the mode of the divine vision is in keeping with the mode of this light. Now it is possible that there be various degrees of participation of this light, so that one receives more light than another. Therefore it is possible that of those who see God, one may see Him more perfectly than another; though both see His substance.

Again. In whatever genus there is one thing higher than the others, we shall find degrees according as these others approach more or less to that thing: thus things are more or less cold according as they approach to fire which is supremely hot. Now God sees His own substance most perfectly, inasmuch as he alone comprehends it, as we have proved above.[2] Therefore of those who see Him one sees His substance more perfectly than another, according to their greater or lesser approach to Him.

Besides. The light of glory raises one to the divine vision for the reason that it is a likeness of the divine intellect, as we have stated.[3] Now a thing may be more or less like to God. Therefore it is possible for one to see the divine substance more or less perfectly.

Further. Since there is proportion between the end and things directed to the end, it follows that things directed

[1] Ch. liii. [2] Ch. lv. [3] Ch. liii.

differently to an end, participate in that end differently. Now vision of the divine substance is the last end of every intellectual substance, as we have shown.[1] And intellectual substances are not all equally prepared for that end: for some are more virtuous, some less, and virtue is the way to happiness.[2] Consequently there must be diversity in the divine vision, in that some see the divine substance more perfectly, some less perfectly. Hence in order to indicate this difference of happiness, our Lord says (Jo. xiv. 2): *In my Father's house there are many mansions.*

Hereby too is excluded the error of those who said that all rewards are equal.

Again, just as the mode of vision indicates a diversity of degrees among the blessed, so the object of the vision shows that their glory is the same: for each one's happiness consists in his seeing God's substance, as we have proved. The same thing then makes them all happy, but they do not all derive an equal happiness therefrom. Hence it does not stand in the way of what has been said, that our Lord declares (Matth. xx.) the labourers in the vineyard to have received the same wage, *a penny* to wit, although they worked not equally: because the same thing is appointed as a reward to be seen and enjoyed, namely God.

Wherein it must also be observed that corporal and spiritual movements are somewhat contrary to each other. For all corporal movements have the identically same first subject, but their ends are diverse: whereas spiritual movements, namely intellectual apprehensions and acts of the will, have various first subjects, but one identical end.

CHAPTER LIX

HOW THOSE WHO SEE THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE SEE ALL THINGS

Now forasmuch as the vision of the divine substance is the last end of every intellectual substance, as we have proved;[3] and since the appetite of everything that has

[1] Ch. l. [2] 1 *Ethic.* ix. [3] Ch. l.

obtained its last end, is at rest: it follows that the natural appetite of the intellectual substance that sees the divine substance must be entirely at rest. Now the natural desire of the intellect is to know all the genera, species and powers of things, and the whole order of the universe: as is evident from the fact that man makes a study of all these things. Therefore everyone that sees the divine substance knows all the things mentioned above.

Again. Intellect and sense differ, as is clear from 3 *De Anima* iv.,[1] in that sense is destroyed or weakened by powerful sensibles, so that afterwards it cannot perceive weaker objects: whereas the intellect, through not being destroyed or weakened by its object, but only perfected thereby, after it has understood a higher intelligible, is not less but more able to understand other intelligibles. Now the highest in the genus of intelligibles is the divine substance. Consequently the intellect which by the divine light is raised to see the substance of God, is *a fortiori* perfected by the same light so as to see all other intelligibles in the universe.

Besides. Intelligible being is not of less, but may be of greater extent than physical being; for the intellect is naturally adapted to understand all the things in the universe, as well as things that have no physical being, such as negations and privations. Consequently anything required for the perfection of physical being, that and even more is required for the perfection of intelligible being. Now the perfection of intelligible being is when the intellect has reached its last end: even as the perfection of physical being consists in the very making of a thing. Therefore God makes known to the intellect, which sees Him, all the things that He has made for the perfection of the universe.

Moreover. Although of those who see God one sees him more perfectly than another, as we have shown,[2] yet each one sees Him so perfectly that all his natural capacity is filled: indeed the vision itself surpasses all natural capacity, as was proved above.[3] Therefore everyone that sees the divine

[1] iv. 5. [2] Ch. lviii. [3] Ch. lii.

substance must needs know in the divine substance all the things to which his natural capacity extends. Now the natural capacity of every intellect extends to the knowledge of all general species, and the order of things. Therefore every one that sees God will know these things in the divine substance.

Wherefore the Lord answered Moses' request to see the divine substance (Exod. xxxiii. 19): *I will show thee all good;* and Gregory says (*Dial.* iv. 33): *What know they not who know Him that knows all?*

If we consider carefully the foregoing, it is clear that those who see the divine substance, in one sense see all things, and in another sense, do not. For if by *all* we understand those things that belong to the perfection of the universe, it is evident from what has been said that those who see God see all things, as the arguments just adduced prove. Because, as the intellect is, in a sense, all things, whatever belongs to the perfection of nature, belongs also to the perfection of intelligible being: wherefore according to Augustine (2 *Super Gen. ad lit.*, viii.), all things made by the Word of God that they might subsist in their respective natures, were made likewise in the angelic intelligence so as to be understood by the angels. Now, to the perfection of natural being belong specific natures, their properties and forces: because the intention of nature is directed to the specific natures, since individuals are for the sake of the species. Consequently it belongs to the perfection of an intellectual substance to know the nature, forces and proper accidents of every species: and therefore it will obtain this through the vision of the divine essence.—Moreover through its knowledge of natural species the individuals also, contained in these species, are known by the intellect that sees God, as may be gathered from what has been already said of the divine and angelic knowledge.[1]

On the other hand if by *all* we understand all that God knows by seeing His essence, no created intellect sees all things in the divine substance, as we have shown.[2]

[1] Bk. I., ch. lxix.; Bk. II., ch. xcvi. *seqq.* [2] Ch. lvi.

This may be considered in respect of several things.

First, as to those things which God can make, but neither has made nor ever will make. For all such things cannot be known without comprehending His power, which is impossible for any created intellect, as we have proved.[1] Hence it is said (Job xi. 7, *seqq.*): *Peradventure thou wilt understand the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea.* For these things are said, not as though God were great in dimensive quantity: but because His power is not limited to all that seems great, so that He be unable to make greater still.

Secondly, as to the reasons of things made: which reasons cannot all be known by an intellect without its comprehending the divine goodness. Because the reason for every thing made is taken from the end which the maker has in view. Now the end of all things made by God is the divine goodness: wherefore the reason for things made is that the divine goodness may be spread abroad in things. So that a man would know all the reasons of created things, if he knew every good that can accrue to things according to the order of divine wisdom: and this would be to comprehend the divine goodness and wisdom, which is impossible to any created intellect. Wherefore it is said (Eccles. viii. 17): *I understood that man can find no reason of all those works of God.*

Thirdly, as to those things which depend on God's will alone: such as predestination, election and justification, and whatever belongs to the creature's sanctification. Hence it is said (1 Cor. ii. 11): *No*[2] *man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him. So the things also that are of God, no man knoweth but the Spirit of God.*

[1] Ch. lv.

[2] Vulg., *What man knoweth . . . in him?*

CHAPTER LX

THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD SEE ALL IN HIM AT ONCE

WHEREAS we have shown[1] that the created intellect which sees the divine substance, sees therein all the species of things; and since whatever is seen in one species, must needs be seen at once and by one vision, because vision must correspond to the principle of vision: it follows that the intellect which sees the divine substance, sees all, not successively but at once.

Again. The supreme and perfect happiness of the intellectual nature consists in seeing God, as proved above.[2] Now happiness results not from a habit but from an act, since it is the ultimate perfection and last end. Consequently whatever we see in the beatific vision of the divine substance is all seen by us actually: and therefore not one thing after another.

Besides. Whenever a thing arrives at its last end, it is at rest: since all movement is to the attainment of an end. Now the last end of the intellect is the vision of the divine substance, as shown above.[3] Therefore the intellect that sees the divine substance does not pass from one intelligible thing to another. Therefore whatsoever it knows in this vision, it considers it all actually.

Moreover. In the divine substance the intellect knows all the species of things, as we have proved.[4] Now of some genera there are an infinite number of species, for instance of numbers, figures and proportions. Therefore the intellect sees an infinite number of things in the divine substance. But it would not see them all unless it saw them at one time: because *it is not possible to pass through the infinite.*[5]

Consequently all the intellect sees in the divine substance, it sees at once.

Hence Augustine says (15 *De Trin.* xvi.): *Our thoughts will not then be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another: but we shall see all we know by one glance.*

[1] Ch. lix. [2] Ch. l. [3] *Ibid.* [4] Ch. lix. [5] 1 *Poster.* xxii.

CHAPTER LXI

THAT BY SEEING GOD A MAN IS MADE A PARTAKER OF ETERNAL LIFE

It follows hence that by the aforesaid vision the created intellect is made a partaker of eternal life. For eternity differs from time in that the latter has its being in a kind of succession, whereas the former is all simultaneously.[1] Now it has already been proved[2] that there is no succession in the vision in question, and that whatsoever is seen in it, is seen at once and at a glance. Therefore this vision takes place in a kind of participation of eternity. Moreover this vision is a kind of life: because the act of the intellect is life.[3] Therefore by that vision the created intellect becomes a partaker of eternal life.

Again. Actions take their species from their objects. Now the object of the aforesaid vision is the divine substance in its very being, and not in some created image, as we have shown.[4] Now the being of the divine substance is in eternity, or rather is eternity itself. Therefore the aforesaid vision consists in a participation of eternity.

Besides. If an action takes place in time, this is either because the principle of the action is in time:—for instance the actions of natural things are temporal;—or on account of the term of the action; for instance, the actions which spiritual substances, who are above time, exercise on things subject to time. Now the vision in question is not subject to time on the part of the thing seen, since this is an eternal substance; nor on the part of the medium of vision, which is also the eternal substance; nor on the part of the seer, namely the intellect, whose being is independent of time; because it is incorruptible, as we have proved.[5] Therefore this vision is according to a participation of eternity, as altogether transcending time.

Further. The intellective soul is created *on the border line*

[1] Boethius, *De Consol.* v. [2] Ch. lx. [3] 1 *Ethic.* ix.
[4] Ch. l. [5] Bk. II., ch. lv., lxxix.

between eternity and time as stated in *De Causis*, and explained above:[1] because it is the last in order among intellects; and yet its substance stands above corporal matter, and is independent thereof. On the other hand its action in respect of which it comes into conjunction with lower and temporal things, is itself temporal. Consequently its action by reason of which it comes into conjunction with higher things that are above time, partakes of eternity. Especially does this apply to the vision in which it sees the divine substance. Therefore by this vision it enters into a participation of eternity: and for the same reason, so too does any other created intellect that sees God.

For this reason our Lord says (Jo. xvii. 3): *This is eternal life : that they may know Thee, the only true God.*

CHAPTER LXII

THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD WILL SEE HIM FOR EVER

It follows from what has been said that those who obtain ultimate happiness from the divine vision, never fall away from it. Because *whatever at one time is, and at another time is not, is measured by time*, as stated in 4 *Phys.* xii. Now the vision in question that makes intellectual creatures happy, is not in time but in eternity.[2] Therefore no one can lose it having once become a partaker thereof.

Again. The intellectual creature does not arrive at its last end except when its natural desire is at rest. Now just as it naturally desires happiness, so does it desire perpetuity of happiness: because as it is perpetual in its substance, that which it desires for its own sake and not on account of something else, it desires to have always. Consequently happiness would not be its last end unless it endured for ever.

Besides. Whatever is possessed with love causes sorrow if it be known that at length it will be lost. Now since the vision in question which makes the possessor happy is

[1] Bk. II., ch. lxviii. [2] Ch. lxi.

supremely enjoyable and desirable, it is supremely loved by those who possess it. Therefore they could not but be sorrowful, if they knew that they would lose it some time. But if it were not perpetual, they would know this: for it has been shown[1] that in seeing the divine substance, they know also other things that naturally are; wherefore much more do they know the conditions of that vision, whether it be perpetual or about to cease eventually. Therefore they would not possess that vision without sorrow. Consequently it would not be true happiness, which should insure from all evil, as we have proved.[2]

Moreover. That which is moved towards a thing as the end of its movement, is not moved away from it except by violence; as a heavy body, when it is projected upwards. Now it is clear from what has been said[3] that every intellectual substance tends to that vision with a natural desire. Therefore it cannot fall away from it except by violence. But nothing is taken away by violence unless the might of him who takes it exceed that of him who caused it. Now the cause of the divine vision is God, as we proved.[4] Consequently, as no might exceeds God's, it is impossible for that vision to be taken away by violence. Therefore it will last for ever.

Further. If a man cease to see what he saw hitherto, this will be either because he loses the faculty of sight—as when a man dies or becomes blind, or is hindered in some other way; or because he wishes no longer to see, as when we turn our eyes away from a thing we saw before; or because the object is withdrawn. And this is invariably true, whether we speak of sensitive or of intellective vision. Now the intellectual substance that sees God cannot lose the faculty of seeing God; neither through ceasing to exist, since it is immortal, as we proved above;[5] nor through failure of the light by which it sees God, since that light is received incorruptibly, on the part both of the recipient and of the giver. Nor can it lack the will to enjoy that vision, for it knows its ultimate

[1] Ch. lix. [2] Ch. xlviii. [3] Ch. l.
[4] Ch. liii. [5] Bk. II., ch. lv.

happiness to consist in that vision: even as it cannot but desire to be happy. Nor will it cease to see through the withdrawal of the object: because that object which is God is unchangeable; nor does He withdraw himself more than we withdraw from Him. Therefore it is impossible for this beatific vision of God ever to cease.

Again. It is impossible for a man to wish to give up a good which he is enjoying, except on account of some evil that he thinks to be attached to the enjoyment of that good, which enjoyment, at least, is an obstacle to a greater good: for just as the appetite desires nothing except under the aspect of a good, so does it shun nothing except as an evil. But in the enjoyment of that vision there cannot be any evil, since it is the greatest good to which the intellectual creature can attain. Nor is it possible that one who enjoys that vision deem any evil to be in it, or anything to be better than it: because the vision of that Supreme Truth excludes any false opinion. Therefore it is impossible that the intellectual substance which sees God ever desire to lose that vision.

Moreover. The reason why we become weary of what we enjoyed hitherto is that it causes some kind of change, by destroying or diminishing one's power. Hence fatigue is incidental to the exercise of the sensitive powers through the action of the sensible objects on the bodily organ;—in fact the power may be altogether destroyed by too powerful an object;—and after a time they are loth to enjoy that which hitherto had been a pleasant sensation. For the same reason we become weary in mind after long or concentrated thought, because powers that employ organs of the body are subject to fatigue, and in this life it is not possible to give the mind to thought without employing those organs. Now the divine substance does not corrupt but, more than anything, perfects the intellect. Nor does any action performed by a corporeal organ concur in the vision of Him. Therefore it is impossible for anyone to be weary of seeing Him, when they have once enjoyed the sight of Him.

Further. Nothing can be wearisome that is wonderful

to him that looks on it: because as long as we wonder at it, it still moves our desire. Now the created intellect always looks with wonder on the divine substance, since no created intellect can comprehend it. Therefore the intellectual substance cannot possibly become weary of that vision: and consequently it cannot of its own choice desist from it.

Besides. If two things were united before, and afterwards become separated, this must be the result of a change in one of them: because just as a relationship does not begin except through a change in one of the relatives, so does it not cease except through a fresh change in one of them. Now the created intellect sees God through being, in some way, united to Him, as proved above.[1] Consequently if that vision cease, through the cessation of that union, this must result from a change either in the divine substance, or in the intellect of the one who sees it. But neither of these is possible: since the divine substance is unchangeable, as we proved in the First Book:[2] and the intellectual substance is raised above all changes, when it sees the divine substance. Therefore it is impossible to lapse from the happiness of seeing God.

Furthermore. The nearer a thing is to God who is utterly unchangeable, the less changeable and the more enduring is it: so that certain bodies *through being far distant from God*, cannot last for ever, as stated in 2 *De Gener.* x. But no creature can come nearer to God than one who sees His substance. Therefore the intellectual creature that sees the divine substance, becomes, in a very high degree, unchangeable. Therefore it can never fall away from that vision. Hence it is said (Ps. lxxxiii. 5): *Blessed are they that dwell in Thy house, O Lord: they shall praise Thee for ever and ever:* and elsewhere (Ps. cxxiv. 1): *He shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem.* Also (Is. xxxiii. 21): *Thy eyes shall see Jerusalem, a rich habitation, a tabernacle that cannot be removed: neither shall the nails thereof be taken away for ever, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken: because only there our Lord is magnificent:* and (Apoc. iii. 12):

[1] Ch. li. [2] Ch. xiii.

He that shall overcome, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go out no more.

Hereby we refute the error of the Platonists who said that souls after being separated from the body, and obtaining ultimate happiness, begin to desire reunion with the body, and that when the happiness of that life is ended, they are plunged once more into this life of unhappiness: and again that of Origen, who maintained that souls and angels can return from bliss to unhappiness.

CHAPTER LXIII

HOW IN THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS MAN'S EVERY DESIRE IS FULFILLED

It is evident from what has been said, that in this happy state which results from the divine vision, man's every desire is fulfilled, according to Ps. cii. 5, *Who satisfieth thy desire with good things*, and his every end achieved. This is clear to anyone who considers man's various desires in kind.

There is a desire in man, as an intellectual being, to *know the truth* : and men pursue this desire by the study of the contemplative life. And this will be most clearly fulfilled in that vision, when the intellect by gazing on the First Truth will know all that it naturally desires to know, as we have proved above.[1]

There is also a desire in man as a rational being capable of regulating things beneath him: and he pursues this desire in the occupations of the active and civic life. The chief object of this desire is that man's entire life be regulated in accord with reason, to wit, that he may *live according to virtue*: because the end of every virtuous man in all his actions is the good of his own virtue, that of the brave man, for instance, that he may act bravely. Now this desire will then be wholly fulfilled: because the reason will be right

[1] Ch. lix.

vigorous, being enlightened with the very light of God lest it stray from righteousness.

Consequent to his life as a citizen, there are also certain goods that man needs for his civic actions. Such is *a position of honour*, through inordinate desire of which, men become proud and ambitious. Now by this vision men are raised to the highest position of honour, because in a way, they are united to God, as we have proved above.[1] Hence, even as God Himself is the *King of ages*,[2] so the Blessed united to Him are said to be kings (Apoc. xx. 6): *They shall reign with Christ.*

There is another desirable thing consequent to the civic life, and this is *to be well known* ; through inordinate desire of which men are said to be desirous of vain glory. Now by this vision the Blessed become well known, not in the opinion of men, who can both deceive and be deceived, but in the most true knowledge both of God and of all the Blessed. Hence this happiness is many times described as *glory* in Holy Writ: thus it is said in the Psalm (cxlix. 5): *The saints shall rejoice in glory.*

There is yet another desirable thing in the civic life, and this is *riches*; through inordinate desire of which men become illiberal and unjust. Now in that happy state there is a sufficiency of all goods: inasmuch as the Blessed enjoy him who contains the perfection of all goods. Hence it is said (Wis. vii. 11): *All good things came to me together with her:* wherefore it is said again (Ps. cxi. 3): *Glory and wealth shall be in his house.*

There is a third desire in man, common to him and other animals, namely the desire for *the enjoyment of pleasure*: and this men pursue especially by leading a voluptuous life, and through lack of moderation become intemperate and incontinent. Now in that vision there is the most perfect pleasure, all the more perfect than sensuous pleasure, as the intellect is above the senses; as the good in which we shall delight surpasses all sensible good, is more penetrating,

[1] Ch. li. [2] 1 Tim. i. 17.

and more continuously delightful; and as that pleasure is freer from all alloy of sorrow, or trouble of anxiety: whereof it is said (Ps. xxxv. 9): *They shall be inebriated with the plenty of Thy house, and Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure.* There is also the natural desire, common to all things, whereby all things seek to be preserved in their being, as far as possible: and through lack of moderation in this desire, men become timorous, and spare themselves overmuch in the matter of labour. This desire will be altogether fulfilled when the Blessed obtain perfect immortality, and security from all evil, according to Is. xlix. 10 and Apoc. xxi. 4:[1] *They shall no more hunger or thirst, neither shall the sun fall on them, nor any heat.* It is therefore evident that intellectual substances by seeing God attain to true beatitude, when their every desire is satisfied, and when there is a sufficiency of all good things, as is required for happiness, as Aristotle says (10 *Ethic.* vii. 3). Hence Boethius says (3 *De Consol.*) that happiness is *a state of life made perfect by the accumulation of all goods.*

In this life there is nothing so like this ultimate and perfect happiness as the life of those who contemplate the truth, as far as possible here below. Hence the philosophers who were unable to obtain full knowledge of that final beatitude, placed man's ultimate happiness in that contemplation which is possible during this life. For this reason too, Holy Writ commends the contemplative rather than other forms of life, when our Lord said (Luke x. 42): *Mary hath chosen the better part,* namely the contemplation of truth, *which shall not be taken from her.* For contemplation of truth begins in this life, but will be consummated in the life to come: while the active and civic life does not transcend the limits of this life.

[1] Apoc. vii. 16.

CHAPTER LXIV

THAT GOD GOVERNS THINGS BY HIS PROVIDENCE

From what has been laid down in the preceding chapters, it has been sufficiently proved that God is the end of all: whence we may further conclude that by His providence He governs or rules all.

For whenever certain things are ordered to a certain end, they are all subject to the disposal of the one to whom chiefly that end belongs. This may be seen in an army: since all the parts of the army, and their actions, are directed to the good of the general, victory to wit, as their ultimate end: for which reason the government of the whole army belongs to the general. In the same way, that art which is concerned with the end dictates and gives laws to the art which is concerned with things directed to the end: as civics controls the military art, and this directs the art of horsemanship; and the art of sailing, the art of ship-building. Since then all things are directed to the divine goodness as their last end, as we have shown above,[1] it follows that God to whom that goodness belongs chiefly as essentially possessed, understood and loved, must be the Governor of all.

Again. Whoever makes a thing for the sake of an end makes use of it for that end. Now it has been shown above that whatsoever has being in any way is an effect of God:[2] and that God makes all things for an end which is Himself.[3] Therefore He uses everything by directing it to its end. But this is to govern. Therefore God, by His providence, is the Governor of all.

Besides. It has been shown that God is the first unmoved mover. Now the first mover moves no less than second movers; more so indeed, because without Him they do not move other things. But all things that are moved, are moved for an end, as was shown above.[4] Therefore God moves

[1] Ch. xvii. [2] Bk. II., ch. xv. [3] Bk. I., ch. lxxv.
[4] Ch. ii.

each thing to its end. Moreover He moves them by his intellect: for it has been proved above[1] that He moves not by natural necessity, but by intellect and will. Now to rule and govern by providence is nothing else but to *move certain things to their end by one's intellect.* Therefore God by His providence governs and rules all things that are moved to their end; whether they be moved corporally, or spiritually, as the seeker is said to be moved by the object desired.

Moreover. It was proved[2] that natural bodies are moved and work towards an end, although they have no knowledge of an end, from the fact that always or nearly always that which is best happens to them: nor would they be made otherwise if they were made by art. Now it is impossible that things without knowledge of an end should act for an end, and attain to that end in an orderly manner, unless they be moved to that end by one who has knowledge of the end: as the arrow is directed to the mark by the archer. Therefore the whole operation of nature must be directed by some knowledge. This must be traced back to God mediately or immediately: because every subordinate art and knowledge must take its principles from a higher one, as may be seen in speculative and practical sciences. Therefore God governs the world by His providence.

Further. Things in nature distinct do not converge into one order, unless they be brought together by one controller. Now the universe is composed of things distinct from one another and of contrary natures; and yet they all converge into one order, some things acting on others, some helping or directing others. Therefore there must be one ordainer and governor of the universe.

Moreover. Natural necessity cannot be alleged as the reason for the various phenomena to be observed in the movements of the heavenly bodies: since the movements of some are more numerous than, and wholly different from the movements of others. Therefore the ordering of their movements must come from some providence: and consequently

[1] Bk. I., ch. lxxxi; Bk. II., ch. xxiii. *seqq.* [2] Ch. iii.

so must the ordering of all those movements and operations here below, that are controlled by the former movements.

Besides. The nearer a thing is to its cause the greater share it has in the effect. Wherefore if we observe that a thing is the more perfectly shared by certain individuals, according as these are nearer to a certain thing, this is a sign that this thing is the cause of that which is shared in various degrees, thus, if certain things are hotter according as they are nearer fire, this shows that fire is the cause of their heat. Now we see that things are all the more perfectly ordered according as they are nearer to God: for in the lower bodies, which are farthest removed from God by unlikeness of nature, we sometimes find defects from the ordinary course of nature, as in monstrosities, and other casual happenings: whereas this never happens in the heavenly bodies, although they are changeable in a certain degree: nor in the separate intellectual substances. Therefore God is the cause of the entire order of things: and consequently He is the governor of the whole universe by His providence.

Further. As we proved above,[1] God brought all things into being, not by natural necessity but by His intellect and will. Now His intellect and will can have no other ultimate end but his goodness, namely the bestowal of His goodness on things, as was shown above.[2] And things partake of the divine goodness by way of likeness, in being good themselves. And the greatest good in things made by Him, is the good consisting in the order of the universe, which is most perfect as the Philosopher says (XII *Metaph.* x.) and divine Scripture in like manner (Gen. i. 31): *God saw all the things He had made, and they were very good*, whereas of each single work it was said simply that *they were good*. Consequently that which is chiefly willed and caused by God is the good consisting in the order of things of which He is the cause. But to govern things is nothing else but to impose order on them. Therefore God by His intellect and will governs all things.

[1] See above, *Besides. It has been shown. . . .*, p. 151.
[2] Bk. I., ch. lxxv. *seq.*

Moreover. Whoever has an end in view, cares more for what is nearest to the last end: because the other ends are directed to this. Now the last end of God's will is His goodness, the nearest thing to which among created things is the good consisting in the order of the universe: because every particular good of this or that thing is ordained thereto as its end, just as the less perfect is ordained to that which is more perfect: even as each part is for the sake of its whole. Consequently that which God cares for most in created things, is the order of the universe: and therefore He governs it.

Again. Every created thing attains its ultimate perfection by its proper operation, because a thing's ultimate end and perfection must be either an operation or the term or effect of an operation: and the form whereby a thing is, is its first perfection, as stated in 2 *De Anima* i. Now the order among effects in respect of different natures and the degrees thereof, issues from divine wisdom as we showed in the Second Book.[1] Therefore the order also among the operations, whereby things approach nearer to their ultimate end, does so in like manner. But to direct the actions of things to their end is to govern them. Therefore God by the providence of His wisdom governs and rules things.

Hence Holy Writ acclaims God as Lord and King, according to Psalm xcix. 2: *The Lord, He is God*, and Psalm xlvi. 8: *God is the King of all the earth*: because the king and lord is he whose office it is to rule and govern subjects. Wherefore Holy Writ ascribes the course of events to the divine control (Job ix. 7): *Who commandeth the sun, and it riseth not, and shutteth up the stars, as it were under a seal:* and (Ps. cxlviii. 6): *He hath made a decree and it shall not pass away*. Hereby is refuted the error of some physicists of old, who held that everything happens from natural necessity; whence it followed that all things happen by chance, and not by the ordinance of Providence.

[1] Ch. xlv.

CHAPTER LXV

THAT GOD PRESERVES THINGS IN EXISTENCE

From the fact that God governs things by His providence, it follows that He preserves them in existence.

For every thing whereby certain things obtain their end comes under the government of those things: because things are said to be governed or ruled according as they are directed to their end. Now things are directed to the ultimate end intended by God, the divine goodness to wit, not only in that they operate, but also in the very fact that they exist: because inasmuch as they exist they bear a likeness to the divine goodness, which is the end of all things, as we have proved.[1] Therefore it belongs to divine providence that things be preserved in existence.

Again. The cause of a thing must needs be the same as the cause of its preservation: because preservation is nothing else than continued existence. Now we have shown above[2] that God is the cause of every thing's existence by His intellect and will. Therefore by His intellect and will He preserves things in existence.

Besides. No particular univocal agent can be the cause of its species simply: thus an individual man cannot be the cause of the human species, for then he would be the cause of every man, and consequently of himself, which is impossible. But properly speaking the individual is the cause of the individual. Now the individual man exists forasmuch as the human nature is in this particular matter which is the principle of his individuality. Therefore the human individual is not the cause of a man except in the point of his being the cause of the human form being in this particular matter: and this is to be the principle of the generation of this particular man. It is consequently evident that neither the individual man, nor any other natural univocal agent, is a cause except of the generation of an individual. Now there

[1] Ch. xix. [2] Bk. II., ch. xxiii. *seqq.*

must needs be some *per se* active cause of the human species; as is evidenced by his composite nature, and the order of his parts, which is always the same, unless it be hindered accidentally: and the same applies to all other species of natural things. This cause is God either mediately or immediately: for it has been shown[1] that He is the first cause of all. Consequently He stands in relation to the species of things as in nature the individual generator to the generation of which He is the cause *per se*. But generation ceases when the generator's action ceases. Therefore all the species of things would cease, were the divine operation to cease. Therefore by His operation He preserves things in existence.

Moreover. Although movement may accidentally belong to an existing thing, it is something additional to the thing's being. Now nothing corporeal is the cause of any thing except in so far as it is moved; because no body acts except through movement, as Aristotle proves.[2] Therefore no body is the cause of a thing's existence, as such, but it is the cause of a thing's being moved towards existence, that is, of its becoming. Now the existence of a thing is participated existence, since no thing is its own existence, save God, as we proved above.[3] Consequently God who is His own being must be first and *per se* the cause of all being. Accordingly the divine operation stands in the same relation to the existence of things, as the movement of a corporeal mover to the *being made* and the *being moved* of things made or moved. Now it is impossible that a thing continue to be made or to be moved if the movement of the mover cease. Therefore a thing cannot possibly continue to exist except through the divine operation.

Further. As the operation of art presupposes the operation of nature, so the operation of nature presupposes the creative operation of God: because art takes its matter from nature, and nature receives its matter from God through creation. Now the products of art are preserved in being by virtue of the products of nature; a house, for instance,

[1] Bk. I., ch. xiii.; Bk. II., ch. xv.
[2] 7 *Phys.* xi.
[3] Bk. I., ch. xxii.; Bk. II., ch. xv.

by the solidity of the stones. Therefore all natural things would not continue to exist except by the power of God.

Again. The impression of the agent does not remain in the effect, after the action of the agent has ceased, unless it merge into the nature of the effect. Because the forms of things generated, and their properties, remain in them to the end after generation, because they become natural to them. In like manner the reason why habits are hard to remove is that they merge into the nature: whereas dispositions and passions, whether in the body or in the soul, remain for a time after the action of the agent, but not for always, because they are in their subject as preparing a way to nature. On the other hand that which belongs to the nature of a higher genus nowise remains after the action of the agent: thus light does not remain in the diaphanous body after the illuminant has been removed. Now existence is not the nature or essence of any created thing, but of God alone, as was proved in the First Book.[1] Therefore nothing could continue to exist, if the divine operation were to cease.

Further. There are two explanations of the origin of things. One is that proposed by faith, that things were first brought into being by God; the other is that of certain philosophers holding that things emanated from God from eternity.[2] According to either explanation it is necessary to say that things are preserved in existence by God. For if things were brought into being by God after not being, their existence as well as their non-existence must result from the divine will: because He permitted things not to be when He so willed, and caused them to be when He so willed. Therefore they exist so long as He wills them to exist. Therefore His will is the preserver of things.—If on the other hand things emanated from God from eternity, we cannot assign a time or an instant when they first emanated from God. Either, therefore, they were never produced by God, or their existence is always emanating from God, as long as they exist. Therefore He preserves things in existence by His operation.

[1] Ch. xxii.

[2] *Cf.* Bk. II., ch. xxxi.

Hence it is said (Heb. i. 3): *Upholding all things by the word of His power.* Augustine too, says (4 *Super Gen. ad lit.* xii.): *The potency of the Creator, and the power of the Almighty and All-upholder, is the cause of every creature's subsistence. If this ruling power were withdrawn from His creatures, their form would cease at once, and all nature would collapse. When a man is building a house, and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and has gone : whereas the world would not stand for a single instant, if God withdrew His support.* Hereby is refuted the statement of certain authorities quoted in the law of the Moors,[1] who in order to be able to maintain that the world needs to be preserved by God, held that all forms are accidents, and that no accident lasts for two instants, so that things would always be in the process of formation: as though a thing needed not an active cause except while being made.—Wherefore some of them are stated to have maintained that the indivisible bodies of which, they say, all substances are composed, and which alone, according to them, have any permanency, would be able for a time to remain in existence, if God were to withdraw His government from things.—Some of these say indeed that things would not cease to exist unless God caused in them the accident of *ceasing-to-be.*—All of which is plainly absurd.

CHAPTER LXVI

THAT NOTHING GIVES EXISTENCE EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS IT ACTS BY GOD'S POWER

It is evident from what has gone before that all inferior agents do not give existence except in so far as they act by God's power.

Nothing gives existence except in so far as it is a being in act. Now God preserves things in existence by His providence, as we have proved.[2] Therefore it is by God's power that a thing causes existence.

[1] *Cf.* Maimonides, *Doct. Perp.* I., lxxiii. [2] Ch. lxv.

Again. When several different agents are subordinate to one agent, the effect that proceeds from them in common, must needs be ascribed to them in so far as they are united together in partaking of the movement and power of that agent: for many things do not make one, except in so far as they are one; thus it is clear that all the men in an army work in order to effect a victory; and this effect they bring about forasmuch as they are subordinate to the general, whose proper effect is the victory. Now it was shown in the First Book[1] that the first agent is God. Since then existence is the effect common to all agents, for every agent makes a thing to be actually: it follows that they produce this effect in so far as they are subordinate to the first agent, and act by its power.

Besides. In all ordered active causes, the last thing in the order of generation and the first in the intention, is the proper effect of the first cause: thus the form of a house which is the proper effect of the builder, comes into being after the cement, stones and timber have prepared the way, which is the work of the inferior workmen who are subject to the builder. Now in every action, actual being is the chief thing intended, and is the last thing in the order of generation: because, when it is obtained, the active principle ceases to act, and the passive principle ceases to be acted upon. Therefore existence is the proper effect of the first agent, namely God: and whatever gives being, does so in so far as it acts by the power of God.

Moreover. Among the things that can be reached by the power of a secondary agent, the limit in goodness and perfection is that which comes within its range through the power of the first agent: because the secondary agent's power receives its complement from the first agent. Now the most perfect of all effects is being: since every nature and form is perfected through being actually, and is compared to actual being as a potentiality to act. Therefore existence is what secondary agents produce by the power of the first agent.

[1] Ch. xiii.

Besides. The order of effects is according to the order of causes. Now the first of all effects is being: for all others are determinations of being. Therefore being is the proper effect of the first agent, and all other agents produce it by the power of the first agent. And secondary agents which, as it were, particularize and determine the action of the first agent, produce the other perfections, as their proper effects, which are particular kinds of being.

Furthermore. That which is such by its essence, is the proper cause of that which is such by participation: thus fire is the cause of all things that are afire. Now God alone is being by His essence, while all others are beings by participation: for in God alone existence is His essence.[1] Therefore the existence of every existing thing is His proper effect, so that whatever brings a thing into existence, does so in so far as it acts by God's power. Wherefore it is said (Wis. i. 14): *God created, that all things might be:* and in several passages of Holy Writ it is stated that God makes all things.—Again in *De Causis* it is said that not even does an intelligence give being except *in so far as it is something divine*, i.e. in so far as it acts by God's power.

CHAPTER LXVII

THAT IN ALL THINGS THAT OPERATE GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THEIR OPERATING

Hence it is clear that in all things that operate God is the cause of their operating. For everyone that operates is in some way a cause of being, either of essential or of accidental being. But nothing is a cause of being except in so far as it acts by God's power. Therefore everyone that operates acts by God's power.

Again. Every operation consequent to a certain power, is ascribed to the giver of that power as effect to cause: thus the natural movement of heavy and light bodies is consequent to their form, whereby they are heavy or light,

[1] Bk. I., ch. xxii.; Bk. II., ch. xv.

wherefore the cause of their movement is said to be that which produced them, and gave them their form. Now all power of any agent whatsoever is from God, as from the first principle of all perfection. Therefore since all operation is consequent to some power, it follows that God is the cause of every operation.

Moreover. It is clear that every action that cannot continue after the influence of a certain agent has ceased, is from that agent: thus the visibility of colours cannot continue after the action of the sun has ceased to enlighten the air; wherefore without doubt it is the cause of the visibility of colours. The same applies to violent motion, which ceases when the violence of the impelling force has ceased. Now, since God not only gave existence to things when they first began to exist, but also causes existence in them as long as they exist, by preserving them in existence, as we have proved,[1]; so not only did He give them active forces when He first made them, but is always causing those forces in them. Consequently if the divine influence were to cease, all operation would come to an end. Therefore every operation of a thing is reducible to Him as its cause.

Besides. Whatever applies an active power to action, is said to be the cause of that action: for the craftsman, when he applies the forces of nature to an action, is said to be the cause of that action; as the cook is the cause of cooking which is done by fire. Now every application of power to action is chiefly and primarily from God. For active forces are applied to their proper operations by some movement of the body or of the soul. Now the first principle of either movement is God. For He is the first mover, wholly immovable, as we have proved above.[2] Likewise every movement of the will whereby certain powers are applied to action, is reducible to God as the first object of appetite, and the first willer. Therefore every operation should be ascribed to God as its first and principal agent.

Further. In all ordered active causes, the causes that follow must always act by the power of the first: thus in

[1] Ch. lxv. [2] Bk. I., ch. xiii.

natural things the lower bodies act by the power of the heavenly bodies; and in voluntary things all the inferior craftsmen act in accordance with the direction of the master craftsman. Now, in the order of active causes, God is the first cause, as we proved in the First Book.[1] Consequently all the lower active causes act by His power. Now the cause of an action is the thing by whose power it is done, more even than that which does it: even as the principal agent in comparison with the instrument. Therefore God is more the cause of every action than even secondary active causes.

Further. Every operator is directed through its operation to its ultimate end: since either the operation itself is its last end, or the thing operated, namely the effect of the operation. Now it belongs to God Himself to direct things to their end, as we have proved.[2] Therefore we must conclude that every agent acts by the power of God: and consequently it is He who causes the actions of all things.

Hence it is said (Isa. xxvi. 12): *Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us*:[3] and (Jo. xv. 5): *Without Me you can do nothing*: and (Philip. ii. 13): *It is God who worketh in us*[4] *both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.* For this reason Holy Writ often ascribes natural effects to the divine operation: because He it is who works in every agent, natural or voluntary, as it is written in Job x. 10, 11: *Hast Thou not milked me as milk, and curdled me like cheese? Thou hast clothed me with skin: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews*: and again in Psalm xvii. 14: *The Lord thundered from heaven, and the highest gave His voice: hail and coals of fire.*

CHAPTER LXVIII

THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE

From this it is evident that God must be everywhere and in all things.

For the mover and the thing moved must be simultaneous,

[1] *Loc. cit.* [2] Ch. lxiv. [3] Douay,—*for us.* [4] Vulg.,—*you.*

as the Philosopher proves (7 *Phys.* ii.). Now God moves all things in their actions, as we have proved.[1] Therefore He is in all things.

Again. Whatever is in a place, or in anything whatsoever, is, after a manner, in contact therewith: for a body is located somewhere by contact of dimensive quantity: while an incorporeal thing is said to be somewhere by contact of its power, since it lacks dimensive quantity. Accordingly an incorporeal thing stands in relation to being somewhere by its power, as a body to being somewhere by dimensive quantity. And if there were a body having infinite dimensive quantity, it would of necessity be everywhere. Consequently if there be an incorporeal thing with infinite power it must needs be everywhere. Now we proved in the First Book[2] that God has infinite power. Therefore He is everywhere.

Besides. As an individual cause is to an individual effect, so is a universal cause to a universal effect. Now the individual cause must needs be present to its proper effect: thus fire by its substance gives out heat, and the soul by its essence gives life to the body. Since, then, God is the universal cause of all being, as we proved in the Second Book,[3] it follows that wherever being is to be found, there also is God present.

Furthermore. If an agent be present to but one of its effects, its action cannot extend to other things except through that one, because agent and patient must be simultaneous: thus the motive power moves the various members of the body not otherwise than through the heart. Consequently if God be present to but one of His effects, such as the first movable, which is moved by Him immediately: it would follow that His action cannot extend to other things except through that first effect. But this is unreasonable. For if the action of an agent cannot extend to other things except through some first effect, the latter must correspond proportionately to the agent as regards the agent's whole power, else the agent could not use its

[1] Ch. lxvii. [2] Ch. xliii. [3] Ch. xv.

whole power: thus we see that all the movements which the motive power is able to cause, can be performed by the heart. Now there is no creature through which can be done everything that the divine power is capable of doing: for the divine power surpasses infinitely every created thing, as we proved in the First Book.[1] Consequently it is unreasonable to say that the divine action does not extend to other things except through some first thing. Therefore He is present, not in one only, but in all His effects.—For it would amount to the same if someone were to say that He is in some, and not in all: because no matter how many divine effects we take, they will not suffice to carry into effect the execution of the divine power.

Moreover. The active cause must needs be joined together with its proximate and immediate effect. Now in each thing there is a proximate and immediate effect of God. For we proved in the Second Book[2] that God alone can create. Also, in each thing there is something caused by creation: in bodies, there is primary matter; in incorporeal beings there is their simple essence; as is clear from what we have said in the Second Book.[3] Accordingly God must be present in all things at the same time: especially since those things He called into being from non-being, are continually preserved in being by him, as we have proved.[4]

Wherefore it is said (Jer. xxiii. 24): *I fill heaven and earth;* and (Ps. cxxxviii. 8): *If I ascend into heaven, Thou art there: if I descend into hell, Thou art present.*

Hereby we refute the error of some who said that God is in a definite part of the world, for instance in the first heaven, and in the eastern portion, so that he is the principle of the heavenly movement.—Yet this statement of theirs might be upheld if rightly understood; so that the meaning be, not that God is confined to some particular part of the world, but that in the natural order, owing to the divine motion, all corporeal movement begins in one particular part. For this reason Holy Writ specially describes God as being in heaven, according to Isa. lxvi. 1: *Heaven is*

[1] Ch. xv. [2] Ch. xxi. [3] Ch. xv. *seqq.* [4] Ch. lxv.

My throne, and Ps. cxiii. 16: *The heaven of heavens is the Lord's,* etc.—However the fact that God works in the lowest bodies some thing outside the ordinary course of nature, that cannot be wrought by the power of a heavenly body, shows clearly that God is immediately present not only to the heavenly body but also to the lowest things.

But we must not think that God is everywhere as though He were distributed throughout local space, one part of Him here, another there, because He is all everywhere: since God, being utterly simple, has no parts.

Nor is He simple in the same way as a point which is the term of a continuous quantity, and consequently occupies a definite place therein; so that one point cannot be elsewhere than in one indivisible place. But God is indivisible as existing altogether outside the genus of continuous quantity. Consequently He is not necessitated by His essence to a definite place, great or small, as though He needed to be in some place: for He was from eternity before there was any place. Yet by the immensity of His power He reaches all things that are in a place, because He is the universal cause of being, as we have stated.[1] Accordingly, He is wholly wheresoever He is. And yet again we must not think that He is in things as though He were mingled with them: for we proved in the First Book[2] that He is neither the matter nor the form of anything. But He is in all things as active cause.

CHAPTER LXIX

CONCERNING THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO WITHDRAW FROM NATURAL THINGS THEIR PROPER ACTIONS

This[3] was an occasion of error to some who thought that no creature has an active part in the production of natural effects: so that, to wit, fire would not heat, but God would cause heat at the presence of fire: and they maintained the like of all natural effects.

[1] See above, *Besides. As an individual.* . . ., p. 163.
[2] Ch. xvii., xxvii.
[3] The conclusion of the preceding chapter.

They endeavoured to confirm this error with arguments, by showing that no form whether substantial or accidental is brought into being except by the way of creation. Because forms and accidents cannot be made out of matter: since matter is not a part of them. Hence, if they be made, they must be made out of nothing, and this is to be created. And since creation is the act of God alone, as we proved in the Second Book,[1] it would seem to follow that God brings into being forms both substantial and accidental.

The opinion of certain philosophers agreed in part with this position. For, seeing that whatever is not *per se* must result from that which is *per se*, it would seem that the forms of things which do not exist by themselves but in matter, result from forms that are by themselves without matter: as though forms existing in matter were participations of forms that are without matter. For this reason Plato supposed that the species of sensible things are certain separate forms, which are causes of being to these objects of sense, in so far as these partake of them.

Avicenna maintained that all substantial forms emanate from the active intelligence. But as to accidental forms he held them to be dispositions of matter, resulting from the action of lower agents disposing the matter: and in this he avoided the absurdity of the previous opinion. A sign of this apparently was that no active power can be found in these bodies except the accidental form, active and passive qualities for instance; and these would not seem capable of causing substantial forms.

Moreover in these lower things we find certain things that are not engendered from their like ; animals caused through putrefaction, for instance. Wherefore apparently the forms of these are caused by higher principles. And in like manner other forms, some of which are much more perfect. Some too, find proof of this in the inadequacy of natural bodies for action. Because the form of every natural body is annexed to quantity. Now quantity is an obstacle to action and movement: a sign of which they see

[1] Ch. xxi.

in the fact that the more we add to the quantity of a body, the heavier it becomes, and the slower its movement. Whence they conclude that no body is active, but that all bodies are purely passive.

They also attempt to prove this again from the fact that every patient is subject to the agent; and that every agent, save the first which creates, requires a subject inferior to itself. But no substance is inferior to a body. Therefore seemingly no body is active.

They add that the corporeal substance is the furthest removed from the first agent: wherefore they do not see how the active power can reach as far as the corporeal substance: and maintain that, as God is purely active, so the corporeal substance, being the lowest thing of all, is purely passive. For these reasons, then, Avicebron[1] (*Fons Vitæ*, tract. ii., iii.) held that no body is active: but that the power of a spiritual substance pervading through bodies produces the actions which seem to be performed by bodies.

Moreover certain Moslem theologians are said to have argued that even accidents are not the result of corporeal activity, because an accident does not pass from one subject to another. Hence they deem it impossible for heat to pass from a hot body into another body so as to heat it: but that all like accidents are created by God.[2]

However, many absurdities arise from the foregoing positions. For if no inferior cause, above all a body, is active, and if God works alone in all things; since God is not changed through working in various things, no diversity will follow among the effects through the diversity of the things in which God works. Now this is evidently false to the senses: for from the application of a hot body there follows, not cooling but only heating: and from human seed is generated a man only. Therefore the causing of inferior effects is not to be ascribed to the divine power so as to withdraw the causality of inferior agents.

Again. It is contrary to the notion of wisdom that any

[1] Jewish philosopher, 1020-1070.
[2] See Maimonides, *Doct. Perp.* I. lxxiii.

thing should be done in vain in the works of a wise man. But if creatures did nothing at all towards the production of effects, and God alone wrought everything immediately, other things would be employed by him in vain for the production of effects. Therefore the above position is incompatible with divine wisdom.

Besides. He who gives a principle, gives whatever results from the principle: thus the cause that gives gravity to an element, gives it downward movement. Now to make a thing actual results from being actual, as we see to be the case in God: for He is pure act, and is also the first cause of being in all things, as we proved above.[1] If therefore He bestowed His likeness on others in respect of being, in so far as He brought things into being, it follows that He also bestowed on them His likeness in the point of acting, so that creatures too should have their proper actions.

Further. Perfection of effect indicates perfection of cause: since greater power produces a more perfect effect. Now God is the most perfect agent. Therefore things created by him must needs receive perfection from him. Consequently to detract from the creature's perfection is to detract from the perfection of the divine power. But if no creature exercises an action for the production of an effect, much is detracted from the perfection of the creature; because it is due to the abundance of its perfection, that a thing is able to communicate to another the perfection that it has. Therefore this opinion detracts from the divine power.

Moreover. Just as it belongs to the good to produce a good, so it belongs to the sovereign good to make a thing best. Now God is the sovereign good, as we proved in the First Book.[2] Therefore it belongs to Him to make all things best. Now it is better that the good bestowed on someone should be common to many, than that it should be proper to one: since *the common good is always considered more godlike than the good of one only*.[3] But the good of one becomes common to many, if it flows from the one to the other: and this can only be when the one, by its own action, com-

[1] Bk. I., ch. xiii. [2] Ch. xli. [3] 1 *Ethic.* ii.

municates it to the others: and if it has not the power to transmit it to others, that good remains its own property. Accordingly God communicated His goodness to His creatures in such wise that one thing can communicate to another the good it has received. Therefore it is derogatory to the divine goodness to deny things their proper operations.

Again. To take order away from creatures is to deny them the best thing they have: because each one is good in itself, while altogether they are very good on account of the order of the universe: for the whole is always better than the parts, and is their end. Now if we subtract action from things, the order among things is withdrawn: because, things differing in nature are not bound together in the unity of order, except through the fact that some are active and some passive. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that things have not their proper actions.

Besides. If effects be produced not by the act of creatures but only by the act of God, the power of a created cause cannot possibly be indicated by its effect: since the effect is no indication of the cause's power, except by reason of the action which proceeds from the power and terminates in the effect. Now the nature of a cause is not known from its effect except in so far as this is an indication of its power which results from its nature. Consequently if creatures exercise no action in producing effects, it will follow that the nature of a creature can never be known from its effect: so that all knowledge of physical science would be denied us, for it is there that arguments from effects are chiefly employed.

Further. By induction it can be proved that *like produces like*.[1] Now, that which is produced in lower things is not a mere form, but a composite of matter and form: because every generation is movement out of something, namely matter, and to something, namely form. Therefore the producer must be not a mere form, but composed of matter and form. Therefore the cause of forms which exist in matter is not the separate species of things, as the Platonists

[1] 1. *De Gener. et Corr.* vii.

maintained, nor the active intellect, as Avicenna said, but an individual composed of matter and form.

Again. If action is consequent to being actual,[1] it is unreasonable that the more perfect act be deprived of action. Now the substantial form is a more perfect act than the accidental. Consequently if the accidental forms in corporeal things have their proper actions,[2] much more has the substantial form an operation proper to it. But this action does not consist in disposing matter, because this is effected by alteration, for which accidental forms suffice. Therefore the form of the generator is the principle of the action whereby the substantial form is introduced into the thing generated. The arguments they adduce are easily solved.

For since a thing is made that it may be, just as a form is called a being, not as though itself had being, but because by it the composite is; so neither is the form made, properly speaking, but it begins to be through the composite being brought from potentiality to the act which is the form.

Nor is it necessary that whatever has a form by way of participation, receive it from that which is a form essentially; for it may receive it immediately from something having a like form in a like manner, namely by participation, and acting by virtue of the separate form, if there be any such; and thus like agent produces like effect.

Nor does it follow, because every action of inferior bodies is effected through active or passive qualities, which are accidents, that nothing, save accidents, results from those actions: because even as those accidental forms are caused by the substantial form, which together with matter is the cause of the proper accidents, so do they act by virtue of the substantial form. Now that which acts by virtue of another produces an effect like not only to itself, but also, and more, to that by virtue of which it acts: thus the action of the instrument reproduces in the work done the likeness of the art: so that the action of accidental forms produces substantial forms, inasmuch as they act instrumentally by

[1] See above, *Besides. He who . . .*, p. 168.
[2] See above, *Avicenna maintained . . .*, p. 166.

virtue of substantial forms. As to animals generated from putrefaction, the substantial form is caused in them through the agency of a body, the heavenly body, to wit, that is the first principle of alteration; consequently in this lower sphere whatever acts dispositively to a form, must act by virtue of that body: so that the virtue of the heavenly body suffices without an univocal agent, for the production of certain imperfect forms; whereas for the production of more perfect forms, such as the souls of the higher animals, an univocal agent is required besides the celestial agent: for such animals are not produced otherwise than by seed: hence Aristotle says[1] that *man and the sun generate man.*

Again, it is untrue that quantity is an obstacle to a form's activity except accidentally, namely in so far as all continuous quantity is in matter. Thus the form which exists in matter, through being less actual, has less active virtue: so that the body which has less matter and more form, fire, for instance, is more active.

But if we suppose the measure of action of which a form existing in matter is capable, then quantity favours an increase rather than a decrease of action: for the greater the fiery body, supposing the heat to be equally intense, the more heat does it give: and supposing an equally intense gravity, the greater a heavy body is, the more rapid will be its natural movement: and for the same reason the slower will its non-natural movement be. Accordingly the fact that heavy bodies are slower in their non-natural movements, through being of greater quantity, is no proof that quantity is an obstacle to action, but rather that it is a help to its increase.

Again it does not follow that all bodies are without action, because in the order of things, corporeal substance is of the lowest kind: since even among bodies one is higher, more formal and more active than another, as fire in comparison with lower bodies, and yet not even the lowest body is excluded from activity. For it is clear that a body cannot be wholly active, since it is composed of matter, which is

[1] 2 *Phys.* ii.

potential being, and form which is act. For a thing acts according as it is actual: wherefore every body acts in respect of its form, to which the other body, the patient to wit, is compared as regards its matter, as subject, inasmuch as its matter is in potentiality to the form of the agent. If, on the other hand, the matter of the active body be in potentiality to the form of the passive body, they will be mutually active and passive, as in the case of two elementary bodies: or else, one will be purely active and the other purely passive in relation to it, as the heavenly body compared to the elementary body. Accordingly a body acts on a subject not by reason of its entirety, but by reason of the form by which it works.

Nor is it true that bodies are furthest removed from God. For as God is pure act, things are more or less distant from Him according as they are more or less in act or potentiality. And that of all things is furthest distant from God, which is pure potentiality, namely primary matter, which is therefore purely passive and nowise active. On the other hand, bodies, being composed of matter and form, approach to a likeness to God, inasmuch as they have a form, which Aristotle (1 *Phys.* ix.) calls a divine thing: wherefore they act inasmuch as they have a form; and are passive, inasmuch as they have matter.

Again, it is absurd to say that a body is not active because accidents do not pass from one subject to another. For when we say that a hot body gives heat, we do not mean that the identical heat which is in the heater passes into the heated body: but that by virtue of the heat in the heater, another heat, individually distinct, becomes actual in the heated body, having been potentially therein before. Because the natural agent does not transmit its own form into another subject, but reduces the passive subject from potentiality to act. Consequently we do not deny creatures their proper actions, although we ascribe all the effects of creatures to God, as operating in all.

CHAPTER LXX

HOW THE SAME EFFECT IS FROM GOD AND FROM THE NATURAL AGENT

Some find it difficult to understand how natural effects are ascribed to God and to the activity of nature. For it would seem impossible that one action should proceed from two agents: hence if the action productive of a natural effect proceeds from a natural body, it does not proceed from God.

Again. If a thing can be done sufficiently by means of one, it is superfluous to do it by means of several: for we observe that nature does not employ two instruments where one suffices. Since, then, the divine power suffices to produce natural effects, it is superfluous to employ for the production of the same effects, the powers of nature also: or if the forces of nature suffice, it is superfluous for the divine power to work for the same effect.

Besides. If God produces the whole natural effect, nothing of the effect is left for the natural agent to produce. Therefore, seemingly, it is impossible that God produce the same effects as natural things.

However these arguments offer no difficulty if we mind what has been said already. For two things may be considered in every agent: namely the thing itself that acts, and the power whereby it acts: thus fire by its heat makes a thing hot. Now the power of the lower agent depends on the power of the higher agent, in so far as the higher agent gives the lower agent the power whereby it acts, or preserves that power, or applies it to action: thus the craftsman applies the instrument to its proper effect, although sometimes he does not give the instrument the form whereby it acts, nor preserves that form, but merely puts it into motion. Consequently the action of the lower agent must not only proceed from it through the latter's proper power, but also through the power of all the higher agents: for it acts by virtue of them all: and just as the lowest agent is found to be immediately active, so the power of the first agent is found to be immediate in the

production of the effect: because the power of the lowest agent does not of itself produce this effect, but by the power of the proximate higher agent, and this by the power of a yet higher agent, so that the power of the supreme agent is found to produce the effects of itself, as though it were the immediate cause, as may be seen in the principles of demonstration, the first of which is immediate. Accordingly just as it is not unreasonable that one action be produced by an agent and by the virtue of that agent, so is it not absurd that the same effect be produced by the inferior agent and by God, and by both immediately, though in a different way.

It is also evident that there is nothing superfluous if nature produce its proper effect and God produce it also, since nature does not produce it except by God's power.

Nor is it superfluous, if God can produce all natural effects by Himself, that they should be produced by certain other causes: because this is not owing to insufficiency of His power, but to the immensity of His goodness, wherefore it was His will to communicate His likeness to things not only in the point of their being but also in the point of their being causes of other things: for it is in these two ways that all creatures in common have the divine likeness bestowed on them, as we proved above.[1]—In this way too the beauty of order is made evident in creatures.

It is, also, clear that the same effect is ascribed to a natural cause and to God, not as though part were effected by God and part by the natural agent: but the whole effect proceeds from each, yet in different ways: just as the whole of the one same effect is ascribed to the instrument, and again the whole is ascribed to the principal agent.

CHAPTER LXXI

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE EVIL FROM THINGS

From the foregoing it is also clear that divine providence, which governs things, does not prevent corruption, defects

[1] Ch. xx., xxi.

and evil from being in the world. For the divine government whereby God works among things, does not exclude the operation of second causes, as we have already shown.[1] Now, a fault may occur in an effect through a fault in the secondary active cause, without there being any fault in the first agent: thus there may be a fault in the work of a craftsman who is perfect in his craft, on account of some defect in the instrument: even so, a man with strong motive power may limp, through no fault in the motive power, but because his leg is not straight. Accordingly in the things moved and governed by God, defect and evil may be found on account of defects in the secondary agents, although there is no defect in God.

Moreover. Perfect goodness would not be found in things, unless there were degrees of goodness, so that, to wit, there be some things better than others: else all the possible degrees of goodness would not be fulfilled, nor would any creature be found like to God in the point of being better than others. Moreover this would do away with the chief beauty in things if the order resulting from distinction and disparity were abolished; and what is more, the absence of inequality in goodness would involve the absence of multitude, since it is by reason of things differing from one another that one is better than another: for instance, the animate than the inanimate, and the rational than the irrational. Consequently if there were absolute equality among things there would be but one created good, which is clearly derogatory to the goodness of the creature. Now the higher degree of goodness is that a thing be good and unable to fail from goodness; and the lower degree is of that which can fail from goodness. Wherefore the perfection of the universe requires both degrees of goodness. Now it belongs to the providence of the governor to preserve and not to diminish perfection in the things governed. Therefore it does not belong to the providence of God entirely to exclude from things the possibility of failing from goodness. But evil results from this possibility: because that which

[1] Ch. lxx.

can fail, at times does fail; and this very deficiency of the good is evil, as we have proved.[1] Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to ward off evil entirely from things.

Again. In every government the best thing is that provision be made for the things governed, according to their mode: for in this consists the justice of the régime. Consequently even as it would be contrary to the right notion of human rule, if the governor of a state were to forbid men to act according to their various duties,—except perhaps for the time being, on account of some particular urgency,—so would it be contrary to the notion of God's government, if He did not allow creatures to act in accordance with their respective natures. Now through creatures acting thus, corruption and evil result in things; since by reason of the contrariety and incompatibility that exist in things, one thing is corruptive of another. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to exclude evil from things altogether.

Besides. An agent cannot possibly produce an evil, except by reason of its intending some good, as we proved above.[2] Now it does not belong to the providence of one who is the cause of all good, to exclude from creatures all intention of any particular good: for thus many goods would be banished from the universe: thus if fire were deprived of the intention of producing its like, a consequence of which is this evil, namely the burning of combustible things; the good consisting in fire being generated and preserved in its species would be done away. Therefore it is not part of divine providence to exclude evil altogether from things.

Further. There are in the world many good things which would have no place unless there were evils: thus there would be no patience of the righteous, if there were no ill-will of the persecutors; nor would there be any place for vindictive justice, were there no crimes; even in the physical order there would be no generation of one thing, unless there were corruption of another. Consequently if evil were entirely excluded from the universe by divine providence, it would be necessary to lessen the great number of good

[1] Ch. vii. [2] Ch. iv.

things. This ought not to be, since good is more powerful in goodness, than evil is in malice, as was shown above.[1] Therefore evil should not be utterly excluded from things by divine providence.

Again. The good of the whole is of more account than the good of the part. Therefore it belongs to a prudent governor to overlook a lack of goodness in a part, that there may be an increase of goodness in the whole: thus the builder hides the foundation of a house underground, that the whole house may stand firm. Now if evil were taken away from certain parts of the universe, the perfection of the universe would be much diminished; since its beauty results from the ordered unity of good and evil things, seeing that evil arises from the lack of good, and yet certain goods are occasioned from those very evils through the providence of the governor, even as the silent pause gives sweetness to the chant. Therefore evil should not be excluded from things by divine providence.

Further. Other things, especially those of lower degree, are directed to man's good as their end. But if there were no evils in the world, man's good would be lessened considerably, both in his knowledge, and in his desire or love of the good. For his knowledge of the good is increased by comparison with evil, and through suffering evil his desire of doing good is kindled: thus the sick know best what a great good health is; and they, too, are more keen about it than those who have it. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to exclude evil from the world altogether.

Hence it is said (Isa. xlv. 7): *I make peace and create evil*: and (Amos iii. 6): *Shall there be evil in the city, which the Lord hath not done?*

Hereby we refute the error of those who through observing the presence of evil in the world, said that there is no God. Thus Boethius (I. *de Consol.*) introduces a philosopher who asks: *If there be a God, whence comes evil?* On the contrary, he should have argued: *If there is evil, there is a God.* For there would be no evil, if the order of good were removed,

[1] Ch xii.

the privation of which is evil: and there would be no such order, if there were no God.

Moreover by what has been laid down, an occasion of erring is removed from those who denied that divine providence extends to this corruptible world, because they observed that many evils occur in it. They said that incorruptible things alone are subject to God's providence, because no defects and no evils are to be found in them.

Also we remove an occasion of error from the Manicheans, who posited two first active principles, good and evil, as though evil could have no place in the providence of a good God.

Also the doubt is solved of some, namely whether evil deeds are from God. For since we proved[1] that every agent produces its action in so far as it acts by the power of God, and that therefore God is the cause of all effects and actions: and since again we proved[2] that evil and defect in things ruled by divine providence, result from the condition of the secondary causes, which may be themselves defective, it is evident that evil deeds, considered as defective, are not from God, but from their defective proximate causes: but in so far as they possess activity and entity, they must be from God: even as a limp is from the motive power, in so far as it has movement; but in so far as it has a defect, it is from the crookedness of the leg.

CHAPTER LXXII

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CONTINGENCY FROM THINGS

Just as divine providence does not altogether banish evil from the world, so neither does it exclude contingency, nor impose necessity on things.

For we have already proved[3] that the operation of providence, whereby God operates in the world, does not exclude

[1] Ch. lxvi. *seqq.* [2] *Ibid.* [3] Ch. lxix.

secondary causes, but is fulfilled by them inasmuch as they act by God's power. Now certain effects are said to be necessary or contingent, in relation to their proximate, not to their remote cause: thus for a plant to bear fruit is a contingent effect, on account of the proximate cause, which is the power of germination that can be hindered and fail, although a remote cause, namely the sun, is a cause that acts of necessity. Since, then, among proximate causes there are many that can fail, not all the effects subject to divine providence will be necessary, but many of them will be contingent.

Again. It belongs to divine providence that the possible degrees of being be fulfilled, as was made evident above.[1] Now being is divided into contingent and necessary: and this is a *per se* division of being. Therefore, if divine providence excluded all contingency, not all the degrees of being would be preserved.

Besides. The nearer things are to God the more they partake in a likeness to Him: and the further they are from Him the more they fail in their likeness to Him. Now those things that are nearest to God are altogether immovable; these are separate substances who approach nearest to a likeness to God who is utterly immovable; while those that are nearest to them and are immediately moved by those that are unchangeable, retain a certain degree of immobility in that they are always moved in the same way, for instance the heavenly bodies. Consequently those that come after the foregoing, and are moved by them, are further removed from the divine immobility, so that, to wit, they are not always moved in the same way: and in this the beauty of order is evident. But every necessary thing, as such, never varies. Therefore it would be incompatible with divine providence, to whom it belongs to establish and preserve order among things, if all things happened of necessity.

Moreover. That which is of necessity, is always. Now nothing corruptible is always. Wherefore if divine providence requires all things to be necessary, it would follow that nothing in the world is corruptible, and consequently nothing

[1] Ch. lxxi.

could be generated. Hence the whole range of things subject to generation and corruption would be withdrawn from the world: and this would be derogatory to the perfection of the universe.

Further. In every movement there is generation and corruption of a kind: since in a thing that is moved, something begins, and another ceases to be. Consequently if all generation and corruption were banished, through the withdrawal of all things contingent, as we have just proved, in consequence all movement and all movable things would be taken away.

Besides. If the power of a substance be weakened, or if it be hindered by a contrary agent, this argues some change in that power. Consequently if divine providence does not banish movement from things, it will prevent neither the weakening of their power nor the impediment arising from the resistance of another agent. Now it is because that power is sometimes weakened and hindered that nature does not work always in the same way, but sometimes fails in that which is competent to a thing according to its nature, so that natural effects do not follow of necessity. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to impose necessity on the things governed.

Moreover. In things that are duly ruled by providence, there should be nothing vain. Since therefore it is evident that some causes are contingent, seeing that they can be hindered from producing their effects, it is clearly inconsistent with providence that all things should occur of necessity. Therefore divine providence does not impose necessity on things, by excluding contingency from them altogether.

CHAPTER LXXIII

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE FREE WILL

WHEREFORE it is clear that providence does not exclude free will.

For the government of any prudent governor is directed to the perfection of the things governed, as regards its attainment, increase or preservation. Therefore whatever pertains to perfection is to be safeguarded by providence rather than what savours of imperfection and defect. Now in inanimate beings, the contingency of causes arises from imperfection and deficiency: because by their nature they are determined to one effect, which they always produce, unless there be an impediment due either to weakness of power, or some extrinsic agency, or indisposition of matter. For this reason natural causes are not indifferent to one or other result, but more often produce their effect in the same way, and seldom fail. On the other hand it is owing to the perfection of the will that it is a contingent cause, because its power is not confined to one effect, and it is in its power to produce this effect or that, so that it is indifferent to either. Therefore it belongs to divine providence to preserve the freedom of the will, more than contingency in natural causes.

Moreover. It belongs to divine providence to use things according to their mode. And the mode of a thing's action is in keeping with its form which is the principle of action. Now the form through which a voluntary agent acts is not determinate: because the will acts through a form apprehended by the intellect, since the apprehended good moves the will objectively; and the intellect has not one determinate form of the effect, but is of such a nature as to understand a multitude of forms; so that the will is able to produce manifold effects. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to exclude freedom of the will.

Again. The things governed are brought to a becoming

end by the government of providence: wherefore Gregory of Nyssa[1] says of divine providence that it is *God's will from which all existing things receive a fitting end.* Now the last end of every creature is to attain to God's likeness, as we proved above.[2] It would therefore be inconsistent with divine providence if any thing were deprived of that whereby it attains to a likeness to God. But the voluntary agent attains to God's likeness in that he acts freely: for we have proved that there is free will in God.[3] Therefore providence does not deprive the will of liberty.

Besides. Providence multiplies good things among the subjects of its government. Therefore any thing that would deprive things of many good things does not belong to providence. Now if the will were deprived of freedom, many good things would be done away: for no praise would be given to human virtue; since virtue would be of no account if man acted not freely: there would be no justice in rewarding or punishing, if man were not free in acting well or ill: and there would be no prudence in taking advice, which would be of no use if things occurred of necessity. Therefore it would be inconsistent with providence to deprive the will of liberty.

Hence it is said (Ecclus. xv. 14): *God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel*; and again (ibid., 18): *Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him.*

Hereby we refute the opinion of the Stoics who held that all things happen of necessity according to the order of infallible causes, which order the Greeks called εἱμαρμένη.

[1] Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.*, xliii.
[2] Ch. xix.
[3] Bk. I., ch. lxxxviii.

CHAPTER LXXIV

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CHANCE OR LUCK

It is also evident from what has been said that divine providence does not remove from the world chance and luck.

Chance and luck are said of things that happen seldom. If nothing happened seldom, all things would happen of necessity; because those things that happen more frequently than not, differ from necessary things in this alone, that they may possibly fail in a few instances. Now it would be inconsistent with divine providence if all things happened of necessity, as we proved above.[1] Therefore it would also be inconsistent with divine providence if there were no luck or chance in the world.

Again. It would be contrary to the nature of providence if things subject to providence were not to act for an end, since it is the part of providence to direct all things to their end: and again it would be contrary to the perfection of the universe, were there nothing corruptible, nor any defectible power, as we proved above.[2] Now it is owing to the fact that an agent acting for the sake of some end fails to attain that end, that certain things happen by chance. Therefore it would be contrary to the nature of providence, and to the perfection of the world, if nothing happened by chance.

Besides. The number and variety of causes result from the ordering of divine providence and disposition. Now given a diversity of causes, it must happen sometimes that one concurs with another, so that one is either hindered or assisted in producing its effect. Now chance occurrences are due to the concurrence of two or more causes, through some end which was not intended ensuing from the concurrence of some cause: for instance, the finding of his debtor by one who went to market to buy something, resulted from the debtor also going to market. Therefore it is not incom-

[1] Ch. lxxii. [2] Ch. lxxi., lxxii.

patible with divine providence that there be luck and chance in things.

Moreover. That which is not, cannot be the cause of any thing, wherefore a thing must stand in relation to being a cause, in the same way as to being. Wherefore the diversity of order in causes must be in keeping with diversity of order among things. Now it belongs to the perfection of things that not only there be some that are beings *per se*, but that there be also some *accidental* beings. Because things which have not their ultimate perfection in their substance, must needs acquire some perfection by means of accidents, which accidents will be all the more numerous, as the things themselves are more distant from God's simplicity. Now if a subject has many accidents it follows that it is a being accidentally: since subject and accident, or again two accidents in one subject, are one accidentally, for instance a *white man*, and a *musical white* thing. Therefore the perfection of the world requires that there should be also accidental causes. But that which results accidentally from a cause, is said to occur by chance or by luck. Therefore it is not inconsistent with providence that certain things happen by chance or luck.

Further. It belongs to the order of divine providence that there be order and degrees among causes. The higher a cause is above its effect, the greater its power, so that its causality extends to a greater number of things. But the intention of a natural cause never extends further than its power: for such an intention would be in vain. Consequently the intention of an individual cause cannot possibly extend to all possible contingencies. Now it is through things happening beside the intention of the agent that things occur by chance or luck. Therefore the order of divine providence requires the presence of luck and chance in the world.

Hence it is said (Eccles. ix. 11): *I saw that . . . the race is not to the swift, etc., but time and chance in all*, namely here below.

CHAPTER LXXV

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CONCERNED WITH SINGULAR CONTINGENCIES

From what we have proved it is evident that divine providence reaches to each individual among things subject to generation and corruption.

For apparently the only reason for excluding such things from providence would be their contingent nature, and the fact that many of them are chance or lucky occurrences: since in this alone do they differ from incorruptibles and from the universals of corruptible things, with which it is said that providence is concerned. Now providence is not inconsistent with contingency, chance and luck, as neither is it with voluntary action, as we have proved.[1] There is no reason therefore why providence should not be about such things, even as it is about incorruptibles and universals.

Besides. If God's providence does not extend to these singular things, this is either because He knows them not, or because He is unable or unwilling to care for them. But it cannot be said that God does not know singulars, since we have proved that He has knowledge of them.[2] Nor can it be said that God is unable to care for them, since His power is infinite, as we proved above:[3] nor that these singulars are incapable of being governed; since we see them to be governed by the purposeful activity of reason, as evidenced in man, or by natural instinct, as evidenced in bees and many dumb animals, which are governed by a kind of natural instinct. Nor can it be said that God is unwilling to govern them: since His will is the universal cause of all good: and the good of things governed consists chiefly in the order of government. Therefore it cannot be said that God has no care for these singulars.

Besides. Every secondary cause, by the mere fact of its being a cause, attains to a likeness to God, as was proved

[1] Ch. lxxiii. [2] Bk. I., ch. lxv. [3] Bk. II., ch. xxii.

above.[1] It is to be universally observed that things which are productive, have the care of the things they produce, thus animals naturally nourish their offspring. Therefore God has care of the things whereof He is the cause. Now He is the cause even of these singulars, as was proved above.[2] Therefore He has care of them.

Further. It was proved above[3] that God acts on created things, not from natural necessity, but by His will and intellect. Now things that are done by will and intellect are subject to providence, which apparently consists in ruling things by the intellect. Consequently the things done by God are subject to His providence. But it has been proved[4] that God works in all second causes, and that all effects of things are to be referred to God as their cause: so that whatever is done in these individuals is His own work. Consequently these individual things, their movements and operations, are subject to divine providence.

Again. A man's providence is foolish if he cares not for those things without which the things he cares for cannot be. Now it is clear that if all individuals ceased to exist, their universals would likewise cease. Wherefore if God cares only for universals, and neglects these individuals altogether, His providence will be foolish and imperfect.—If, however, someone say that God cares for these individuals so far as to preserve them in existence, but no further; this is quite impossible: since whatever else happens in regard to individuals concerns their preservation or corruption. Consequently, if God cares for individuals as to their preservation, he cares also for whatever happens to them.—Yet someone might say that the mere care of universals suffices for the preservation of individuals in existence; since each species is provided with the means of self-preservation for each individual of that species: thus animals were given organs for taking and digesting food, and horns for self-protection: and the use of these organs does not fail except in the minority, since that which is of nature produces its

[1] Ch. xxi.
[2] Bk. II., ch. xv.
[3] Bk. I., ch. xxiii., xxiv.
[4] Ch. lxvii.

effect either always or more frequently; so that all the individuals could not cease to exist, although some might. But, according to this way of reasoning, whatever happens to individuals will be subject to providence, even as their preservation in being: because nothing can happen to the individual member of a species, that cannot in some way be referred to the principles of that species. Accordingly individuals are not subject to divine providence as to their preservation in existence, more than in other matters.

Moreover. The order of things in relation to the end is such that accidents are for the sake of substances, in order that the latter may be perfected by them. And in substances matter is for the sake of the form; since it is through the form that matter has a participation in the divine goodness, for the sake of which all things were made, as we proved above.[1] Hence it is evident that the individual is for the sake of the universal nature: in sign of which where the universal nature can be preserved in one individual, there are not many individuals of one species, as exemplified in the moon and sun. Now since providence has the ordering of things to their end, it follows that to providence belong both the ends and things directed to the end. Therefore not only universals but also individuals are subject to divine providence.

Again. The difference between speculative and practical knowledge is that speculative knowledge and things connected with it are perfected in the universal, whereas things pertaining to practical knowledge are perfected in the particular: because the end of speculative knowledge is truth which consists first and of its very nature in immaterial and universal things: whereas the end of practical knowledge is operation which is about individual things: hence the physician does not heal a man in general, but this particular man, and the whole of medical science is directed to this. Now it is clear that providence belongs to practical knowledge, since it directs things to their end. Therefore God's

[1] Ch. xvii.

providence would be imperfect, if it extended no further than universals and reached not the individual.

Besides. Speculative knowledge is perfected in the universal rather than in the particular, because universals are known better than individuals: wherefore the knowledge of the most universal principles is common to all. Yet the more perfect in speculative knowledge is he who possesses not only universal but also proper knowledge of things; since he who knows a thing merely in general, knows it only potentially: for which reason the disciple is led from the general knowledge of principles to the proper knowledge of conclusions, by the master who is possessed of both knowledges, just as a thing is brought from potentiality to act by that which is in act. A fortiori therefore the more perfect in practical knowledge is he who directs things to act not only in general but also in particular. Consequently divine providence, being supremely perfect, extends to individuals.

Moreover. Since God is the cause of being as such, as we proved above,[1] it follows that His providence must care for being as such; since He governs things inasmuch as He is their cause. Therefore whatever exists, no matter in what way it exists, is subject to His providence. Now individuals are beings, and more so than universals: because universals do not exist by themselves, but only in individuals. Therefore divine providence is concerned about individuals also.

Further. Creatures are subject to divine providence, as being directed thereby to their end, which is the divine goodness. Therefore participation in the divine goodness by creatures is the work of divine providence. But even contingent singulars participate in the divine goodness. Therefore divine providence must extend to them also.

Hence it is said (Matth. x. 29): *Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing: and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father,* etc., and (Wis. viii. 1): *She reacheth . . . from end to end mightily,* that is from the highest

[1] Bk. II., ch. xv.

creatures to the lowest. Moreover (Ezech. ix. 9) the opinion is refuted of some who said: *The Lord hath forsaken the earth, and the Lord seeth not,* and (Job xxii. 14) of those who asserted: *He doth not consider our things, and He walketh about the poles of heaven.*

Hereby is refuted the opinion of some who maintained that divine providence does not extend to these individual things: an opinion ascribed by some to Aristotle, although it cannot be gathered from his words.

CHAPTER LXXVI

THAT GOD'S PROVIDENCE CARES FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS IMMEDIATELY

Now some have granted that divine providence reaches these individual things, but through certain intermediary causes. For Plato, according to Gregory of Nyssa,[1] posited a threefold providence. The first is that of the supreme god, who cares first and foremost for his own, i.e. spiritual and intellectual beings, and consequently for the whole world, as regards genera, species, and the universal causes, i.e. the heavenly bodies. The second consists in the care of individual animals and plants and other things subject to generation and corruption, in the matter of their generation, corruption and other changes. This providence Plato ascribed to the gods who wander about heaven; while Aristotle[2] ascribes the causality of such things to the oblique circle. The third providence he places over things concerning human life: and he ascribes it to certain demons who dwell in the neighbourhood of the earth and, according to him, are in charge of human actions. Yet, according to Plato, the second and third providence depend on the first, because *the supreme god appointed those of the second and third class as governors.*

This opinion accords with the Catholic Faith, in so far as it refers universal providence to God as its first author.

[1] *De Hom.* viii. [2] 2 *De Gener. et Corrup.* x.

But it would seem contrary to the Faith in that it denies that every individual thing is immediately subject to divine providence. This may be proved from what has been already laid down.

For God has immediate knowledge of individuals, as knowing them not merely in their causes, but also in themselves, as we proved in the First Book.[1] Now it would seem unreasonable if, knowing individuals, He did not desire their order, wherein the chief good of things consists, since His will is the source of all goodness. Consequently even as He knows individuals immediately, so does He establish order among them immediately.

Again. The order established by providence in the things governed, is derived from the order conceived in the mind of the governor: even as the art-form that is produced in matter is derived from that which is in the mind of the craftsman. Now where there are several in charge, one subordinate to another, the higher must deliver to the inferior the order he has conceived, just as a subordinate art receives its principles from the higher. Accordingly supposing the governors of the second and third rank to be under the chief governor who is the supreme God, it follows that they must receive from the supreme God the order to be established among things. But this order cannot be more perfect in them than in the supreme God: in fact all perfections proceed from Him into other things in descending order, as we proved above.[2] And the order of things must be in the governors of the second rank, not only in general, but also as to the individual: else they would be unable to establish order in individuals by their providence. Much more therefore is the order of individuals under the control of divine providence.

Besides. In things ruled by human providence it is to be observed that someone is placed at the head, who has charge of general matters of great importance, and by himself devises what arrangements to make with regard to them: while he himself does not trouble about the order

[1] I., ch. lxv. *seqq.* [2] Bk. I., ch. xxxviii.

of minor affairs, but leaves this to others lower than himself. And this is owing to a defect on his part, inasmuch as he ignores the conditions of particular matters of less importance, or is himself incompetent to decide the order of every thing, on account of the labour and delay required for the purpose. But such defects are far removed from God: for He knows all individual things, nor does He require labour or time in order to understand them; since by understanding Himself, He knows all other things, as we proved above.[1] Therefore He Himself devises the order of all individuals: and His providence is concerned about all individuals immediately.

Moreover. In human affairs the inferior officials by their own skill devise the ordering of the things subjected to their government by the chief governor: which skill they do not receive from the chief, nor its use: for if they received it from the chief, the ordering would be done by the superior, and they would no longer be devisers of this ordering but executors. Now, from what has been said[2] it is clear that all wisdom and understanding is caused in every intellect by the supreme God: nor can any intellect understand except by God's power, even as neither does any agent act except in so far as it acts by God's power. Therefore God Himself cares for all things immediately by His providence: and whoever is said to govern under Him, is the executor of His providence.

Further. The higher providence gives rules to the lower providence: even as the politician gives rules and laws to the commander in chief; who gives rules and laws to the captains and generals. Consequently if there be other providences subordinate to the highest providence of the supreme God: it follows that God gives the second and third governors the rules of their office. Either, therefore, He gives general rules and laws or particular.—If He gives them general rules, since general rules are not always applicable to particular cases, especially in matters that are subject to movement and change, it would be necessary for these

[1] Bk. II., ch. xlvi. [2] Bk. I., ch. xi.; Bk. III., ch. lxvii.

governors of the second or third rank to go beyond the rules given them in deciding about matters confided to their care. Consequently they would exercise judgement on the rules given to them, as to when to act according to them, and when it would be necessary to disregard them: which is impossible, because such a judgement belongs to the superior, since the interpretation of laws and dispensation from their observance belong to Him who made the law. Accordingly judgement concerning general rules that have been given must be pronounced by the governor in chief: and this would not be possible unless he concerned himself immediately with the ordering of individuals. Therefore, on this supposition, he should be the immediate governor of such things.—If, on the other hand, the governors of the second or third rank receive particular rules and laws from the supreme governor, it is clear that then the ordering of these individual matters comes immediately from divine providence.

Moreover. The higher governor always has the right to judge of the arrangements made by the lower governors, whether they be fitting or not. Consequently if the second or third governors are subordinate to God the chief governor: it follows that God judges of the arrangements made by them: which would be impossible if God considered not the ordering of these individual matters. Therefore He personally cares for individuals by Himself.

Again. If God does not care for these lower individuals immediately by Himself; this is either because He despises them or, as some say, lest His dignity should be besmirched by them. But this is unreasonable. For there is more dignity in providing for and planning the ordering of things, than operating in them. Consequently if God works in all things, as was proved above,[1] and this far from being derogatory to His dignity, on the contrary, belongs to His all pervading and supreme power, it is nowise contemptible in Him, nor does it besmirch His dignity, if His providence extends to these individual things immediately.

[1] Ch. lxvii.

Further. Every wise man who uses his power providently, moderates that use in his actions, by directing the purpose and extent of that use: else his power would not be obsequious to his wisdom. Now it is clear from what has been said that divine providence, in its operations, extends to the lowest things. Consequently divine providence directs which and how many effects are to result from its power, and how they are to result therefrom, even in the very lowest of things. Therefore God Himself by His providence, immediately plans the ordering of all things.

Hence it is said (Rom. xiii. 1): *Those that are, are ordained of God,* and (Judith ix. 4): *Thou hast done the things of old, and hast devised one thing after another, and what thou hast designed hath been done.*

CHAPTER LXXVII

THAT THE EXECUTION OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CARRIED OUT BY SECONDARY CAUSES

It must be observed that two things are required for providence, the order and the execution of the order. The first is the work of the cognitive power, wherefore those that are more perfect in knowledge, are said to order others: for it belongs to the wise man to order. The second is the work of the operative power. Now these two are in inverse proportion to each other. For the ordering is the more perfect according as it extends to the smallest things: whereas the execution of the least things belongs to the lower power proportionate to the effect. In God we find the highest perfection as to both: since in Him is the most perfect wisdom in ordering, and the most perfect power for operation. Consequently, He it is who by His wisdom disposes all things even the very least in their order; and who executes the least or lowest things by means of other inferior powers, through which He operates, as a universal and higher power through an inferior and particular power.

It is fitting therefore that there should be inferior active powers to execute divine providence.

Again. It was proved above[1] that the divine operation does not exclude the operations of secondary causes. And whatever is effected by the operations of secondary causes, is subject to divine providence, since God directs all individual things by Himself, as was proved above.[2] Therefore secondary causes execute divine providence.

Besides. The stronger the power of an agent, the further does its operation extend: thus the greater the fire, the more distant things does it heat. But this is not the case with an agent that does not act through an intermediary, because everything on which it acts is close to it. Since then the power of divine providence is supreme, it must bring its operation to bear on the most distant things through certain intermediaries.

Further. It belongs to the dignity of a ruler to have many ministers and various executors of his rule: because the greater the number of his subordinates of various degrees, the more complete and extensive is his dominion shown to be. But no government can compare with the divine in point of dignity. Therefore it is fitting that the execution of divine providence be committed to agents of various degrees.

Moreover. Suitable order is a proof of perfect providence, for order is the proper effect of providence. Now suitable order implies that nothing be allowed to be out of order. Consequently the perfection of divine providence requires that it should reduce the excess of certain things over others, to a suitable order. And this is done by allowing those who have less to benefit from the superabundance of others. Since then the perfection of the universe requires that some share more abundantly in the divine goodness, as we proved above,[3] the perfection of divine providence demands that the execution of the divine government be fulfilled by those things which have the larger share of divine goodness.

Again. The order of causes excels the order of effects

[1] Ch. lxix. [2] Ch. lxxvi. [3] Bk. II., ch. xlv.

even as the cause excels the effect: consequently it is a greater proof of the perfection of providence. Now if there were no intermediary causes to execute divine providence, there would be no order of causes in the world, but of effects only. Therefore the perfection of divine providence requires intermediary causes for its fulfilment. Hence it is written (Ps. cii. 21): *Bless the Lord, all ye His hosts: you ministers of His who do His will;* and (Ps. cxlviii. 8): *Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfil His word.*

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THAT BY MEANS OF INTELLECTUAL CREATURES OTHER CREATURES ARE RULED BY GOD

SINCE it belongs to divine providence that order be preserved in the world; and suitable order consists in a proportionate descent from the highest to the lowest, it is meet that divine providence should reach the most distant things according to a certain proportion. This proportion consists in this,—that just as the highest creatures are subject to God and governed by Him, so the lower creatures are subject to and governed by the higher. Now of all creatures the highest is the intellectual, as was proved above.[1] Therefore the very nature of divine providence demands that the remaining creatures be ruled by rational creatures.

Again. Whatever creature executes the order of divine providence, does so in so far as it has a share of the power of the supreme providence: even as the instrument has no movement except in so far as through being moved it has a share in the power of the principal agent. Accordingly those things which have the larger share of the power of divine providence, are the executors of divine providence in regard to those whose share is smaller. Now intellectual creatures have a greater share thereof than others: because, while providence requires disposition of order which is effected

[1] Bk. II., ch. xlvi.

by the cognitive faculty, and execution which is the work of the operative power, rational creatures have a share of both powers, whereas other creatures have only the latter. Therefore all other creatures are ruled, under divine providence, by rational creatures.

Moreover. To whomsoever God gives a power: it is given in relation to the effect of that power: for then are all things disposed of in the best way, when each one is directed to all the goods that it has a natural aptitude to produce. Now the intellective power by its very nature is a directive and governing faculty: hence we see that when they are united in the one subject, the operative power follows the ruling of the intellective power: as in man the limb moves at the will's command. The same may be seen also, if they be in different subjects: since those men who excel in the operative power, need to be directed by those who excel in the intellective faculty. Therefore the nature of divine providence requires that other creatures be ruled by intellectual creatures.

Again. Particular powers are naturally adapted to be moved by universal powers, as may be seen both in art and in nature. Now it is evident that the intellective power is more universal than any other operative power: because it contains universal forms, whereas all operative powers proceed only from a form proper to the operator. Therefore all other creatures must needs be moved and ruled by intellectual powers.

Moreover. In all ordered powers, that one is directive of another, which has the better knowledge about the plan to be followed: thus we may observe in the arts, that the art which is concerned with the end, whence is taken the entire scheme of the work to be produced, directs and governs the art that is immediately productive of that work: for instance the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding; and the art which gives the form, governs the art which prepares the material: whereas the instruments, through having no knowledge of the scheme, are governed only. Since then intellectual creatures alone are able to know the

scheme of the ordering of creatures, it belongs to them to rule and govern all other creatures.

Further. That which is *per se*, is the cause of that which is by another. Now intellectual creatures alone operate *per se*, since they are masters of their own actions through having free will: whereas other creatures operate through natural necessity, as being moved by another. Therefore intellectual creatures by their operations move and rule other creatures.

CHAPTER LXXIX

THAT THE LOWER INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE RULED BY THE HIGHER

FORASMUCH as some intellectual creatures are higher than others, as we have shown;[1] the lower intellectual nature must needs be governed by the higher.

Again. The more universal powers move the particular powers, as already stated.[2] And the higher intellectual natures have more universal forms, as we have proved.[3] Therefore they rule the lower intellectual natures.

Besides. The intellective faculty that is nearer to the principle is always found to be the ruler of the intellectual faculty that is more distant from the principle: this is evident both in speculative and in practical science. For the speculative science that receives its principles of demonstration from another, is said to be subalternate to it, and the practical science that is nearer to the end, *which is the principle in practical matters*,[4] is the master science in comparison with the more distant. Since then some intellectual substances are nearer to the first principle, namely God, as we have shown,[5] they will be the rulers of the others.

Moreover. The higher intellectual substances receive the influence of divine wisdom more perfectly, since each one receives something according to its mode. Now all things

[1] Bk. II., ch. xci., xcv.
[2] Ch. cxxviii.
[3] Bk. II., ch. xcviii.
[4] 7 Eth. iii.
[5] Bk. II., ch. xcv., lxxviii.

are governed by divine wisdom, so that those which have the greater share of divine wisdom, govern those which have the smaller share. Therefore the lower intellectual substances are governed by the higher.

Wherefore the higher spirits are called both *angels*, inasmuch as they direct the lower spirits, by message as it were, for angels are called messengers; and *ministers*, forasmuch as by their operation they execute, even in corporeal things, the order of divine providence: because a minister *is like an animate instrument* according to the Philosopher.[1] This is what is said (Ps. ciii. 4): *Who makest thy angels spirits: and thy ministers a burning fire.*

CHAPTER LXXX

OF THE ORDER BETWEEN ONE ANGEL AND ANOTHER

Since corporeal things are governed by spiritual, as we have proved,[2] and since there is order of a kind among corporeal things, it follows that the higher bodies are governed by the higher intellectual substances, and the lower bodies by the lower intellectual substances. And seeing that the higher a substance is, the more universal is its power; while the power of an intellectual substance is more universal than the power of a body; the higher intellectual substances have powers entirely independent of any corporeal power, and consequently they are not united to bodies; whereas the lower intellectual substances have powers confined to certain limits and dependent on certain corporeal organs for their exercise, and consequently they need to be united to bodies. And just as the higher intellectual substances have a more universal power, so too they receive from God more perfectly the divine disposal of things, in that they are acquainted with the scheme of order, even as regards individuals, through receiving it from God. This manifestation of the divine governance, made by God,

[1] 1 Pol. ii.

[2] Ch. lxxviii.

reaches to the uttermost intellectual substances: thus it is said (Job xxv. 3): *Is there any numbering of his soldiers? and upon whom shall not his light arise?* On the other hand the lower intelligences do not receive this manifestation so perfectly, as to be able to know thereby every detail of the order of divine providence left to their execution, but only in a general way: and the lower their position, the less detailed knowledge of the divine government do they receive through this first manifestation received from above; so much so that the human intellect, which is the lowest in point of natural knowledge, has a knowledge of only certain most general things. Accordingly the higher intellectual substances receive immediately from God the perfection of the knowledge in question; which perfection the other lower intellectual substances need to receive through them: just as we have said above[1] that the general knowledge of the disciple is brought to perfection by means of the specific knowledge of the master. Hence it is that Dionysius speaking of the highest intellectual substances which he assigns to the first *hierarchy* or *holy sovereignty*, says that *they are not sanctified by means of other substances, but that they are placed by God Himself immediately around Him, and as far as possible close to His immaterial and incomprehensible beauty on which they gaze, and in which they contemplate the intelligible concept of His works*: and by these, he says, *the inferior ranks of heavenly substances are instructed*.[2]

Accordingly the higher intelligences receive their perfection from a higher source of knowledge. Now in every disposition of providence, the order of effects is derived from the form of agents: since the effect must needs proceed from its cause in some kind of likeness. Now it is for the sake of an end that the cause communicates the likeness of its form to the effect. Hence the first principle in the dispositions of providence is the end; the second is the form of the agent; the third is the appointment of the order of effects. Consequently in the order of the intellect the highest degree is the consideration of the idea of order, *in the end;* the second

[1] Ch. lxxv. [2] *Cœl. Hier.* vii.

degree is the same consideration, *in the form;* while the third is the knowledge of the disposition of order *in itself* and not in a higher principle. Wherefore the art which considers the end governs the art which considers the form, as the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding. And the art which considers the form governs the art which considers only the order of movements which prepare the way for the form, as the art of shipbuilding governs the handiwork of the builders.

Accordingly there is a certain order among the intelligences who take from God Himself immediate and perfect cognizance of the order of divine providence. The first and highest perceive the ordered scheme of providence in the last end itself which is the divine goodness, some of them, however, clearer than others; and these are called *Seraphim*, i.e. *fiery* or *setting on fire*, because fire is used to designate intensity of love or desire, which are about the end. Hence Dionysius says that this name indicates both their *fervent and quivering activity towards God, and their leading lower things to God as their end.*[1]

The second place belongs to those who acquire perfect knowledge of the scheme of providence in the divine form: and these are called *Cherubim* which signifies *fulness of knowledge:* for knowledge is made complete through the form of the thing known. Wherefore Dionysius says that *their name indicates that they contemplate the highest operative power of the divine beauty.*[2]

The third grade is of those who contemplate the disposition of divine judgements in itself: and they are called *Thrones:* because the throne is significative of judicial power, according to Ps. ix. 5: *Thou hast sat on the throne, who judgest justice.* Hence Dionysius says that this name signifies that they are *God-bearers and adapted for the obedient fulfilment of all divine undertakings.*[3]

What has been said must however be understood, not as though the divine goodness, essence, and knowledge of the disposition of things were three distinct things, but in

[1] *Cæl. Hier.* vii. [2] *Loc. cit.* [3] *Loc. cit*

the sense that according to what we have been saying we may look at the matter in question from different points of view.

Again, there must be order among even the lower spirits who receive from the higher spirits perfect knowledge of the divine order to be fulfilled by them. Because the higher ones are also more universal in their power of understanding; so that they acquire their knowledge of the order of providence from more universal principles and causes, but those beneath them, from more particular causes: for a man who could consider the entire physical order in the heavenly bodies, would be of a higher intelligence than one who needed to turn his mind to lower things in order to perfect his knowledge. Accordingly those who are able to know perfectly the order of providence from the universal causes which stand midway between God, the supremely universal cause, and particular causes, are themselves between those who are able to consider the aforesaid order in God Himself, and those who need to consider it in particular causes. Dionysius assigns these to the middle hierarchy which, as it is governed by the highest, so, says he, does it govern the lowest.[1]

Again, among these intellectual substances also there must be some kind of order: since the universal disposition of providence is divided, first, among many executors: which belongs to the order of *Dominations:* because to command what others execute belongs to one having dominion. Hence Dionysius says[2] that domination signifies a *certain liberty free from servile condition and any subjection.* Secondly, it is distributed by the operator and executor in reference to many effects. This is done by the order of *Virtues* whose name, as Dionysius says in the same passage, designates *a certain strength and virility in carrying out the divine operations, without so much as swerving, through weakness, from the divine movement.* Hence it is evident that the principle of universal operation belongs to this order: so that apparently the movement of the heavenly bodies belongs to this order also, from which as from universal

[1] *Cœl. Hier.* viii. [2] *Ibid.*, viii

causes particular effects ensue in nature: wherefore they are called *powers of heaven* (Lk. xxi. 26), where it is said: *The powers of heaven shall be moved.* To the same spirits apparently belongs the execution of those divine works which are done outside the order of nature; for these are the highest of God's ministries: for which reason Gregory says[1] that the *Virtues are those spirits through whom miracles are frequently wrought.* And if there be anything else of a universal and prominent nature in the fulfilment of the divine ministry, it is fittingly ascribed to this order. Thirdly, the universal order of providence, once established in its effects, is guarded from confusion, by curbing the things which might disturb that order. This belongs to the order of *Powers.* Wherefore Dionysius says in the same place that the name *Powers* implies *a well-established order, without confusion, in the divine undertakings:* and so Gregory says[2] that it belongs to this order *to check contrary powers.*

The lowest of superior intellectual substances are those who receive the knowledge of the order of divine providence in relation to particular causes: these are placed in immediate authority over human affairs. Of them Dionysius says:[3] *This third rank of spirits presides, in consequence, over the human hierarchy.* By human affairs we must understand all lower natures and particular causes, that are subordinated to man and serve for his use, as we have already explained.[4] Among these also there is a certain order. For in human affairs there is a common good, namely the good of the city or of the nation,[5] and this apparently belongs to the order of *Principalities.* Hence Dionysius says in the same chapter that the name *Principality* indicates *leadership in a sacred order.* Hence (Dan. x. 12-20) mention is made of *Michael the Prince of the Jews, of a Prince of the Persians, and of a Prince of the Greeks.* And thus the government of kingdoms and the change of supremacy from one nation to another, must belong to the ministry of this order. It would also

[1] *Hom.* xxxiv. *in Ev.* [2] *Loc. cit.* [3] *Loc. cit.* ix.
[4] Ch. lxxi. *Further. Other things* ... ., p. 177.
[5] 1 *Ethic.* ii.

seem part of their office to instruct those men who are in positions of authority, in matters pertaining to the administration of their office.

There is also a human good, not common to many, but belonging to an individual by himself, yet useful not to one only, but to many: for instance those things which all and each one must believe and observe, such as the articles of faith, the divine worship, and the like. This belongs to the *Archangels* of whom Gregory says[1] that *they announce the greater things:* thus we call Gabriel an *Archangel*, because he announced the Incarnation of the Word to the Virgin, which is an article of faith for all.

There is also a human good that belongs to each one singly. This pertains to the order of *Angels* of whom Gregory says that they *announce minor matters*. Hence they are called *guardian angels* according to Ps. xc. 11: *He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways*. Wherefore Dionysius says[2] that the Archangels are between the Principalities and Angels, because they have something in common with both: with the Principalities *inasmuch as they lead the lower angels*, and rightly so, because in human affairs matters of restricted interest must be regulated according to those that are of common interest: and with the Angels, because *they announce to the Angels, and through the Angels, to us*, for it is the duty of the latter to announce to men *what concerns each individual*. For this reason the lowest order has received as proper, the name common to all: because, to wit, its duty is to announce to us immediately. And so the name Archangel is as it were composed of both, since Archangel means a *Principal Angel*.

Gregory assigns the ordering of the heavenly spirits differently:[3] for he places the Principalities among the spirits of the second rank, immediately after the Dominations: and the Virtues among the lowest, above the Archangels. But to one who considers the matter carefully, the difference is but small. For, according to Gregory, the

[1] *Loc. cit.* [2] *Loc. cit.* ix.
[3] *Hom.* xxxiv. *in Ev.*

Principalities are not placed over nations but *over good spirits*, as holding the principal place in the execution of the divine ministry: because, says he, *to be a principal is to stand in a higher place than others*. According to the explanation given above, we said that this belonged to the Virtues.—As to the Virtues, according to Gregory they are assigned to certain particular operations when, in some special case, outside the usual order of things, miracles have to be wrought. In this way they are fittingly numbered among the lowest angels.

Both explanations have the authority of the Apostle. For he says (Eph. i. 20, 21): *Setting Him*, namely Christ, *on his right hand in heavenly places, above all principality, and power, and virtue, and dominion*, where it is clear that in the ascending order he places the Powers above the Principalities, and the Virtues above these, and the Dominations above the last named. This is the order adopted by Dionysius. Whereas speaking of Christ to the Colossians (i. 16) he says: *Whether thrones or dominations or principalities or powers, all things were created by Him and in Him.* Here we see that beginning with the Thrones, in the descending order, he places the Dominations under them, beneath these the Principalities, and lower still the Powers. This is the order adopted by Gregory.

Mention is made of the Seraphim, Isa. vi. 2, 6; of the Cherubim, Ezech. i. 3; of the Archangels in the canonical epistle of Jude (9): *When Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil*, etc.; and of the Angels in the Psalms as already observed.

In all ordered powers there is this in common, that the lower all work by virtue of the higher. Hence what we have stated as belonging to the order of Seraphim, all the lower angels accomplish by virtue thereof: and the same applies to the other orders.

CHAPTER LXXXI

OF THE ORDERING OF MEN AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO OTHER THINGS

In comparison with other intellectual substances, the human soul holds the lowest place: because, as we have already stated,[1] when it is first created it receives knowledge of the order of divine providence only in a general way; whereas, in order to acquire perfect knowledge of that order in individual matters, it needs to start from these very things in which the order of divine providence is already established in detail. Consequently the human soul needs bodily organs, so as to be able to receive knowledge from things having bodies. And yet, on account of the weakness of its intellectual light, it is unable to acquire perfect knowledge of things that concern man, without the help of higher spirits, God so disposing that the lower spirits reach perfection through the higher, as we have already proved.[2] Since however man has some share of intellectual light, dumb animals which have none at all are subject to man, according to the order of divine providence. Hence it is said (Gen. i. 26): *Let us make man to our own image and likeness*, that is to say, inasmuch as he is an intelligent being, *and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts of the earth.*[3] Dumb animals, though bereft of intellect, yet, since they have some kind of knowledge, are placed by the order of divine providence above plants and other things devoid of knowledge. Hence it is said (Gen. i. 29-30): *Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat, and to all the beasts of the earth.*

Among those that are wholly bereft of knowledge, one thing is placed before another according as one is more

[1] Ch. lxxx. [2] Ch. lxxix.
[3] Vulg., *beasts, and the whole earth . . .*, etc.

capable of action than another. For they have no share in the disposition of providence, but only in the execution.

And since man has both intelligence, and sense, and bodily powers, these things are dependent on one another, according to the disposition of divine providence, in likeness to the order to be observed in the universe. For bodily power is subject to the powers of sense and intellect, as carrying out their commands; and the sensitive power is subject to the intellective, and is controlled by its rule.

In the same way, we find order among men. For those who excel in intelligence, are naturally rulers; whereas those who are less intelligent, but strong in body, seem made by nature for service, as Aristotle says in his *Politics*.[1] The statement of Solomon (Prov. xi. 29) is in agreement with this: *The fool shall serve the wise;* as also the words of Exodus (xviii. 21, 22): *Provide out of all the people wise*[2] *men such as fear God . . . who may judge the people at all times.*

And just as in the works of one man there is disorder through the intellect being obsequious to the sensual faculty; while the sensual faculty, through indisposition of the body, is drawn to the movement of the body, as instanced in those who limp: so too, in human government disorder results from a man being set in authority, not on account of his excelling in intelligence, but because he has usurped the government by bodily force, or has been appointed to rule through motives of sensual affection. Nor does Solomon omit to mention this disorder, for he says (Eccles. x. 5, 6): *There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, as it were by an error proceeding from the face of the prince; a fool set in high dignity.* Now divine providence does not exclude a disorder of this kind: for it results, by God's permission, from the fault of the inferior agents; even as we have said of other evils.[3] Nor is the natural order wholly perverted by such a disorder: for the government of fools is weak, unless it be strengthened by the counsels of the wise. Hence it is said (Prov. xx. 18): *Designs are strengthened by counsels: and wars are to be arranged by governments;* and (xxiv. 5, 6):

[1] I. ii. 13 *seqq.* [2] Vulg., *able.* [3] Ch. lxxi.

A wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant: because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety when there are many counsels. And since the counsellor rules him who receives his counsel, and, in a sense, governs him, it is said (Prov. xvii. 2) that *a wise servant shall rule over foolish sons.*

It is therefore evident that divine providence imposes order on all things, and thus the Apostle says truly (Rom. xiii. 1) that *the things which are of God are well ordered.*[1]

CHAPTER LXXXII

THAT THE INFERIOR BODIES ARE RULED BY GOD BY MEANS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES

JUST as in intellectual substances some are of higher and some of lower degree, so too are there in corporeal substances. Now intellectual substances are governed by higher substances, so that the disposition of divine providence may reach down proportionately to the lowest things, as we have already said.[2] Therefore in like manner bodies of lower degree are ruled by those of a higher.

Again. The higher a body is as regards its place, the more formal it is: hence it is reasonably the place of a lower body, because form contains even as place does; thus water is more formal than earth, air than water, fire than air. Now the heavenly bodies have a higher place than all others. Therefore they are more formal and consequently more active than all other bodies. Therefore they act on lower bodies: and consequently the latter are ruled by them.

Besides. That which in its nature is perfect without contrariety, is of more universal power than that which in its nature is not perfected without contrariety: because contrariety arises from differences which determine and contract the genus: wherefore in the conception of the intellect, forasmuch as it is universal, the species of contraries are not contrary to one another, since they coexist in the intellect.

[1] Vulg., *Those (powers) that are, are ordained of God.* St. Thomas invariably quotes this passage as rendered above.

[2] Ch. lxxviii. *seqq.*

Now the heavenly bodies are perfect in their respective natures without any contrariety: for they are neither light nor heavy, neither hot nor cold: whereas the inferior bodies are not perfect in their respective natures without any contrariety. This is proved by their movements: for there is no contrary to the circular movement of the heavenly bodies, so that there can be nothing violent in them: whereas there are movements contrary to that of the lower bodies; for instance, downward movement is contrary to upward movement. Therefore heavenly bodies have a more universal power than the inferior bodies. Now universal powers move particular powers, as we have proved.[1] Therefore the heavenly bodies move and govern lower bodies.

Moreover. We have shown[2] that all other things are ruled by intellectual substances. Now the heavenly bodies resemble the intellectual substances, more than other bodies do, forasmuch as they are incorruptible. Moreover they are nearer to them, inasmuch as they are moved by them immediately, as we have shown above.[3] Therefore the lower bodies are ruled by them.

Further. The first principle of movement must be something immovable. Consequently things that approach nearest to immobility, must be the movers of others. Now heavenly bodies approach nearer to the immobility of a first principle than do the inferior bodies: because they have but one species of movement, namely local: whereas other bodies have all manner of movements. Therefore the heavenly bodies move and rule the lower bodies.

Again. *In each genus the first is the cause of that which comes after.*[4] Now the heavenly movement is the first of all movements. First, because local movement precedes all others.—Both in point of time, because it alone can be everlasting, as is proved in 8 *Phys.* vii.—And naturally: because without it there could be no other: since a thing cannot be increased without a previous alteration, whereby that which was dissimilar is transformed and assimilated:

[1] Ch. lxxviii. [2] *Ibid.* [3] Ch. lxxx.; *cf.* Bk. II., ch. lxx.
[4] Aristotle, 2 *Metaph.* (Ed. Did. Iα., i.)

place, since in order that there be alteration, the cause of alteration must become nearer to the subject altered than it was before:—And in perfection: because local movement does not cause a thing to vary in respect of something inherent, but only in respect of something extrinsic; and for this reason belongs to a thing already perfect.—Secondly, because even among local movements, circular movement holds the first place.—Both in point of time: because it alone can be everlasting, as proved in 8 *Phys.* viii.—And naturally: because it excels in simplicity and unity, since it is not divided into beginning, middle and end, but is all middle, as it were.—And in perfection, because it returns to its principle.—Thirdly, because alone the heavenly movement is always regular and uniform; since in the movements of heavy and light bodies the speed increases towards the end if the movement be natural, and decreases if the movement be violent.—Therefore the movement of the heaven must be the cause of all other movements.

Further. As that which is simply immovable is in comparison with movement simply, so is that which is immovable in respect of a particular kind of movement, in comparison with that particular movement. Now that which is simply immovable is the principle of all movement, as we have proved.[1] Therefore that which is immovable in respect of alteration, is the principle of all alteration. Now of all things corporeal the heavenly bodies alone are inalterable: this is proved by their disposition which is always the same. Therefore the heavenly body is the cause of alteration in all things alterable. But in this lower world alteration is the principle of all movement: because alteration leads to increase and generation: and the generator is a *per se* mover in the local movement of heavy and light bodies. Consequently the heaven must be the cause of all movement in these lower bodies.

Therefore it is evident that the lower bodies are governed by God by means of the heavenly bodies.

[1] Bk. I., ch. xiii.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

CONCLUSION OF THE FOREGOING

FROM all that has been proved hitherto, we are able to conclude that as regards the design of the order to be imposed on things, God governs all things by Himself.[1] Wherefore Gregory commenting on Job xxxiv. 13, *What other hath He appointed over the earth?* says[2]: *He who created the world by Himself governs it by Himself*: and Boethius says (*De Consol.* iii. 12): *God rules all things by Himself alone.* As to the execution, however, He governs the lower by means of the higher things:—bodily things by means of spiritual things[3]: wherefore Gregory says (*Dial.* iv. 6): *In this visible world nothing can be ruled except by means of the invisible creature*:—the lower spirits by the higher:[4] wherefore Dionysius says[5] that *the intelligent heavenly substances first of all shed forth the divine enlightenment on themselves, and bestow on us those manifestations which surpass our capacity*:—and the lower bodies by the higher:[6] wherefore Dionysius says[7] that *the sun contributes to the generation of visible bodies, as also to life itself, by means of nourishment, growth and perfection, by cleansing and renewing them.*

Of all these together Augustine says (3 *De Trin.* iv.): *As the grosser and lower bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power: so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life, and the sinful rational spirit by the righteous rational spirit.*

[1] Ch. lxxvii. [2] *Moral.* xxiv. 20. [3] Ch. lxxviii.
[4] Ch. lxxix. [5] *Cœl. Hier.* iv. [6] Ch. lxxxii.
[7] *Div. Nom.* iv.

DATE DUE

DOMINICAN COLLEGE LIBRARY
v.3 Pt.1
Thomas/The Summa contra gentiles of Sain
3 3645 00048494 2

BX1749.T56 S8513 1923
v.3 Pt.1
Thomas, Aquinas, Saint,
1225?-1274.
The Summa contra gentiles of
Saint Thomas Aquinas

Dominican College Library
San Rafael, California